An analysis of institutional arrangements for providing animal health services : a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from Kenya and Uganda by Ilukor, John
  
University of Hohenheim 
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
Institute of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics 
Chair of Social and Institutional Change in Agricultural Development 
Prof. Dr. Regina Birner 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
PROVIDING ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICES: A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM KENYA 
AND UGANDA 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
“Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften” 
(Dr. sc. agr./Ph.D. in Agricultural Sciences) 
 
To the 
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
 
 
Presented by 
 
JOHN ILUKOR 
 
2014
 ii 
This thesis was accepted as a doctoral dissertation in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree “Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften” (Dr.sc.agr. / Ph.D. in Agricultural Sciences) by 
the faculty Agricultural Sciences of the University of Hohenheim on the 27.02.2014. 
 
Date of oral examination: 27.11.2014 
 
 
Examination Committee 
 
Supervisor and Reviewer:  Prof. Dr. Regina Birner 
Co-Reviewer:    Prof. Dr. Harald Grethe 
Additional Examiner:   Prof. Dr. Uta Dickhöfer 
Head of the Committee:  Prof. Dr. Rainer Mosenthin 
 
 
This research is the result of a scholarship from the Food Security Center (FSC) of 
Universität Hohenheim, which is part of the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) 
Program “Exceed”. It is also supported by DAAD and the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................iii 
DEDICATION ..................................................................................................................... vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... vii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................viii 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ...................................................................................................xiii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. xix 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ xx 
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 General background ............................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Specific objectives and research questions ......................................................... 5 
1.3 Overview of the study area ................................................................................. 6 
1.4 Research topics and questions ............................................................................. 7 
1.5 Thesis Outline ..................................................................................................... 9 
References .................................................................................................................. 9 
2 ADDRESSING GOVERANCE CHALLENGES IN THE PROVISION OF 
ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF TRANSACTION COST THEORY .................. 13 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 13 
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 14 
2.2 A Transaction Cost Framework for analyzing veterinary service delivery ...... 18 
2.2.1 A review of analytical frameworks .................................................... 18 
2.2.2 The transaction cost framework: An illustration ................................ 20 
2.3 A transaction cost framework: insights from the literature of animal health 
delivery in developing countries ....................................................................... 24 
2.3.1 Externalities ........................................................................................ 25 
2.3.2 Free rider problem .............................................................................. 26 
2.3.3 Transaction intensity .......................................................................... 26 
2.3.4 Care intensity ...................................................................................... 27 
2.3.5 Service measurability ......................................................................... 28 
2.3.6 Scope of corruption (state capacity) ................................................... 30 
2.3.7 Community attributes or community capacity ................................... 31 
2.4 Empirical Analyses ........................................................................................... 33 
Table of Contents 
iv 
2.4.1 Measurements ..................................................................................... 34 
2.4.2 The model ........................................................................................... 36 
2.5 Results ............................................................................................................... 39 
2.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 43 
2.7 References ......................................................................................................... 44 
3 THE PROVISION OF VETERINARY SERVICES: WHO ARE THE 
INFLUENTIAL ACTORS AND WHAT ARE THE GOVERNANCE 
CHALLENGES? A CASE STUDY OF UGANDA ..................................................... 51 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 51 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 52 
3.2 Materials and Methods ...................................................................................... 54 
3.3 Results ............................................................................................................... 57 
3.3.1      Actors involved in the treatment of endemic diseases ........................ 57 
3.3.2      Challenges to treatment of endemic diseases ...................................... 62 
3.3.3      The actors involved in the treatment and control of epidemic diseases ..  
                                                                                                                           64 
3.3.4        Problems in treatment and control of epidemic diseases .......................... 68 
3.4 Synthesis, Discussion and policy recommendations ......................................... 72 
3.4.1 Synthesis ............................................................................................. 72 
3.4.2 Discussion and Policy options ............................................................ 74 
3.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 76 
3.6 References ......................................................................................................... 76 
4 DETERMINANTS OF REFERRALS FROM PARAPROFESSIONALS TO 
VERTERINARIANS IN UGANDA AND KENYA .................................................... 80 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 80 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 81 
4.2 Materials and Methods ...................................................................................... 82 
4.2.1      Data ..................................................................................................... 82 
4.2.2      Model Specification ............................................................................ 85 
4.3 Results ............................................................................................................... 89 
4.3.1      Diseases handled by paraprofessionals ............................................... 89 
4.3.2      General characteristics of paraprofessional ........................................ 90 
4.3.3      Relationships among the study variables ............................................ 91 
4.3.4      Empirical probit estimates .................................................................. 92 
Table of Contents 
v 
4.4 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 94 
4.5 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 99 
4.6 References ......................................................................................................... 99 
5 DO PARAPROFESSIONALS PROVIDE QUALITY VETERINARY 
SERVICES? RESULTS FROM A ROLE PLAY EXPERIMENT IN RURAL 
UGANDA ...................................................................................................................... 104 
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 104 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 105 
5.2 Materials and Methods .................................................................................... 108 
5.2.1 Design of the game ........................................................................... 108 
5.2.2 Analysis of data ................................................................................ 110 
5.3 Results ............................................................................................................. 112 
5.3.1 Analysis of service quality by disease .............................................. 112 
5.3.2 Learning curves and quality of veterinary Services ......................... 115 
5.3.3 Demand for clinical services ............................................................ 117 
5.4 Discussion and implications for clinical veterinary service delivery ............. 120 
5.5 References ....................................................................................................... 124 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................... 127 
6.1 Summary of the main results .......................................................................... 127 
6.2 Limitation of methods and recommendations for future research .................. 132 
6.3 Policy recommendations ................................................................................. 134 
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................ 139 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................... 154 
Appendix A: Household Questionnaire .................................................................. 154 
Appendix B: Service Provider Questionnaire ........................................................ 168 
Appendix C: Animal Health Medical Card ............................................................ 180 
CURRICULUM VITAE .................................................................................................. 182 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ........................................................................................ 187 
 
 
 vi 
DEDICATION 
 
I dedicate this work to my family, especially my late grandmother Akwi Ilukor, mother 
Imalingat Jane, late father Patrick Kwanga, uncle Anselm Ariko, wife Pheona Namuyaba, 
and my two daughters Chloe Akwi and Imalingat Regina. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I wish to convey my sincere thanks and appreciation to Prof. Dr. Regina Birner for guiding 
and nurturing me throughout this journey and, more importantly, for the motherly care she 
provided. Her confidence in me and her desire for excellence motivated me to be creative 
and explore new methods and research ideas. My sincere appreciation also goes to the 
Food Security Centre team, especially the Director Prof. Dr. Manfred Zeller, former 
Executive Manager Dr. Detlef Virchow, current Executive Manager Dr. Andrea Jost, Dr. 
Brigitte Kranz, and Hélène Stauss for their unconditional support.  
I also want to convey my sincere appreciation to the teams of 490C and 490A for 
their encouragement, support, and the constructive comments on my work. I would like 
thank Jonathan Mockshell, Tobias Kolo, and Christa Fanka Ayena for accepting to write 
their master theses within my PhD project and for their support in the development and 
implementation of the field work. I am also grateful to Denis Guttler for the many things 
she helped me deal with. My sincere appreciation also goes to Dr. Thea Nielsen for her 
relentless support while writing this thesis. She greatly helped me navigate through 
grammar challenges. 
I would like to extend my heart-felt thanks to my Global Food Security scholar 
colleagues, specifically Josey Kamanda, Patchimaporn Udomkun, and Tesfamicheal 
Wossen, who have been very close to me and helped me feel at home at place so far away 
from my home. I would also like to send a special thanks to my research assistants, service 
providers, and farmers from Uganda and Kenya who sacrificed their time to help me 
during the field work. Finally, I would like to thank Patience Rwamigisha, James Higenyi, 
and Nantima Noelina from the Ministry of Agriculture in Uganda and Dennis Onkundi 
from the Ministry of Livestock in Kenya for their logistical support. The field work would 
not have been manageable without their support. 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Providing adequate animal health services to smallholder farmers in developing countries 
has remained a challenge, in spite of various reform efforts during the past decades, mainly 
because of governance challenges. Although good governance has been recognized as an 
important element in addressing emerging and re-emerging animal disease threats, animal 
health research has paid limited attention to the governance challenges inherent in the 
provision of animal health services. The existing frameworks for analyzing animal health 
services have mainly focused on market failures to decide what the public sector, private 
sector, and “third sector” (the community-based sector) should do with regard to providing 
animal health services. This thesis uses transaction cost economics to analyze institutional 
arrangements for providing animal health services since it captures both market failures 
and governance attributes. The objective of this thesis is threefold: (1) to develop a 
conceptual framework for analyzing animal health services using transaction cost theory of 
economic organization and to provide empirical evidence on its application using data 
collected on clinical veterinary services in Uganda and Kenya; (2) to identify governance 
challenges in the provision of animal health services and possible remedies to address them 
using a case study of Uganda; (3) to examine the quality of services provided by different 
service providers (paraprofessionals and veterinarians) and to gain insights into 
paraprofessional-veterinarian relations.  
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The introductory chapter provides 
background information regarding the study areas in Uganda and Kenya, highlights the 
importance of strengthening and supporting the provision of veterinary services in 
developing countries, and presents the main research objectives and outline of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 presents a conceptual framework for analyzing institutional arrangements for 
providing veterinary services using Williamson’s discriminating alignment hypothesis and 
generates testable hypotheses regarding the cost effectiveness of various institutional 
arrangements. Using household survey data collected in Uganda and Kenya on clinical 
services, empirical tests of these hypotheses are presented.  Chapter 3 examines the process 
of animal service delivery as well as identifies the main influential actors, important social 
relations, and main governance challenges encountered in the provision of clinical and 
preventive veterinary services in pastoral and intensive livestock productions systems in 
Uganda. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of referrals from veterinary 
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paraprofessionals to professional veterinarians. The Chapter 5 examines whether veterinary 
paraprofessionals perform correct disease diagnosis and prescribe correct drugs for 
selected endemic diseases. The chapter also examines whether interaction between 
veterinary paraprofessionals and professional veterinarians would result in correct drug 
prescription and disease diagnosis. Chapter 6 concludes and offers policy 
recommendations and areas for further research. 
After presenting the importance of animal health services in developing countries, a 
framework for analyzing animal health services is developed in Chapter 2 based on 
Williamson’s discriminating alignment hypothesis. This framework combines both market 
failure and governance attributes to assess the cost-effectiveness of different institutional 
arrangements for animal health services. Some of these attributes include externality, 
transaction intensity, care intensity, measurability, and state and community capacity. 
Using this attributes, testable hypotheses regarding the appropriateness of institutional 
arrangements for providing animal health services are developed. Using data from Uganda 
and Kenya on clinical veterinary services, empirical tests of these hypotheses are 
performed to demonstrate the application of Williamson’s transaction cost theory to 
veterinary service delivery.  The empirical results show that paraprofessionals are desirable 
because they offer needed care and attention to clients since they are located closer to 
livestock producers and thus have lower transaction costs and may be trusted more by 
farmers. Professional veterinarians, on the other hand, are preferred by farmers when cases 
require technical expertise (high measurability). The use of paraprofessional services is 
found to be positively associated with the availability of veterinarians, implying the 
existence of synergistic relationship between veterinarians and paraprofessionals. In other 
words, a referral system may be the most costs effective approach for building state and 
community capacity to provide veterinary services. 
After developing the framework for analyzing the provision of animal health 
services, Chapter 3 examines the process of providing animal health services using Uganda 
as a case study. A participatory mapping tool called Process Net-Map is used to identify 
relevant actors and assess their influence in the delivery of clinical and preventive 
veterinary services in both pastoral and intensive livestock production systems. The tool 
also helps elicit governance challenges in veterinary service delivery. The results reveal 
that important social relations in ensuring the provision of quality veterinary services and 
the timely reporting of animal disease in veterinary service delivery include: (1) 
cooperation between private veterinarians and paraprofessionals, as well as private 
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veterinarians and government veterinarians in intensive production systems; and (2) 
cooperation between NGOs, government veterinarians, and community based animal 
health workers (CAHWs) in pastoral areas. The limited number of trained 
paraprofessionals and professional veterinarians, absenteeism by government veterinarians, 
insufficient and unpredictable budgets, weak legislation, exclusion of technical staff from 
the decision making process, and policy illogicality are identified as major governance 
problems in veterinary service delivery. Respondents also noted that the quality of 
veterinary services is very low because paraprofessionals without animal health training 
have dominated animal health markets in Uganda and the key to improve veterinary 
services is to build referral arrangements between paraprofessional and veterinarians. 
Although the literature on animal health service delivery recognizes that referrals 
between paraprofessionals and veterinarians are important in ensuring correct drug 
prescriptions and in improving disease surveillance, detection, and reporting, little is 
known about determinants of referrals between paraprofessionals and professional 
veterinarians. Chapter 4 analyzes data collected from paraprofessionals in Kenya and 
Uganda to identify factors influencing referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians 
using a probit regression model. The results show that the determinants of paraprofessional 
referrals to veterinarians include: paraprofessional’s mobile phone ownership, gender, 
attendance of short term trainings, annual assessments, and membership in 
paraprofessional associations. This chapter argues that policy makers should invest in 
legislation for paraprofessionals, supervision of paraprofessionals, the expansion of mobile 
phone ownership by paraprofessionals, the formation of paraprofessional associations, and 
short term training for paraprofessionals to build and strengthen referrals from 
paraprofessionals to veterinarians.  
The question of the quality of veterinary services provided by paraprofessionals has 
been contested in the animal health service delivery literature. Chapter 5 examines this 
question by using a role play experiment to analyze how the interaction of farmers and 
service providers influences the quality and demand for clinical services. The quality of 
clinical services is measured by scoring the accuracy of a service provider prescribing the 
appropriate drug for selected endemic animal diseases in each of the game’s four rounds. 
Statistical tests establish whether the quality of services provided by different types of 
paraprofessionals and veterinarians differ. Learning curves for service providers are 
constructed to examine whether the quality of services provided by paraprofessionals 
improves as they continue to interact with veterinarians. Belief updating curves are 
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constructed for farmers to examine whether they change their beliefs about 
paraprofessionals after receiving information about the quality of they (farmers) receive 
from service providers. A probit regression model for binary panel data is estimated to 
determine the factors that influence farmers’ decisions to change service providers. The 
results show that the ability to identify the signs of different diseases and the accuracy of 
prescriptions by veterinarians is not significantly different from that of paraprofessionals 
trained in veterinary science. However, the ability of service providers who are not trained 
in veterinary medicine to perform these tasks is significantly lower than that of service 
providers trained in veterinary science. The continued interaction between 
paraprofessionals and veterinarians gradually leads to an improvement in the ability of 
paraprofessionals trained in general agriculture and social sciences to perform these tasks. 
This is not the case for paraprofessionals with no formal training or education. Farmers do 
not easily change their beliefs about paraprofessionals, even if they receive information on 
their lack of ability to diagnose diseases and prescribe drugs correctly. Belief updating 
depends not only on the outcome of the previous round, but also on the gender of the 
farmer and on the livestock production system. This paper argues that the slow pace in 
which farmers update their beliefs about paraprofessionals limits paraprofessionals’ 
willingness to learn and to consult with veterinarians. However, the use of “animal health 
cards” (records of diagnoses and treatments) could induce paraprofessionals to provide 
better quality services as well as enable farmers to measure the quality of services, thus 
improving the quality of veterinary services in the long run.  
The main policy recommendation generated from this thesis are the following: (1) 
There is a need for developing countries to invest and create an enabling environment that 
supports paraprofessionals and professional veterinarians’ relations to ensure timely 
reporting, treatment, and control of animal disease. This would help reduce wastes and 
efficiencies in animal production as well as human health risks. (2) The provision of 
veterinary extension services should focus not only on household heads, but on other 
household members as well, such as spouses/wives and herdsmen. This could contribute to 
improved reporting, treatment, and disease control, thus reducing the risks of animal loss 
and the spreading of diseases to other animals, livestock farms, and humans. (3) Stronger 
government engagement in the provision of veterinary services in pastoral or extensive 
livestock is required because the market has failed to attract private and trained 
paraprofessionals. Our findings indicate that the effort to close this gap by promoting 
community animal health workers with rather limited informal training has proven to be a 
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rather problematic answer to this problem. This is especially true when these service 
providers are expected to fulfill a major role in providing curative services since this may 
lead to the inefficient use or potentially dangerous misuse of veterinary drugs. (4) Farmers 
need to be empowered to hold service providers accountable by developing and 
experimenting with tools, such as animal medical cards, that would enable them to measure 
the quality of services they receive and distinguish qualifications of different services 
providers. (5) Investment in veterinary education is needed to ensure that enough qualified 
veterinary staff (both diploma and degree holders) are available to offer veterinary 
services. This could be achieved by supporting and encouraging recognized universities or 
tertiary institutions to establish training centers in livestock producing areas and by 
offering scholarships targeting training community-based animal health workers or 
students from marginalized/pastoral livestock areas. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Die Bereitstellung angemessener Veterinärdienstleistungen stellt für Kleinbauern in 
Entwicklungsländern trotz verschiedener Reformbemühungen, die in den letzten 
Jahrzehnten stattgefunden haben, weiterhin eine große Herausforderung dar. Governance-
Probleme, wie etwa die Abwesenheit von Veterinärbeamten sowie Markversagen (geringe 
Anreize für private Tierärzte) stehen dabei im Vordergrund. Obwohl eine gute Governance 
mittlerweile als wichtiges Ziel bei der Vorbeugung und Behandlung von Tierkrankheiten 
angesehen wird, hat die Forschung im Bereich Tiergesundheit den politischen und 
administrativen Herausforderungen, die mit der Bereitstellung von 
Veterinärdienstleistungen verbunden sind, bisher nur wenig Beachtung geschenkt. 
Bisherige Analysen im Tiergesundheitswesen haben sich vor allem nur auf 
Marktversagen konzentriert, um Entscheidungshilfen dafür abzuleiten, was der öffentliche 
Sektor, die Privatwirtschaft und der "dritte Sektor" (Gemeinschaften, Verbände, Nicht-
Regierungsorganisationen) in Bezug auf die veterinärmedizinische Betreuung unternehmen 
sollten. Die vorliegende Studie hat auf der Basis der Transaktionskostenökonomik die 
institutionellen Arrangements für Veterinärdienstleistungen analysiert, da diese sowohl 
Marktversagen als auch Governance-Probleme erfasst. Die vorliegende Arbeit verfolgt drei 
Ziele: (1) Die Entwicklung eines konzeptionellen Rahmens für die Analyse der 
veterinärmedizinischen Versorgung mit Hilfe der Transaktionskostentheorie, und die 
Anwendung dieses Analyserahmens mit empirischen Daten in Uganda und Kenia zur 
veterinärmedizinischen Versorgung in pastoralen und intensiven Tierhaltungssystemen; (2) 
die Identifizierung der politischen und administrativen Herausforderungen bei der 
Bereitstellung von Veterinärdienstleistungen und die Identifizierung von 
Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten dieser Dienstleistungen anhand einer Fallstudie in Uganda; 
(3) die Prüfung der Dienstleistungsqualität verschiedener Dienstleister (Aushilfstierärzte 
(paraprofessionals) und Tierärzte) sowie die Analyse der Beziehungen von 
Aushilfstierarzten und Tierärzten. 
Die Dissertation setzt sich aus sechs Kapiteln zusammen: Im einführenden Kapitel 
wird der Forschungsgegenstand skizziert, und es werden Hintergrundinformationen zu den 
Studienregionen in Uganda und Kenia gegeben. Auch wird die Bedeutung der Förderung 
der Erbringung von Tiergesundheitsdienstleistungen in Entwicklungsländern aufgezeigt. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die Ziele der vorliegenden Arbeit vorgestellt und das 
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Vorgehen skizziert. Das zweite Kapitel stellt den konzeptionellen Rahmen für die Analyse 
der institutionellen Regelungen bezüglich tierärztlicher Dienstleistungen anhand von 
Williamson's sogenannter „Disciminating Alignment“ Hypothese dar und leitet daraus 
überprüfbare Hypothesen zur  Kosteneffizienz verschiedener institutionellen Arrangements 
für Tiergesundheitsdienstleistungen ab. Die empirische Prüfung der Hypothesen erfolgt 
durch eine Daten aus einer Haushaltsbefragung, die in Uganda und Kenia durchgeführt 
wurde. .Kapitel drei beleuchtet den Prozess der Dienstleistungserbringung im 
Tiergesundheitswesen, und identifiziert die einflussreichsten Akteure sowie wichtige 
soziale Beziehungen und politische Herausforderungen bei der Erbringung der klinischen 
und präventiven Dienstleistungen des Veterinärwesens. Dabei wird zwischen extensiven 
und intensiven Produktionssystemen in Uganda unterscheiden. Kapitel 4 untersucht die 
Beweggründe für Überweisungen von Krankheitsfällen durch Aushilfstierärzte an 
akademisch ausgebildete Tierärzte. Im fünften Kapitel wird untersucht, inwieweit 
Aushilfstierärzte mit verschiedenem Ausbildungsstand eine korrekte Diagnose erstellen 
und die richtigen Medikamente für ausgewählte endemischen Krankheiten verschreiben 
können. Zusätzlich wird überprüft, ob eine Interaktion zwischen den Aushilfstierärzten und 
professionellen Tierärzten zu einer besseren Diagnose von Krankheiten und einer 
korrekteren Verschreibung von Medikamenten  führen würde. Kapitel sechs fasst die 
Ergebnisse zusammen und gibt Empfehlungen für Politikmaßnamen. Außerdem wird 
weiterer Forschungsbedarf identifiziert. 
Nachdem die Bedeutung des Tiergesundheitswesens in Entwicklungsländern 
dargestellt wurde, wird in Kapitel zwei, wie oben erwähnt, eine Analyse der 
veternärmedizinischen Dienstleistungen, basierend auf Williamson’s „Discriminating 
Alignment“ Hypothese vorgestellt. Diese Hypothese verbindet Marktversagen und 
Governance-Aspekte, um die Kosteneffizienz der einzelnen institutionellen Arrangements 
für veterinärmedizinische Versorgung abzuleiten. Folgende Attribute werden als relevant 
identifziert: externe Effekte, Transaktionsintensität, Pflegeintensität, Messbarkeit der 
Qualität von Leistungen, sowie die Kapazität von Staat und gemeinschaftsbasierten 
Dienstleistern. Mit Hilfe dieser Attribute wurden überprüfbare Hypothesen bezüglich der 
Angemessenheit/Eignung verschiedener institutionellen Regelungen für die 
veterinärmedizinische Betreuung entwickelt. Unter Verwendung von Haushaltsdaten aus 
Uganda und Kenia wurden empirische Tests der Hypothesen durchgeführt. Die 
empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Einsatz von gut ausgebildeten paraprofessionellen 
Aushilfstierärzten wünschenswert sind, da sie die erforderlichen Kenntnisse haben und die 
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notwendige Sorgfalt aufbringen, aber ihre Transaktionskosten durch die Nähe zu den 
Tierhalter nniedriger sind als die der professionellen Tierärzte sowie  die Landwirte zum 
Teil den Helfern ein größeres Vertrauen entgegen bringen. Professionelle Tierärzte wurden 
von Bauern bei Fällen, in denen technischer Expertise (hohe Messbarkeit) notwendig 
wurden, bevorzugt.  Die in Anspruchnahme von tierärztlichen Helferleistungen wirken sich 
positiv auf die Verfügbarkeit der Tierärzte aus. Dadurch existiert eine synergetische 
Beziehung zwischen Tierarzt und Tierarzthelfer. Mit anderen Worten, das vorherrschende 
Überweisungssystem ist möglicherweise der am kostenwirksamsten Ansatz zum Aufbau 
der staatlichen und gemeinschaftlichen Kapazitäten bezüglich tierärztlichen Leistungen. 
Nach der Entwicklung der Rahmenbedingungen für die Analyse der Bereitstellung 
von tierärztlichen Leistungen, untersucht Kapitel 3 den Prozess dieser Bereitstellung 
anhand eines Falls aus Uganda. Ein partizipatives Mapping Tool namens "Process Net-
Map wurde verwendet, um die relevanten Akteure und deren Einfluss auf klinische und 
präventive Dienstleistungen des Veterinärwesens in extensiven und intensiven 
Tierproduktionssystemen zu ermitteln. Das Tool soll dazu beitragen, die staatlichen 
Herausforderungen bezüglich des Tiergesundheitswesens aufzudecken. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass soziale Beziehungen für die Bereitstellung von qualitativ hochwertigen 
Dienstleistungen des Veterinärwesens und die zeitnahe Meldung von Tierkrankheiten in 
tierärztliche Dienstleistungen notwendig sind. 
Dazu gehören die folgenden Aspekte: (1) Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen privaten 
Tierärzten und Tierarzthelfern, wie auch die Zusammenarbeit zwischen privaten Tierärzten 
und von der Regierung angestellten Tierärzten in intensiven Produktionssystemen; und (2) 
die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den NROs und von der Regierung angestellten Tierärzte 
und den sogenannten Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) (Gemeinde-basierten 
Tiergesundheitsdienstleistern) in pastoralen Produktionssystemen. Folgende Probleme 
wurden identifiziert: die begrenzte Zahl von ausgebildeten Tierarzthelfern und 
professionellen Tierärzten, Fehlzeiten von Veterinärbeamten, unzureichende und 
unvorhersehbaren Budgets, eine unzureichende Gesetzgebung, Ausschluss des technischen 
Personals aus dem Entscheidungsprozess und politische Inkohärenz. Dies sind die 
bedeutendsten Governance Probleme in Bezug auf tierärztlichen Dienstleistungen. Die 
Befragten gaben auch eine niedrige Qualität der Dienstleistungen im Veterinärwesenn als 
Problem an, da Tierarzthelfer ohne veterinärmedizinische Ausbildung den 
Tiergesundheitsmarkt in Uganda dominieren und der Schlüssel zur Verbesserung dieser 
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Dienstleistungen liegen in einem verbesserten Überweisungssystem zwischen 
Tierarzthelfern und ausgebildeten Tierärzten.  
Obwohl bereits in der Literatur beschrieben ist, dass für das Tiergesundheitswesen 
die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Tierarzthelfern und den Tierärzten wichtig für eine 
bessere Überwachung von Krankheiten, Erkennung und Berichterstattung sowie die 
Sicherstellung einer korrekten Medikamenten Verschreibung ist, ist bisher nur wenig über 
die bestimmten Faktoren der Überweisungen von den Tierarzthelfern an die Tierärzte 
bekannt. Kapitel vier verwendet Daten zu identifizieren Faktoren, die Einfluss auf die 
Empfehlungen an die Tierärzte durch Tierarzthelfer mit Hilfe eines Probit 
Regressionsmodells in Kenia und Uganda aufzeigen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die 
Determinanten der Empfehlungen an die Tierärzte sich wie folgt zusammensetzen: Besitz 
von Mobiltelefonen des Helfers, Geschlecht und Ausbildung sowie Teilnahme an kurze 
Weiterbildungen, jährliche Begutachtungen und der Mitgliedschaft in Vereinigungen. Die 
Studie zeigt auf, dass die politischen Entscheidungsträger Investitionen die Aufsicht der 
Tierarzthelfer tätigen sollten, sowie die Möglichkeit der mobilen Erreichbarkeit der Helfer 
ausbauen sollten, sowie die Bildung von Verbände unterstützen und Kurzzeittrainings 
fördern sollten, um die Vernetzung von Helfern und Tierärzten zu stärken.  
In der Tiergesundheitsliteratur wurde die Qualität der tierärztlichen Leistungen der 
Helfer angefochten. Kapitel 5 untersucht anhand eines Rollenspiel- Experiments, die 
Frage, inwieweit das Zusammenspiel der Landwirte und Dienstleister die Qualität und die 
Nachfrage nach klinischen Dienstleistungen beeinflusst. Das Experiment wurde in vier 
Runden durchgeführt. Die Qualität der klinischen Dienstleistungen wurde anhand der 
Genauigkeit in der Medikamentenverordnung ausgewählter endemischer Tierkrankheiten 
durch die Dienstleister  bewertet. Statistische Tests wurden durchgeführt, ob die Qualität 
der Leistungen sich von verschiedenen Gruppen von Helfern und Tierärzten unterscheiden. 
Es wurden Lernkurven erstellt, anhand deren festgestellt wurde, ob die Qualität der 
Dienstleistung sich durch Zusammenarbeit mit Tierärzten verbessert. Weiter wurden 
Meinungskurven der Bauern erstellt, hinsichtlich ihrer Meinung der Qualität der erhaltenen 
Dienstleistung durch Tierarzthelfer. Ein Probit Regressionsmodell für binäre Daten wurde 
zur Bestimmung der Faktoren geschätzt, die einen Einfluss auf einen möglichen 
Dienstleisterwechsel der Landwirte haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Fähigkeit zum 
Erkennen der Anzeichen von verschiedenen Krankheiten und die Genauigkeit der 
Verschreibungen durch Tierärzte sich nicht wesentlich von den in der Veterinärmedizin 
ausgebildeten Helfern unterscheiden. Jedoch ist die Fähigkeit zur Durchführung dieser 
Zusammenfassung 
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Aufgaben von Dienstleistern, die nicht veterinärmedizinisch geschult sind, deutlich 
geringer als die der veterinärmedizinisch  geschulten. Die häufige Interaktion zwischen 
Helfer und Tierärzte führt allmählich zu einer Verbesserung der Fähigkeit der 
Tierarzthelfer, die bereits in der allgemeinen Landwirtschaft und in Sozialwissenschaften 
ausgebildet sind. Dies trifft nicht auf Helfer zu, die keine formale Ausbildung oder Bildung 
besitzen. Die Bauern ändern nur schwer ihre Meinung über die Helfer, auch wenn sie die 
Information erhalten, dass die Diagnose und Medikamentierung der Krankheiten nicht 
immer vollständig zutreffend waren. Die Meinungskurven sind nicht nur von den 
Ergebnissen der vorherigen Runde abhängig, sondern auch vom Geschlecht des Landwirts 
und vom Tierproduktionssystem. Diese Studie vertritt den Standpunkt,  dass durch nur eine 
langsam voran gehende Meinungsänderung der Landwirte bezüglich der Helfer, die 
Bereitschaft der Weiterbildung dieser, sowie die Konsultierung von Tierärzten stark 
limitiert ist. Die Verwendung von „Tiergesundheitskarten“ (Aufzeichnungen von 
Diagnosen und Behandlungen) könnten Helfer zur Erbringung von Leistungen besserer 
Qualität veranlassen, wobei die Landwirte diese Dienstleistungen besser bewerten und 
dadurch auf lange Sicht zur Verbesserung der Qualität der tierärztlichen Dienste beitragen 
können.  
Die wichtigsten politischen Empfehlungen resultierend aus dieser Studie sind die 
folgenden: 1.) Es beteht einie Notwendigkeit zu Investitionen und zur Schaffung eines 
positiven Umfelds für bessere Tiergesundheitsdienstleistungen, vor allem in pastoralen 
Systemen. Maßnahmen sollten Beziehungen zwischen Tierarzthelfern und professionellen 
Tierärzten stärken und eine zeitnahe Berichterstattung verbessern, welche bei der 
Behandlung und Bekämpfung von Tierseuchen unerlässlich ist. Dies wäre ein Beitrag zur 
Verringerung von Produktivitäsverlust und zur Steigerung in der Effizienz in der 
Produktion, als auch eine Verringerung der Risiken für humane Gesundheit.  (2) Die 
tierärztliche Beratung sollte sich nicht nur auf Haushaltsvorstände, sondern auch auf 
andere Haushaltsmitglieder wie Partner/innen und Ehefrauen und Hirten beziehen. Auch 
dies könnte zur aktuellen Berichterstattung, Behandlung und Bekämpfung von Krankheiten 
beitragen, wodurch die Gefahr des Verlusts eines Tieres und die Ausbreitung von 
Krankheiten auf andere Tiere in der Tierhaltung und beim Menschen verringert werden 
könnte. (3) Eine stärkeres staatliches Engagement bei der Bereitstellung von 
Dienstleistungen des Veterinärwesens in der intensiven oder extensiven Tierhaltung ist 
erforderlich, da der Markt dort nicht attraktiv für private und geschulte Helfer ist. Unsere 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Bemühungen, um diese Lücke zu schließen, durch die 
Zusammenfassung 
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Förderung der Tiergesundheit in der Gemeinschaft durch Helfer ohne anerkannte 
Ausbildung eine eher problematische Lösung für dieses Problem darstellt. Dies ist vor 
allem der Fall, wenn von diesen Dienstleistern erwartet wird, dass sie eine große Rolle bei 
der Bereitstellung von kurativen Dienstleistungen spielen. Insbesondere kann dies dazu 
führen, dass potenziell gefährliche Medikamente unsachgemäß angewandt werden können. 
(4) Die Betriebsinhaber sollten die Möglichkeit haben, die Dienstleiter durch spezielle 
Methoden zu bewerten und die Qualität der Dienstleistung zu beurteilen. Weiter sollten die 
unterschiedlichen Qualifikationen der Dienstleiter durch zum Beispiel Verwendung der 
Tiergesundheitskarten ersichtlich gemacht werden. (5) Investitionen in tierärztlichen 
Ausbildung ist erforderlich, um sicherzustellen, dass genügend qualifizierte Mitarbeiter im 
Veterinärdienst (sowohl Diplom- als auch Hochschulabsolventen) zur Verfügung stehen. 
Erreicht werden könnte dies durch Unterstützung und Förderung anerkannter Universitäten 
und die Schaffung von Schulungszentren in der tierischen Erzeugung. Das das Angebot 
spezifischer Stipendien für Studenten aus pastoralen Regionen zur Ausbildung von 
Tiergesundheitsdienstleistern kann dabei eine wichtige Rolle spielen. 
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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Livestock plays a critical role in feeding the world’s different human populations, 
particularly urban dwellers and small scale mixed farmers, pastoralists, as well as ranchers. 
Livestock provides high quality proteins and micronutrients to consumers. In addition, it is 
an income source for livestock producers. The current and unprecedented increase in 
emerging and re-emerging animal diseases and zoonosis negatively impact animal 
productivity and production, trade in meat, live animals, and livestock products, human 
health, and poverty eradication efforts. Weak animal health care systems, mostly in 
developing countries, exacerbate these impacts. Strengthening the governance of animal 
health systems in both the public and private sector is seen as the most effective way to 
minimize these impacts. This study contributes to these efforts by examining the 
institutional environment, behavior of actors, and policy options for improving the 
provision of animal health services. This chapter provides background information 
regarding the study areas, main research objectives, and outline of the thesis. 
 
1.1 General background 
The importance of animal health services 
Livestock production is a very important activity in the livelihoods of many rural 
households in developing countries. It often contributes to multiple livelihood objectives 
and is the main source of nutritious food, income, and draft power (Bender et al., 2006; 
FAO, 2011; Randolph et al., 2007). Livestock is also a social asset. For example, livestock 
is used to pay dowry for marriage, to compensate bruised parties in tribal or clan feuds, and 
to indicate social status (Kaimba et al., 2011; Randolph et al., 2007). Livestock production 
also offers employment opportunities, especially for people involved in value addition of 
livestock products (Perry and Grace, 2009). However, animal diseases continue to be a 
threat to livestock production and to the realization of livestock benefits in most 
developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (FAO, 2011; Forman et al., 2012; 
Sansoucy, 1995). An outbreak of disease can mean the difference between: being food 
sufficient and food insecure, having a secure income and losing key household assets, and 
eating healthy and contaminated food (FAO, 2011; Forman et al., 2012). Throughout the 
world, epidemic diseases, such as pes-te des petits ruminant (PPR), Contagious Bovine 
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Pleurapneumonia (CBPP) and Contagious Caprine Pleurapneumonia (CCPP), have led to 
the death of many animals, while others, such as Foot and Mouth and Brucellosis, have 
affected the growth of animals and milk production (Mcdermott et al., 2013; Plumb et al., 
2013; Rich and Perry, 2011; Rushton et al., 2012). Zoonotic diseases (passed from animal 
to humans) and food borne diseases (resulting from the consumption of food of animal 
origin), such as gastrointestinal diseases, have led to deaths and have increased the costs of 
treatment for consumers of livestock products (Grace et al., 2012; Senior, 2009). 
A report by the International Federation of Animal Health (IFAH) estimates that 
about one million cattle die of rabies in Central and South America each year. In addition, 
55,000 people die of rabies annually throughout the world, with 99% of these deaths 
occurring in developing countries. In the United Kingdom, the 2001 Foot and Mouth 
disease (FMD) outbreak is estimated to have resulted in the slaughter of six million 
animals and a loss of US $11.5 billion in tourism revenue (IFAH, 2012). The report also 
reveals that Salmonella costs the United States $3 billion annually. In developing 
countries, Knight-Jones and Rushton (2013) estimate that losses from FMD in the endemic 
regions of Africa and Asia are US $5 to $21 billion annually from production losses and 
vaccines. In Cambodia, Shankar et al. (2012) estimate that FMD outbreaks reduce 
household income and animal value by 4.4-11.7% and 54-92%, respectively. In India, 
Ganesh et al. (2012) estimate that FMD infections result in losses of 450 million to 2 
billion pounds of sterling per year. In Nigeria, Fadiga et al. (2013) estimate that the 
economic burden of pes-te des petits ruminant (PPR), Contagious Bovine, and Caprine 
Pleurapneumonia (CBPP& CCPP),Trypanosomiasis, Newcastle disease (NCD), and 
African Swine Fever (ASF) to the economy is US $179 million (29.2 billion naira). 
Zoonotic diseases, such as Brucellosis, Rabies, Rift Valley Fever, and food-borne 
diseases like salmonella, have led to the death of many people and have burdened health 
care systems in most developing countries (Jones et al., 2013). A recent study by the 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) reveals that the major geographical 
hotspots for zoonotic diseases are in East Africa, with Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania appearing among the top 20 most burdened countries in the world from zoonotic 
diseases (Grace et al., 2012). The report reveals that about 13 zoonotic diseases are 
responsible for 2.4 billion human illnesses and 2.2 million deaths every year in developing 
countries (see Table 1.1 below). The risk of zoonotic disease emergence is expected to 
increase with increased intensification of livestock production to meet the increasing 
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demand for food of animal origin, especially in developing countries (Grace et al., 2012; 
Jones et al., 2013).  
 
Table 1.1 Important zoonoses and their impact on human health 
Disease Pathogens/agent Transmission Common illness in humans Annual 
human deaths  
Annual 
affected 
humans  
Gastrointestinal  Bacteria (Salmonella, E. 
coli, Cryptosporidium) 
Contact with infected farm 
animals, wild animals, and 
pets. Eating contaminated food 
and drinking water 
contaminated with excretions 
from infected animals. 
Imprudent use of 
antimicrobials in animals. 
Diarrhoea, nausea, vomiting, 
and loss of appetite, 
abdominal cramps, weight 
loss. 
1,500,000 2,333,000,000 
Leptospirosis Leptospira bacteria Contact with infected animals 
and contaminated water. 
Fever, chills, intense 
headache, meningitis, liver 
damage, and renal failure. 
123,000 1,700,000 
Cystlcercosis Parasite (Taenia solium, 
a tape worm in pigs) 
Eating pork or fruits and 
vegetables infected with 
Taenia solium. 
Decreased vision, seizures, 
heart failures, and spine and 
nerve damage. 
50,000 50,000,000 
Tuberculosis  Bacteria 
(Mycobacterium 
tuberculos) 
Inhalation of aerosols or the 
ingestion of unpasteurized 
milk. 
Cough, fever, fatigue, 
sweating, weight loss, chills, 
and abdominal swelling. 
100,000 554,500 
Rabies Neurotropic virus Bites from infected animals 
including dogs, cats and bats. 
Fever, headache,  fatigue, 
confusion, hallucinations, 
and paralysis 
70,000 70,000 
Leishmaniasis Parasites (e.g., sandfly ) A parasitic disease spread by 
the bite of infected sand flies. 
Affects internal organs 
(spleen, liver, and bone 
marrow). 
47,000 2,000,000 
Brucellosis  Bacteria (Brucella) Contact with infected animals 
or meat. Drinking raw milk 
from infected cattle, goats, 
camels. 
Back pain, chills, abdominal 
pain, excessive sweating, 
headache, fever, joint pain, 
weight loss, and muscle pain. 
25,000 500,000 
Echinococcosis Parasite (Echinococcus) Humans become infected when 
they swallow eggs in 
contaminated food from cattle, 
dear, pigs, sheep and contact 
with dogs. 
A closed pocket tissue forms 
in the liver, brain, bones, 
kidney, lungs, skeletal 
muscles, and spleen. 
18,000 30,0000 
Toxoplasmosis  Parasite (Toxoplasma 
gondii)  
Contact with cat faeces that 
contain the parasite, Eat 
contaminated food (lamb and 
pork) or drink contaminated 
water. 
Body aches, swollen lymph 
nodes, headaches, 
miscarriages, stillborn 
children,, blurred vision, and 
liver problems. 
10,000 2,000,000 
Q fever Bacteria (Coxiella 
burnetii) 
Drinking raw or unpasteurized 
milk, as well as inhaling dust 
or air contaminated with 
infected animal feces, blood, 
or birth products. 
Dry cough, fever, headache, 
chest pain, rash, and muscle 
pains. 
3,000 3,500,000 
Trypanosomosis  Parasite (Trypanosoma 
brucei) 
Tsetse fly bite. Fever, swollen lymph glands, 
headaches, irritability, 
confusion, slurred speech, 
seizures, and difficulty 
walking and talking. 
2,500 15,000 
Anthrax Bacillus anthracis Contact with infected animals, 
wool, meat, or hides. 
Cutaneous (skin), lungs and 
gastrointestinal infections. 
1,250 11,000 
Hepatitis E*  Hepatitis E virus Ingestion of fecal matter 
(especially through drinking 
contaminated water), food 
from infected animals, and 
blood transfusion. 
Abdominal pain and 
tenderness, nausea, vomiting, 
and acute liver failure. 
300,000 14,000,000 
Information and data from this table are based on Grace et al. (2012) and the U.S. National Library of Medicine. 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projects an increase of meat 
consumption from 158.3 to 330.4 million tons between 2010 and 2050 in developing 
countries (FAO, 2011), which is attributed to growing per capita income, population, and 
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urbanization (Pica-Ciamarra and Otte, 2008). The availability and quality of animal health 
services is therefore important for increasing the productivity of the livestock sector and 
for reducing human health risks related to animal diseases. 
 
The provision of animal health services: from markets failure to process-based analysis  
The rapid expansion of livestock production needs significant investment in animal health 
systems to acquire human and logistical resources to address the risks associated with 
animal diseases. However, the optimal ratio of staff to non-staff expenditure is difficult to 
determine and will vary by country. Moreover, such investments may require substantial 
increases in developing countries’ budgets, which is unlikely to occur given their pervasive 
fiscal problems. As a result, cost effective institutional arrangements are needed to lessen 
animal disease risks arising from the production of livestock related products. Previous 
efforts aimed at developing cost effective institutional arrangements led by the World Bank 
resulted in the privatization of most veterinary services and retrenchment of most 
paraprofessionals. However, markets failed to work and did solve service delivery 
problems. Subsequently, Umali et al. (1994) developed a framework that categorized 
veterinary
1
 services into private and public services. Veterinary services for which no 
market failure was assumed to exist are categorized as private services and veterinary 
services where market failures existed are categorized as public goods (Leonard, 2002; 
Riviere-Cinnamond, 2004). As a result, a number of institutional arrangements emerged, 
including decentralization, cost recovery, sub-contracting, provision of subsidies to animal 
health service providers, and – particularly in pastoral areas – the Community Animal 
Health Worker (CAHW) system. Nonetheless, expectations in most cases have not been 
met (Pica-Ciamarra and Otte, 2008) and this is largely attributed to institutional and 
governance challenges (Pastoret and Chaisemartin, 2011; Schneider, 2011; Vallat and 
Mallet, 2006).  
To address the institutional and governance challenges, Riviere-Cinnamond (2004) 
recommends that economic analyses of animal health service delivery should move 
towards a process-based approach that provides a broader perspective and understanding of 
transaction costs. Process-based analysis provides insights to transaction costs that arise 
from political interference, behavioural attributes, and other economic attributes including 
                                                 
1
 The word veterinary and animal health are used interchangeably  
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market failure (Riviere-Cinnamond, 2004). Process-based analysis facilitates the 
development of cost effective institutional arrangements or policy options for addressing 
these problems. However, studies that apply process-based approaches to analyze the 
provision of veterinary services have been limited, partly because animal health 
economists did not have economic theory and the tools to support this type of analysis.   
 
1.2 Specific objectives and research questions  
Although institutional and governance challenges have been cited and recognized in the 
animal health literature as key bottlenecks to the efficient and sustainable provision of 
animal health services, little is known about the real nature of governance challenges and 
the extent to which these challenges manifest themselves and affect animal service 
delivery. In addition, existing analytical frameworks for analyzing animal health services 
provide little attention to governance problems. The objectives of this thesis are: (1) to 
develop a conceptual framework for analyzing animal health services using transaction 
cost theory (TCE) and to demonstrate its application in assessing the cost effectiveness of  
institutional arrangements for providing veterinary services; (2) to identify the actors, their 
roles, possible challenges, and remedies to address challenges faced in the provision of 
animal health services using Uganda as a case study; (3) to determine factors that influence 
paraprofessional-veterinarian relationships; and (4) to examine the quality of services 
provided by different service providers (paraprofessionals and veterinarians) and to 
measure the impact of paraprofessional-veterinarian relations on the quality of veterinary 
services. 
In this thesis, a conceptual framework for analyzing animal health services is 
developed based on transaction cost theory by reviewing the literature on the provision of 
veterinary services in developing countries. Applying Williamson’s discriminating 
alignment hypothesis as an analytical basis, hypotheses regarding cost effective 
institutional arrangements to provide animal health services are developed and tested using 
empirical data on clinical services collected from Uganda and Kenya. The process Net-
Map tool is also used to examine the process of animal health service delivery and to 
identify the actors and their roles, interests and challenges. A role play experiment 
measures the quality of services provided by paraprofessionals and the impact of 
paraprofessional-professional relations on the quality of veterinary services using Uganda 
as a case study. 
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1.3 Overview of the study area 
Both Uganda and Kenya are low income countries with livestock contributing over 5% and 
12%, respectively, to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (FAO, 2005). Both countries adopted 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) that were instituted in the late 1980s by the World 
Bank. However, unlike Uganda which adopted and successfully implemented the SAPs in 
1987, Kenya began implementing SAPs in 1993 and did not completely liberalize the 
provision of private veterinary services (FAO, 2005; Silkin, 2005). In addition, Kenya did 
not lay-off or retrench para-veterinarians, but instead stopped the policy of automatic 
recruitment of veterinarians into the government’s formal veterinary system (Silkin, 2005). 
Uganda, on the other hand, retrenched all para-veterinarians and ceased the policy of 
automatic recruitment of veterinarians into the formal government veterinary system. 
Variations in the implementation of the SAPs resulted in variations in level of investment 
and provision of animal health services (Woodford, 2004). Therefore, it is important to 
study the impact of these policy variations on the provision of animal health services in 
these two countries. 
Field research was conducted in Kiambu and North Pokot districts of Kenya and in 
Mukono and Amudat districts of Uganda in 2012. Mukono and Kiambu districts are 
located in intensive livestock production systems, while Amudat and North Pokot districts 
are located in pastoral systems. The two production systems differ in terms of 
infrastructure as well as in the supply of and demand for animal health services. These are 
the most important factors influencing the development of sustainable animal health 
service delivery systems in developing countries (cf. Woodford, 2004). Kiambu and 
Mukono districts were selected because they are located close to the capital cities of Kenya 
and Uganda, respectively. In addition, the main types of animals kept in both districts are 
dairy cattle, pigs, and chicken, mainly for commercial purposes. Kiambu district has two 
farmer cooperatives, the Githunguri and Ndumberi Dairy Farmers Co-operative Societies 
which collect 170,000 and 20,000 litres of milk, respectively. However, about 40% of 
livestock farmers are members of the cooperatives and about 7% of livestock farmers are 
actively engaged in supplying milk to cooperatives. According to Mburu et al.(2007), 
livestock farmers in Kiambu district  who solely depend on farm income, own  larger land 
sizes, have more cows, and produce more milk are less likely to actively participate in 
cooperatives because cooperative prices are lower than the market price.  
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Amudat and North Pokot districts were selected because they boarder one another 
and are inhabited by one ethnic group, the Pokots. The Pokots keep large herd size of 
mainly indigenous breeds of cattle and shots (Ettyang, 1999). In both Uganda and Kenya, 
the Pokot communities lack access to basic developmental services and physical 
infrastructure. Their access to schools and hospitals is limited and most roads in the area 
are not passable (Kristensen, 2009; Yiga et al., 2008). The number of trained animal health 
service providers in these areas is also low (Hassan, 2003). Very few trained veterinary 
professionals are willing to stay in these areas because of the limited access to basic 
services and the prevalence of rampant cattle rustling (Greiner, 2013; Hassan, 2003).
2
  To 
the Pokots, livestock is the main source of food (namely, milk, blood, and meat), provides 
income, and is an integral component of social relations since livestock is used for dowry 
payments and is a store of  wealth, symbol of prosperity, and means for compensating 
aggrieved parties in tribal, clan, and family conflicts (Kaimba et al., 2011).     
 
1.4 Research topics and questions  
Research topic 1: A review of the literature and an empirical application of 
Transaction Cost Theory for analyzing institutional arrangements for providing 
animal health services 
This topic is dealt with in Chapter 2. In this chapter, Oliver Williamson’s discriminating 
alignment hypothesis is applied to assess the cost effectiveness of various institutional 
arrangements and to generate testable hypothesises. The rationale behind the application of 
the TCE framework is that it allows us to address market failure, governance, and 
contextual problems specific to the provision of animal health services. This chapter 
contains the hypothesis that the inclusion of governance and context specific factors in to 
the analysis animal health service delivery may lead to the conclusion that private animal 
health services should become a public service. For example, clinical services (often 
considered as a private service that can be provided by a market-based system may require 
public sector intervention.   
 
                                                 
2
 Cattle rustling also called cattle raiding are the act of stealing cattle. It is common practice among the 
pastoral communities in East Africa such as the Karamajong in Uganda, the Pokot,  and Turkana in Kenya   
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Research topic 2: Influential actors and governance challenges in the provision of 
veterinary services – A case study of Uganda 
A full discussion of this topic is dealt with in Chapter 3. The main research questions 
addressed within this research topic are: Who are the actors and what role do they play in 
the provision of animal health services? What are the governance challenges and what is 
their effect on the provision of animal health services? And what are the possible remedies 
to these governance challenges? Understanding the roles of different actors, as well as their 
interests and resource capacity is useful in creating suitable institutional arrangements for 
proving animal health services and for improving coordination among actors (Burgos and 
Otte, 2009). Improved coordination among the actors ensures good governance of 
veterinary services and systems, as well as improved service delivery (Vallat and Mallet, 
2006). This chapter applies the Process Net-Map tool to identify networks of actors, 
problem areas, and possible strategies to solve these problems using a case study of 
Uganda.  
Research topic 3: Determinants of referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians 
in Uganda and Kenya 
The topic is dealt with in Chapter 4. The main research question is: What factors influence 
referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians in animal health care? Because of the 
limited literature on referrals in animal health care, the study uses referral literature in 
human health care to generate hypotheses. The chapter contains the hypothesis that 
paraprofessional’s mobile phone ownership, gender, attendance of short term trainings, 
annual assessments, and membership in paraprofessional associations, as well as the 
prevalence of epidemic animal diseases and the number of paraprofessionals not trained in 
animal health in a given area influence their referrals to veterinarians. 
Research topic 4: The quality of veterinary services provided by veterinary services 
providers in rural Uganda 
This topic is dealt with in Chapter 5. The research questions covered in this chapter are: 
Does the quality of services of paraprofessionals differ from that of veterinarians? Does 
information about the quality of services by paraprofessionals influence farmer’s choice of 
service providers? Do interactions between paraprofessionals and veterinarians influence 
the quality of animal health services? Finally, what influences farmer’s decision to change 
animal health service providers? A contentious issue in animal health service delivery is 
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the quality of services provided by veterinary paraprofessionals. To date, there is no clarity 
as to whether veterinary paraprofessionals provide quality services. For example, studies 
by Oakeley et al. (2001) and Peeling and Holden (2004) show that paraprofessionals, 
especially community animal health workers (CAHWS) with three weeks of training 
provide quality services in Kenya, Tanzania, and the Philippines. However, Curran and 
MacLehose (2002) dismiss these studies for their poor research design in assessing the 
level of drug prescription and disease diagnosis. Chapter 3 analyzes results from a role play 
experiment, which is an innovative yet tested approach to answer the above questions.  
 
1.5  Thesis Outline 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a conceptual framework for 
analyzing the provision of veterinary services based on transaction cost theory. Chapter 3 
examines the interaction of different actors in the provision of veterinary services and also 
identifies governance challenges, policy options, and entry points for addressing these 
challenges. Chapter 4 examines determinants of referrals from paraprofessionals to 
veterinarians. Chapter 5 measures the quality of services provided by different types of 
service provides and examines how farmers’ decisions influence the quality of veterinary 
services. Chapter 5 also assesses whether information influences farmers’ decision to 
change service providers and whether interactions between veterinarians and 
paraprofessionals result in improved service quality. Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the 
results, data limitations, and offers policy recommendations.  
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Abstract 
Providing adequate animal health services to smallholder farmers in developing countries 
has remained a challenge, in spite of various reform efforts during the past decades. The 
focuses of the past reforms were on market failures to decide what the public sector, the 
private sector, and the “third sector” (the community-based sector) should do with regard 
to providing animal health services. However, such frameworks have paid limited attention 
to the governance challenges inherent in the provision of animal health services. This paper 
presents a framework for analyzing institutional arrangements for providing animal health 
services that focus not only on market failures, but also on governance challenges, such as 
elite capture, and absenteeism of staff. As an analytical basis, Williamson’s discriminating 
alignment hypothesis is applied to assess the cost-effectiveness of different institutional 
arrangements for animal health services in view of both market failures and governance 
challenges. This framework is used to generate testable hypotheses on the appropriateness 
of different institutional arrangements for providing animal health services, depending on 
context-specific circumstances. Data from Uganda and Kenya on clinical veterinary 
services is used to provide an empirical test of these hypotheses and to demonstrate 
application of Williamson’s transaction cost theory to veterinary service delivery. The 
paper concludes that strong public sector involvement, especially in building and 
strengthening a synergistic relation-based referral arrangement between paraprofessionals 
and veterinarians is imperative in improving animal health service delivery in developing 
countries.
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Key words: Institutional arrangements, Animal health services, Market failures, 
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2.1 Introduction 
Providing effective animal health services to livestock keepers in developing countries has 
remained a challenge. Provision of these services by the government prevailed in the first 
decades after developing countries reached their independence. In the structural adjustment 
period that began in the 1980s, government provision of livestock services came under 
increasing criticism for high costs and limited effectiveness. A solution was seen in the 
privatization of those veterinary services for which no market failure was assumed to exist 
(Leonard, 2002; Pica-Ciamarra and Otte, 2008; Riviere-Cinnamond, 2004). An important 
analytical framework to justify this approach was developed by Umali et al. (1994), who 
applied concepts of public economics to determine the services for which a market for 
animal health services was expected to emerge -a market in which private veterinarians and 
other private service providers could flourish. The experience showed that this approach 
had its merits. High-potential areas and market-oriented livestock systems, such as the 
intensive dairy systems of Kenya, are indeed served by this market (Oruko and Ndung’u, 
2009). However, marginal areas and poorer livestock keepers continued to lack adequate 
access to animal health services (Okwiri et al.,  2001; Otieno et al., 2000). 
Following the failures of both the public and the private sector in these areas, a new 
wave of reform focused on a “third sector” consisting of community-based animal health 
workers. In spite of initial concerns about their capacity, they became a major feature of 
recent reform efforts (McSherry and Brass, 2008). And indeed, this approach had its 
merits, too. For example, the eradication of the rinderpest -which is without a doubt the 
single biggest success in animal health provision in modern history-would not have been 
possible without the thousands of community-animal health workers who vaccinated 
animals in the most remote and conflict-affected areas of the developing world (FAO, 
2012a).  
However, the “third sector” approach is not a panacea and serious problems remain 
in spite of reform efforts and their successes (Oruko and Ndung’u, 2009). Foot and Mouth 
disease (FMD), Contagious Bovine Pleurapneumonia (CBPP) in cattle and Rift Valley 
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Fever disease in both cattle and humans have continued to inflict serious losses to livestock 
farmers, especially the rural poor. For example, in 2011 there were 60 outbreaks of FMD 
reported in Kenya, 58 in Ethiopia, 15 in Uganda, 57 in Ghana, and 161 in Burkina-Faso 
(FAO, 2012b). Over 15 million cattle, sheep and goats suffer from FMD annually (Knight-
Jones and Rushton, 2013). The overall economic costs of FMD for each country in East 
Africa is estimated to be US$4.5 billion annually (ILRI, 2012). In 2002, 87 outbreaks of 
CBPP were reported in East Africa, 54 of which occurred in Uganda, 18 in Kenya and 15 
in Tanzania (Tambi et al., 2006). Estimates by Rich and Wanyoike, (2010) indicate that the 
2007 outbreak of Rift Valley Fever disease in Garrisa and Injara districts in Kenya led to 
economic losses of US$9.3 million in the two districts (Rich and Wanyoike, 2010) which 
is more than twice the budget expenditures of the two districts estimated to be US$3.5 
million. These values include both direct and indirect costs such as loss in milk, and 
abortions as well as losses made when sick animals are sold to avoid total loss due to death 
and losses to traders and slaughter houses. 
A study of livestock keepers in Northern Ghana by Mockshell et al (2014) showed 
that such losses are not only important from the perspective of national development, but 
are also important for household welfare especially as asource of food (milk and meat), 
income, draft power (transportation and animal traction) and food nutrients required for 
human development (Bender et al., 2006; FAO, 2011). For poor people who depend on 
livestock, every animal lost can be a threat to the family’s livelihood and future 
development opportunity. Moreover, with the current European Union (EU) led “zero 
tolerance” standards on free disease regions, poor livestock keepers are missing out from 
the increasing global demand for food of animal origin, which is the driving force behind 
the “livestock revolution” (Otte et al., 2004; Wymann et al., 2007). 
Why do these problems remain in spite of all of the previous reform efforts? As will 
be discussed in this paper, a major reason can be seen in the neglect of the governance 
challenges that are inherent in each of the three sectors—public, private, and third—which 
can be involved in the provision of animal health services (Birner & Gunaweera, 2002). 
While “good governance”[deliberate effort to create workable arrangements to ensure 
continuity and mutuality in exchange (Williamson, 2005)] has been on the development 
agenda since the late 1990s (UN, 1998), governance issues have remained relatively 
neglected in the debate on animal health services. As noted by Vallat and Mallet (2006), 
good governance is a key to addressing the emerging and re-emerging animal disease 
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threats. Yet, little attention has been paid to this problem. According to the World Bank 
(1994), good governance is characterized by predictable, open and enlightened policy 
making; a bureaucracy instilled with a professional character; an executive arm of 
government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public 
affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law. This definition is of particular relevance 
because it emphasizes the need for transparency and accountability in policy making 
process and the significance of all actors performing their responsibilities effectively, in a 
sustainable, coordinated and coherent manner. Such actors may include political actors and 
institutions, interest groups, civil society, and non-governmental and transnational 
organizations. Sustaining coordination and coherence among actors is key to promoting 
suitable governance for veterinary health policies (Vallat and Mallet, 2006). 
The problems inherent in public sector service provision are well known. In fact, 
they have been the major reason for the drive towards privatization in the 1980s. One 
problem is the absenteeism of extension staff: veterinarians and other staff are absent from 
their duty stations and fail to visit their clients since it is very difficult for the government, 
especially the central government, to supervise them. The problem of absenteeism of civil 
servants is a serious problem for service providers in primary education and health 
(Chaudhury and Hammer, 2006). Another problem is sub-standard performance, which 
arises from the information asymmetry problem-the livestock keeper has difficulties to 
assess whether a negative result, such as the death of a sick animal, is due to lack of effort 
and skills of the service provider or due to reasons beyond his or her control (Leonard and 
Leonard, 1998, 1999; Leonard, 2002). A third problem is the propensity of public sector 
service providers to demand “fees” or accept favors or bribes in return for preferential 
treatment from veterinarians (Heffernan and Misturelli, 2000). As a consequence, poor 
livestock farmers have less access to their services, resulting in a problem also referred to 
as “elite capture”-the better off farmers are able to capture a larger share, or all, of the 
public spending made for the provision of these services (Birner and Anderson, 2007). 
Public sector service provision is also affected by a range of problems, which are not the 
“fault” of individual staff. Lack or delay of the government funding necessary to vaccines 
and equipment, low salaries and failure to pay the salary of service providers in time, are 
frequent problems in developing countries.   
The private sector has its own challenges just like the public sector. Some 
challenges were well-known and addressed in the early analytical frameworks (see Section 
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2). Preventive services such vaccinations have positive externalities and involve collective 
action problems. For example, individual livestock keepers have incentives to “free-ride” 
and save costs by not vaccinating their animals, assuming that others vaccinate. Such 
problems justify government involvement. However, other governance challenges of 
private service provision have been underestimated, as the experience of the privatization 
reform has shown. Substantial market failures arise due to the high travel costs of serving 
livestock keepers, especially in pastoral areas and for private veterinarians who for the 
most part do not live close to or in marginal are. Cash constraints faced by such farmers 
aggravate the problem. The challenge of information asymmetry mentioned above also 
applies to private animal service providers. Hence, substandard service provision may also 
apply in this case. Private veterinarians who sell veterinary drugs also face a conflict of 
interest or adverse selection and moral hazard problem, as they may be inclined to sell 
substandard or non-essential drugs (Leonard, 2000).  
Community animal health workers- the “third-sector” providers-are subject to the 
same governance challenges that arise from information asymmetry, yet may be better able 
to overcome the problem of high transaction costs of service provision. They can demand 
lower fees because they live in rural areas and do not have to recover the high investment 
in education that a university-trained veterinarian has to make. However, the downside of 
this low-cost provision is that they are also less well-trained. Moreover, they are not 
subject to the same mechanisms of government regulation and self-regulation that 
characterizes the veterinary profession. In addition, if the community is expected to fund 
such health workers collectively, the typical free-rider problem of collective action 
problems may jeopardize their funding. If non-governmental organizations or donors 
provide funds for community animal health workers, they are subject to a similar or even 
greater problem regarding the unreliability of funding than their public sector counterparts. 
Also, people may not feel obliged to pay for their services or value their services if a donor 
is providing the funding 
To devise institutional arrangements that can address these governance challenges, 
there is a need to expand existing analytical frameworks. This paper proposes a transaction 
costs approach to achieve this goal. Specifically, we propose a framework that is based on 
the so-called “discriminating alignment hypothesis” developed by Williamson (1991). The 
transaction costs framework, which is further explained in the next section, has been 
selected for four major reasons: First, acknowledging that there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
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solution, the framework makes it possible to identify the context-specific factors that 
determine the comparative advantage of different institutional arrangements for providing 
animal health services. Hence, the framework makes it possible to move “from best 
practice to best fit”, which has been a major insight in the literature on governance in 
developing countries (Birner et al., 2009; Grindle, 2007; World Bank, 2004). Second, 
rather than “re-inventing the wheel”, this framework is compatible with the existing 
frameworks (that focused on public economics) and makes it possible to build upon the 
rich insights that have been derived from such frameworks. Third, the Williamson’s 
transaction costs framework has been widely used in assessing the comparative advantage 
of empirically observed institutional arrangements. Hence, even though the empirical 
research for the animal health services still needs to be carried out, the framework has 
considerable promise for its application to this area. The fourth reason relates to the fact 
that transaction costs is a broader concept than market failures (Arrow, 1969), which 
considers market failures as well as process based challenges in the supply and demand of 
animal health services 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the conceptual framework 
and explains how it is linked to existing frameworks. Section 3 interprets the existing 
literature in the context of the new framework with the goal of deriving hypotheses about 
the comparative advantage of different institutional arrangements for animal health service 
delivery. Section 4 discusses the empirical approach and presents results for the case of 
clinical services to test the hypotheses. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2 A Transaction Cost Framework for analyzing veterinary service delivery 
As indicated above, the framework developed in this section builds upon existing 
frameworks. Therefore, those frameworks are briefly reviewed first. 
 
2.2.1 A review of analytical frameworks 
The main analytical frameworks used to determine which animal health services should be 
provided by the public versus the priviate sector was published in 1994 by Umali et al. 
(1994). Their seminal contribution was the application of the concepts of public and 
private goods to animal health service delivery. A public good is defined in this literature 
as a good that is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption, implying that 
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individuals cannot be effectively excluded from its use (non-excludability) and that the 
consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce its availability to others (non-
subtractabilty). Using these concepts, Umali et al. (1994) classified animal health services 
based the economic attributes of non-subtractability and non-excludability to determine 
whether a service is a public good or a private good. Subtractability occurs if the 
production or use of a service reduces the quantity of this service that is available to others, 
while excludability arises when only those who pay for the service benefit from it. 
 
Table 2.1 Animal health services that should be provided by the private and public 
sector based market failures 
Veterinary service Public Private Economic Attribute of Veterinary Service 
Clinical      
Treatment & diagnosis of endemic 
diseases 
   Private good 
Diagnostic and treatment of 
epidemic diseases 
   Public good with externality 
Preventive    
Vaccination    Public good (correcting free rider problem) 
Vector control-ticks     Public good (correcting free rider problem) 
Vector control-Tsetse fly    Public good (correcting free rider problem) 
Slaughter of animals (meat 
hygiene/inspection) 
   Measure to correct moral hazard 
Quarantine    Measure to correct externality 
Surveillance and regulation    Public good 
Public health    Public good with externality 
Production     
Research ,extension and training     Public private good 
Breed improvement.    Private good 
Animal drug distribution    Private good  
Animal drug quality control    Measure to correct moral hazard 
Source: Ahuja (2004); Umali et al. (1994) 
 
A veterinarian who diagnoses and treats an animal with endemic diseases has less 
time available to treat other animals and the benefits that arise from treating this animal 
only accrue to one livestock farmer. According to this reasoning, the treatment and 
diagnosis of a disease like Tryponamiasis is considered a private good and should therefore 
be provided by the private sector (see Table 2.1 below). Ahuja and Redmond (2001, 2004) 
expanded this framework by considering not only public goods attributes, but also 
externalities and moral hazard problems that are generated by a particular service. An 
externality is a cost or benefit that is not transmitted through prices and is incurred by a 
party who was not involved in the use or production of that service. Moral hazard arises 
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when both the livestock owner and veterinarian fail to effectively monitor the effort that 
the other devotes to the production of the contracted service (Leonard, 2000). Ahuja and 
Redmond recommend that those services that exhibit public goods attributes and produce 
externalities should be provided by the state and that those that exhibit private good 
attributes and produce no externalities should be provided by private service providers (see 
Table 2.1).  
 
2.2.2 The transaction cost framework: An illustration 
The framework presented in this paper is based on transaction cost theory as developed by 
Williamson (Williamson, 2005, 1991, 2000, 1989), and its application to agriculture, 
natural resource management and rural service provision by Birner and Braun (2009) and 
Birner and Wittmer (2004). The logic behind the application of the transaction costs 
paradigm is as follows: Veterinary services differ in their attributes (characteristics) and 
these attributes need to be identified to derive implications for the choice of governance 
structures. Although the literature on animal health service delivery identifies many 
institutional arrangements such as decentralization government structures, community 
animal health workers and para-veterinarians (paraprofessional) system, and cost sharing, 
this study considers the following three main service delivery systems: paraprofessionals, 
professionals and referrals for analytical purposes. Paraprofessional system is one with 
service providers having experience in animal health care but no formal training. They are 
often called Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) and are found mainly in 
marginal areas (Peeling and Holden, 2004). Animal Health Assistants (AHAs) with 
certificates or diplomas in animal health or general agriculture also belong to the 
paraprofessional system (Schneider, 2011, 2006). Professional system is one with services 
providers having degrees in veterinary medicine, while the referral or integrated system is 
one that links government veterinarians with private veterinary professionals, 
paraprofessionals and farmers.  
These systems differ in terms the costs, accessibility, and quality of service offered. 
Applying Williamson’s alignment hypothesis to this area suggests that veterinary services 
that differ in their characteristics should be aligned with a system or an institutional 
arrangement or governance structure, that “differ in their costs and competencies, so as to 
yield transaction cost economizing result” (Williamson, 1991; pp. 277). Following 
Williamson’s concept that transaction costs are the costs of using a specific governance 
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structure (Williamson, 1979, pp. 243), transaction costs are defined here to include the 
costs incurred by a farmer  accessing the service, failing to access the service (access 
failure costs), and an inadequate provision of the service (effort failure costs) such as costs 
relate antimicrobial resistance like repeat treatment costs for same case from a different 
service provider resulting from inadequate prescription and wrong diagnosis from the first 
service provider. In contrast, production costs include the costs of the drugs or vaccines 
and the cost of the labor of the service provider. 
Access costs include transport costs, communication costs, opportunity costs of 
time spent by the livestock keepers, and, if applicable, bribes paid to access the service. 
Losses caused by delays in reporting a disease due to communication problems, such as 
(lack of access to mobile phones), are also access costs. Access failure costs include the 
loss due to the death of the animal as a result of failing to access a service, the reduction in 
milk yield and growth rates; and any reduction in the price of selling the animal or its 
products that result from failure to access animal health services. Effort failure costs arise 
if the livestock keeper has access to the service, but faces problems regarding the quality of 
the treatment, which is caused by information asymmetry (Leonard, 2000). Such costs arise 
due to delays, poor diagnosis, prescription of the wrong drugs, or the supply of sub-
standard drugs by the service provider. Like access failure costs, these costs may include 
the loss of the animal or loss in weight and milk production that could have been prevented 
if the treatment was appropriate. Effort failure costs can also arise from diverting public 
resources for service delivery for private gains (embezzlement). For example, a 
government veterinarian may purchase vaccines that are not enough to vaccinate the target 
number of animals, but records the target number and uses the saved funds for his own 
purposes. It is important to note that “effort failure costs”, as defined here, only refer to 
costs arising due to substandard performance or wrong-doing of the service providers. An 
animal may die even in the case of correct treatment. Such cases would not be considered 
to be an “Effort failure”. Based on transaction cost economics, the magnitude of these costs 
vary depending on service attributes and animal health delivery system. 
The hypotheses regarding the appropriateness or cost effectiveness of different 
animal health service delivery systems (governance structures) is illustrated in Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 below. These diagrams illustrate a cost-effectiveness analysis (comparing the costs 
arising under different governance structures to produce a defined output). The rationale of 
Williamson’s discriminating hypothesis is that governance structure (institutional 
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arrangement) A is considered to be more cost-effective than governance structure B or C if 
a defined output-in this case a service of defined quality that reaches a specified number of 
users-can be provided by governance structure A with lower costs than B or C. 
Hypothetical cost curves are used to analyze the comparative advantage of different 
governance structures by representing the total costs of producing the specified output 
under the different governance structures. Since the goal of selecting a governance 
structure is to minimize total costs, production and transaction costs have to be considered 
simultaneously. The attributes of the transactions, which influence the comparative 
advantage of different governance structures, are displayed on the horizontal axis, as in 
Figure 2.1 below (Williamson, 1991; pp. 284). A set of these attributes determines the 
appropriateness of these arrangements and will be discussed in Section 3, based on a 
review of the existing literature. In a cost-effectiveness analysis, the output is held 
constant. However, differences in service quality or in the number of livestock keepers 
with access to the service can be included in the analysis. Such changes are reflected as 
increased costs: reducing the number of livestock keepers served with a given level of 
resources is equivalent to increasing the resources needed (i.e., increasing the costs) to 
reach a given number of livestock keepers. The same consideration applies to the quality of 
service: reducing the quality of service provided with a given level of resources is 
equivalent to increasing the effort failure costs (the costs of providing substandard service). 
 
Figure 2.1 High transaction intensity and systems cost effectiveness. 
Source: Adapted from Birner and Braun (2009, pp.292) 
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In Figure 2.1, the vertical axis indicates the total costs arising from the delivery of a 
specified animal health service, according to the above considerations. The horizontal axis 
displays those attributes that influence the cost-effectiveness of different institutional 
arrangements for service delivery. In a two-dimensional diagram, one can only consider 
the change in one attribute on the horizontal axis, while keeping all other attributes 
constant. However, the same considerations apply to all attributes that cause the same 
direction of change in the cost curves. As further discussed in Section 3, the attributes that 
matter for veterinary services include transaction and care intensity, measurability of the 
service, and state and community capacity. In Figure 2.1, we consider the attribute of 
transaction-intensity for illustration purpose.  
Transaction-intensity refers to the extent to which a service requires a large number 
of activities (transactions) both with regard to time and space (Pritchett and Woolcock, 
2004). For example, tick control is transaction-intensive with regard to both space and time 
because it has to be carried out for all animals in a region at regular time intervals. An 
annual vaccination campaign is also transaction-intensive in terms of space (all animals 
have to be covered), but not with regard to time (as it is only carried out once a year). If 
transaction-intensity is an important attribute for the provision of a particular veterinary 
service activity, one can hypothesize that the paraprofessional system has a comparative 
advantage over a professional or veterinarian system and a referral system. This is 
indicated in the slope of the hypothetical cost curve for paraprofessionals in Figure 1 
above, which increases less than the slope of the cost curves for alternative governance 
structures as the level of the attribute transaction-intensity increases (moving from left to 
right on the horizontal axis). Points A, B and C are the equilibrium positions while the area 
above point A is a relative advantage of the paraprofessional system to professional 
system. Similarly, the area above point B is a relative advantage of the paraprofessionals to 
the referral or integrated system and the area above point C is relative advantage of the 
professional to integrated or referral system. If transaction intensity is low, the 
paraprofessionals system has a low comparative advantage over the other systems. The 
area below point C will be the point of relative advantage of an integrated system to the 
professional system; the area below point B will be a relative advantage point of integrated 
system to paraprofessionals and the area below point A will be the relative advantage point 
of the professional system over the paraprofessionals as shown by slopes of the costs 
curves.  
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Figure 2.2 represents the effect of contextual factors. For example, if 
paraprofessionals had veterinary training their performance and service quality would 
improve, and transaction costs would be reduced (Mugunieri and Irungu, 2002); thus 
shifting downward the paraprofessional curve (shift “A”). This shift causes the relative 
advantage point for the paraprofessional system over the integrated system to shift from 
point F to H. Similarly, the governance system can be made more effective if personnel 
management and regulation is improved, more staffs are recruited, and infrastructure is 
improved. Thus most diseases are reported, diagnosed, and effective control measures are 
taken up immediately (Ahuja et al., 2008). Subsequently, the integrated system’s curve 
shifts outwards and downwards (shift “B”) in Figure 2.2 and the relative advantage point of 
the government system to paraprofessional shifts from point F to G. If paraprofessionals 
are trained and legislation is strong, the equilibrium will be attained at point I. Point I is the 
relative advantage point of the integrated system to professional or improved 
paraprofessional system. 
 
Figure 2.2 Contextual factors and systems cost effectiveness under transaction 
intensity.  
Source: Adapted from Birner and Braun (2009, p.292) 
 
2.3 A transaction cost framework: insights from the literature of animal health 
delivery in developing countries  
The previous section illustrated the use of the transaction cost framework for analyzing 
veterinary services delivery based on the attributes of the transactions involved. In this 
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section, we discuss these attributes and contextual factors in more detail based on the 
existing literature. In this section, market failure attributes (such as externality and free 
rider problem) and governance attributes of animal health services (such as transaction 
intensity, discretion or care intensity, and service measurability) as well as contextual 
factors (such as community and state capacity) are discussed. Their ramifications on 
governance of animal health service delivery systems are examined and hypotheses 
regarding the appropriateness of these systems are generated. In Section 4, household 
survey data of clinical veterinary services in Uganda and Kenya is used to test the validity 
of the above hypotheses generated.  
 
2.3.1 Externalities 
Externalities are costs or benefits arising from a transaction that affect a different 
individual(s) or organization(s) other than those engaged in the transaction and are not 
reflected fully in prices. In other words, an externality occurs if the 
consumption/production of a veterinary service by one farmer or service provider affects 
another farmer's utility or service provider’s ability to produce, without being fully and 
directly reflected by market prices (Merlo and Briales, 2000). For example, the benefits of 
a farmer vaccinating or spraying his or her animals accrue to another farmer who did not 
pay for that service because of reduced risk of exposure to his or her animal from 
neighbouring farmer vaccinating his or her animals. This is an example of positive 
externality (Ahuja, 2004; Umali et al., 1994). A negative externality occurs when a 
quarantine declared by the government inflict significant losses to actors other than farmers 
in the value chain, such as traders, slaughterhouses, casual labourer’s, and butchers (Rich 
and Wanyoike, 2010). If a livestock health service generates an externality, an integrated 
system that involves key actors like farmers, paraprofessionals, veterinarians, NGOs, local 
leaders and government will have a higher comparative advantage than any other system. 
Coase (1960) argues that the optimal solution to an externality is a negotiated solution. The 
role of government would be to organize and enforce the solution. Empirical evidence 
from most developing countries including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda reveals that during 
vaccination exercises, paraprofessionals, veterinarians (especially those from government), 
farmers, local leaders and non-governmental organizations are involved (Ilukor, 2012; 
Wolmer and Scoones, 2005). 
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Hypothesis 1: If a veterinary service is characterized by an externality, the integrated 
system has a comparative advantage over the paraprofessionals or veterinary 
professionals system. 
 
2.3.2 Free rider problem 
A free rider problem occurs if a member of the community or group who obtains benefits 
from the community or group does not contribute or bear a share of costs of the providing 
benefits (Albanese and Fleet, 1985). Unlike in the case of an externality, a free rider 
problem is generated directly by the affected agents or farmers. It is usually an acute 
problem in the collective provision of public goods or services (Stroup, 2000) because of 
low excludability and subtractability in consumption of public goods (Umali et al., 1994). 
Using an example by Umali (1994), farmers asked to contribute for aerial spraying to 
control the tsetse-flies, will shirk or avoid making such a contributions (Ahuja, 2004). 
Other examples of veterinary services for which the free rider problem can occur are 
quarantines and vaccination, if provided collectively. Due to the free rider problem, public 
goods and services are considered to be provided collectively, either through taxes and/or 
subsidies (Ahuja, 2004; Umali et al., 1994). Thus we can hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: If a veterinary service is characterized by the free rider problem, the 
integrated system which has strong government backing has a comparative advantage over 
a paraprofessional, and a professional system. 
 
2.3.3 Transaction intensity 
Pritchet and Woolock define transaction intensity as the extent to which a service requires 
a large number of transactions and face-to-face interactions (Pritchett and Woolcock, 
2004). This concept relates directly to Oliver Williamson concept of frequency of 
transaction (Williamson, 2005). As argued by Pritchet Woolock (2004) and Birner and 
Linacre (2008), transaction intensity is closely linked to economies of scale. Economies of 
scale refer to reduction or increase in the unit cost of providing a service as a number of 
livestock farmers served increases. If the unit cost of providing a service increases as the 
number served increases, the service is said to have low economies of scale. If unit costs 
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decreases as the number served increases, a service is said to exhibit high economies of 
scale. In animal health service delivery, low economies of scale arise from the indivisibility 
of transportation (fixed) costs incurred by service providers irrespective of the number of 
animals he or she will treat (Ahuja, 2004). They also arise from spatial spreading or the 
distribution of clients (livestock keepers) and from the frequency with which a service is 
demanded (Birner and Braun, 2009; Birner and Linacre, 2008; Pritchett and Woolcock, 
2004). For services such as clinical services, breeding, extension, surveillance, and 
diagnostic services, the paraprofessional system will have a comparative advantage over 
professional and referral system because it is closer to farmers other factors kept constant.  
Peeling and Holden (2004) observed in poor rural areas in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Philippines that most farmers were of the view that although veterinarians provide better 
services due to better training, they were located too far from livestock-keepers to be 
accessible at reasonable costs (Peeling and Holden, 2004). Empirical evidence from 
productive areas of Kenya show that Animal Health Assistants are the predominant service 
provider at the farm level because they live closer to farmers and are therefore more 
accessible to farmers (Ndung’u, 2002; Oruko and Ndung’u, 2009). In state of Andhra 
Pradesh in India, Sastry and Raju (2005) found that paraprofessionals have a comparative 
advantage in the provision of clinical services and artificial insemination because they live 
in villages with farmers. These results are also supported by Kathiravan et al. (2011) who 
found that the average cost for travel and waiting time for using veterinarians were higher 
than those of using paraprofessionals for clinical and breeding services.  
 
Hypothesis 3: When a service exhibits high transaction intensity and low economies of 
scale, the paraprofessionals system has a comparative advantage over the referral and 
professional system.  
 
2.3.4 Care intensity 
Care-intensive transactions or services require a service provider to be watchful, cautious 
and diligent (Birner and Wittmer, 2004; Fenoaltea, 1984; Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004) 
and relates to Williamsons concept of asset specificity (Birner and Braun, 2009). Care 
intensity can be measured in terms of the time spent waiting for the service provider after 
the first contact, the time the service provider spends with a farmer, and the number of 
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visits (Wennberg et al., 2009). As Leonard (2000) explains, livestock keepers are more 
concerned with effort, accessibility and timeliness of service providers over formal 
qualifications.  Empirical evidence from the state of Tamil Nadu in India reveals that the 
waiting time for private veterinarians was highest, followed by government veterinarians 
and paraprofessionals (Kathiravan et al., 2011). Similarly, service time for 
paraprofessionals was higher than government and private veterinarians, indicating that 
paraprofessionals tend to provide more attention to farmers’ needs and interests. In 
addition, because paraprofessionals are located closer to farmers, they can more frequently 
visits and monitor an animal’s response to treatment, the probability of death, the in milk 
produced and animal weight loss is reduced thus reducing transaction costs. Accordingly, 
transaction costs curves for paraprofessionals will have a flatter slope the veterinarians.  
 
Hypothesis 4: If a service is characterised with care-intensity, the paraprofessional system 
has a comparative advantage over the referral and veterinary system  
 
2.3.5 Service measurability 
Measurability refers to how difficult it is for people who contract a service to measure and 
predict the actions of the service provider because of uncertainty arising from limited 
knowledge of the person paying for the service (Brown and Potoski, 2003). The concept of 
measurability directly relates to the principal agent-problem that arises from asymmetric 
information and limited knowledge. Measurability attribute is related to Williamson’s 
concept of asset specificity and uncertainty in that the animal health service providers 
(agents) are consulted because they have specialized knowledge or skills, but the principals 
(livestock keepers) cannot be sure that the service providers’ skills and efforts are 
appropriate to solve their problem (Ly, 2003). Therefore, in repeated interaction, the 
principals may lose confidence and trust in the quality of the services offered by the 
practitioners especially if the outcomes of the transactions are bad. Consequently, 
principals may reduce their consumption of the services and they may only be prepared to 
pay an amount that is less than the value of the lowest-quality services available in the 
market (Leonard, 2000). As a result, a so-called “lemon market” arises. This theory was 
developed by Akerlof (1970) who used the term “lemon” to refer to sub-standard product. 
Phrased differently, a lemon market refers to a situation where the providers of services 
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that meet or exceed professional standards are driven out of the market by substandard 
service providers due to the problem of information asymmetry between service providers 
and clients. 
In the provision of clinical services, for example, a livestock farmer has a limited 
capacity to determine with certainty the quality of care and effort that a service provider 
has employed (Leonard, 2000). If a farmer does not believe that the service provider is 
exerting sufficient effort based on previous experience or experience of someone in his or 
her network, he may be unwilling to pay for the service and may decide to change to 
another service provider. If he has limited options, he may either resort to self-treatment or 
selling the animal at a lower price (Mockshell, 2011) or obtaining poor quality service at a 
lower price. This may result in drug abuse and resistance, in animals thus increasing costs 
and losses to farmers as well as hospitalization costs for humans who develop 
antimicrobial resistance from consuming animal products from those animals (Wang et al., 
2012). Clinical services and other services, such as quality control of drugs, and vaccine 
development, which require expert knowledge, will need to be provided veterinary 
professionals. However, if a service requires less expert knowledge to assess its outcome, 
such as tick control, and breeding, paraprofessionals can be more cost-effective.  
 
Hypothesis 5: With high measurability, professionals will have a comparative advantage 
over paraprofessionals.  
 
However, most services such as disease surveillance and reporting and treating of 
epidemic diseases, require both local and expert knowledge. For such transactions, an 
integrated or referral system will have a comparative advantage. For example, farmers and 
paraprofessionals can observe the signs of an outbreak of Riderpest, but expert knowledge 
is required for an accurate evaluation. Equally, clinical services which have low economies 
of scale, high transaction intensity, and high measurability will require an integrated or a 
referral system.  
 
Hypothesis 6: If a service exhibits a mix of high measurability, externality, care and 
transaction intensity, an integrated or referral system has a comparative advantage over 
the professional and paraprofessionals. 
Addressing Governance Challenges in the Provision of Animal Health Services 
30 
 
2.3.6 Scope of corruption (state capacity) 
Scope of corruption refers to the extent to which an officer is likely to use public resources 
and power entrusted to him or her for personal gains. This problem is manifested in four 
ways: (1) demanding bribes, (2) stealing or misuse of public resources, (3) elite capture 
and (4) influencing peddling (Shah, 2007). In the state of Karnataka in India, where 
veterinary clinical services and vaccination are offered freely by the government, 33% of 
the users paid for the services, 16% reported paying bribes of $2 (Vivekananda et al., 
2010). In Uganda, a report by the Economic Policy and Research Centre (EPRC) revealed 
that in a Tsetse fly control project, $20,975 was recorded to have been released to Pallisa 
district in 2006, but information at Pallisa district indicates that only $1,044 was received 
and the rest was not accounted for (EPRC, 2009). The results for 2007 indicate that funds 
were expended on behalf of the districts by the district administration for provision of 
administrative goods and services rather than tsetse control (ibid). Moreover, no 
accountability was presented for the funds even for those expenditures. 
The scope of elite capture is predominantly a problem in the decision-making 
process by local and central governments and is aggravated by the problem of “rational 
ignorance” where livestock keepers or voters do not always know what the government 
and its opposition are doing to serve their interests, because getting that information is 
costly (Downs, 2011, 1957). Vu (2007) presents two interesting examples: In Thailand 
government rejected vaccination against avian influenza and opted for alternatives like a 
ban on fowl transport and the insertion of microchips in fighting cocks which benefitted 
exporting firms owned by mainly politicians (Vu, 2007). The second example is a case of 
bird flu outbreak detected in July 2003 in Vietnam. The government never publicized it 
and adopted a policy of quiet containment until the situation became out of control (Vu, 
2007). In Uganda, politicians have been observed intervene in providing preventive 
services based on the electoral schedule to please different interest groups. The director of 
animal resources at ministry of agriculture noted that local politicians support traders to 
defy quarantines (see Otim, 2011a; Wetaka, 2011; Monitor, 2012) and veterinarians are 
sent on forced leave to pave way for lifting quarantines. When the president’s intervention 
is thought, he responds after elections. For example, they had petition the president to 
direct local politicians not to interfere with the implementation of quarantines early 2011 
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but the president intervened in January 2012, after the 2011 elections (Presidents Office, 
2012).  
The above example provides evidence that, when scope of corruption and elite 
capture is high, there no clear cut solution. Nonetheless, an integrated system where 
professional veterinarians, civil society, and government engage with each other may be 
appropriate. As Sabin and Dehaven (2012) argue, a well-educated animal health workforce 
will be better poised to actively advance good governance practices of accountability and 
transparency, thus minimizing corruption. However, professional veterinarians in most 
developing countries work in government. The civil society is needed to check the 
activities of the government officials and politicians and build the capacity of the 
community to demand better services (White, 1994). 
 
Hypothesis 7: If the scope of corruption is high, an integrated system has high 
comparative advantage over veterinary professionals and paraprofessionals. 
 
2.3.7 Community attributes or community capacity 
Community attributes refer to social economic attributes of society or local governments 
that affect service delivery (Rose-Ackerman, 2007). These factors may include the 
ethnicity and education level of service providers and farmers, availability of 
infrastructure, community's collective action capacity, and the respective livestock 
production system. Ethnicity and education level of service providers is relevant in 
facilitating  communication between a service provider and the farmer (Rushton, 2009) as 
well as building trust between a farmer and service provider (Oruko and Ndung’u, 2009). 
However, education levels in pastoral communities are low, and veterinarians who are 
hired by government are often from different ethnic backgrounds and cannot speak the 
same language as the farmers. In addition, veterinarians posted to these areas are often 
reluctant to work there (Hassan, 2003). Positions for the veterinarians are advertised, but 
no or few applications are received because pastoral areas have poor transport, 
communication, housing infrastructure, and the area is often insecure (Watson, 2008). As a 
result, there are very few veterinarians in such areas. Consequently, paraprofessionals have 
a comparative advantage in such areas relative to veterinarians because they can survive 
under above environment (Peeling and Holden, 2004). However, most paraprofessionals 
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are not well educated and not trained for the job, resulting in drug abuse and increased drug 
resistance (Mugunieri et al., 2004). An integrated system of veterinarians and 
paraprofessionals may have a comparative advantage since it can avoid these problems. In 
fact, a veterinarians in the Karamajong region in Uganda remarked during our field work 
that he often ask the community animal health workers, especially those he has trained to 
substitute for him when he is out of station. 
Another important community factor is the community's collective action capacity 
which is often measured by membership in veterinary association and participation of 
community members in farmer groups, cooperatives, and service provider associations like 
CAHWs associations. Community groups and institutions help establishing and strengthen 
social networks which can serve as communication channels for gathering new knowledge 
and information regarding the control of diseases (Ireland and Thomalla, 2011). Groups 
also help in redressing  or reducing the scope of corruption and elite capture (Dasgupta and 
Beard, 2007) and enable farmers or citizens to pool their resources together to minimize 
production risks (Ireland and Thomalla, 2011). For example Githunguri Dairy cooperative 
in Kenya has overcome perceived risks of inadequate quantities of milk, the problems 
related to milk collection, transportation and processing and have widened their market 
share. This has increased farmer income and their capacity to seek services from private 
veterinarians and Paravets (FAO, 1999). Empirical evidence from Uganda show that areas 
with high community collective action capacity have reduced poverty rates (Kwapong et 
al., 2012).  
 
Hypothesis 8: If the community capacity is high the comparative advantage of veterinary 
professional’s increases relative to paraprofessionals. Paraprofessionals could only 
benefit by working together with veterinary professionals. 
 
The transaction cost approach described above shows that in terms of cost-
effectiveness, the market failure theory is useful, but not sufficient in analysing 
institutional arrangements or systems for providing animal health services. The sufficient 
condition requires that both governance factors together with market failures should be 
considered in the analysis of animal service delivery. From the market failure literature, 
two attributes have been identified: externality and free rider problem. The ramifications of 
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these attributes for the delivery of animal health services are quite clear and discussed in 
Ahuja (2004) and Umali et al.(1994). For example, when a free rider and externality 
problem is high, the more appropriate system is the integrated system. In the case of the 
two governance attributes of care and transaction intensity in both space and time, the more 
relevant they are, the more appropriate system would be the paraprofessional system 
assuming that other factors are held constant. Measurability and high scope of corruption 
require veterinary professionals with technical knowledge. However, most veterinary 
professionals are work in the government, so they are susceptible to political interference. 
Moreover, they are poorly facilitated to perform their task. Therefore, an integrated system 
would be more appropriate than other systems. The approach also hypothesizes that 
veterinary professionals would gain a comparative advantage if community capacity to 
demand animal health services improves.  
 
2.4 Empirical Analyses  
In this section, the paper uses data from a household survey in Uganda and Kenya to test 
these hypotheses by considering a case of clinical services. The data was collected from 
pastoral livestock production districts of Amudat in Uganda and North Pokot in Kenya as 
well as intensive production producing districts of Mukono in Uganda and Kiambu in 
Kenya. The sampling design employed was two-stage clustered sampling. The respondents 
were clustered based on districts and randomly sampled from lists of farmers who 
participated in routine vaccination exercise in each district in the same year. Since the 
target of routine vaccination exercises is all farmers keeping livestock in the district, the 
sampling frame was taken as exhaustive. A total of 476 livestock farmers were 
interviewed. The information collected relates mainly to governance and community 
attributes discussed above and the summary statistics of the data variables are represented 
in Table 2.2 below. The results generally show that 52% of the farmers treated the last 
cases in their farms by themselves, 31% used services of paraprofessionals and only 17% 
used services veterinarians. 
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Table 2.2 Means and Standard Deviation of selected variables for clinical veterinary 
services 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Service System    
Veterinarian 1 if a farmer used the veterinarian service in the last case  treated in 
his/her farm, 0 otherwise 
0.172 0.378 
Paraprofessional 1 if a farmer used the veterinarian service in the last case  treated in 
his/her farm, 0 otherwise  
0.309 0.462 
Self-treatment 1 if a farmer treated last case  in his/her farm by himself or herself, 
0 otherwise  
0.519 0.500 
Service attributes   
Experience A farmers experience in keeping livestock in (Years) 16.498 14.640 
Education  Education level: 1=No-education, 2=Primary, 3= High school, 
4=Certificate 5=Diploma ,6=Degree  
1.868 0.874 
Skills 1 if a farmer has knowledge on methods of treating the recently 
treated diseases, 0 otherwise 
0.445 0.498 
Records 1 if a farmer keeps farm records, 0 otherwise 0.166 0.372 
Epidemic disease 1 If the recently treated  animal disease in the farm is an epidemic 
disease, 0 otherwise  
0.410 0.492 
Disease frequency Frequency with which the disease occurs in a year  6.137 12.960 
TLU Total Livestock Units in a given household  10.346 16.468 
Numpp Number of farmers present when the animal was being treated 1.679 8.076 
Waiting-time Time taken by livestock service provider to come to attend the case 
(Hours) including travel time 
2.236 6.218 
Time-spent Time spent by livestock service provider with the farmer (Hours)   0.551 0.804 
Cash objective 1 if the objective of keeping  livestock is for cash, 0 otherwise 0.557 0.497 
Improved livestock 1 if a farmer if a farmer keeps improved livestock , 0 otherwise   0.357 0.480 
Contextual factors   
Bank account 1 if a farmer has a bank account, 0 otherwise 2.784 1.190 
Credit 1 if a farmer used credit for farming purpose in the previous year, 0 
otherwise  
0.153 0.361 
Phone 1 if the phone is the means of contact with livestock service 
providers, 0 otherwise 
0.479 0.500 
Group 1 if a farmer is a member of a livestock farmers association, 0 
otherwise  
0.300 0.459 
Country 1 if a farmer is from Uganda, 0 for Kenya 0.431 0.496 
System 1 if a farmer is from pastoral systems, 0 Intensive system 0.498 0.501 
Avail_para 1 if a farmer ranked paraprofessionals as available, 0 otherwise 0.496 0.500 
Avail_vet 1 if a farmer ranked veterinarians as available, 0 otherwise  0.269 0.444 
 
2.4.1 Measurements 
As noted by David and Han (2004) and Carter and Hodgson (2006), there are extensive 
measurement problems in the empirical analysis of transaction costs economics because of 
lack of unanimity on the measurement of variables. Because of this limitation, most 
empirical studies in transaction economics apply proxy variables to specific attributes 
(Battu et al., 2002; McMaster and White, 2013). For example, Battu et al. (2002) proxied 
labour specificity with job tenure, and membership in trade unions. In this study, the 
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service of interest is clinical services. This proxy variables are used to test the hypotheses 
generated in the previous sections and demonstrated the application of Oliver Williamson 
discriminating alignment approach in animal health service delivery.  
In the provision of clinical services, the treatment of contagious or highly epidemic 
diseases in one farm produces a positive externality because it reduces the risk of the 
disease spreading to other farms. As a result, disease type can be a proxy variable for 
externality. Transaction intensity is proxied by the frequency with which disease occurs in 
the farm and the total livestock units. Number of community members or neighbours 
present during the treatment of the animal was also considered as a proxy of transaction 
intensity because as Leonard (2000) noted, half of the business for service providers comes 
from requests from farmers in the community after reaching the on call from the another 
farmer. This concept relates to trust and strong social ties resulting from being known to 
the farmers. If you are a known service provider, when you appear in village, then others 
farmers will come around.  In human medical care, Wennberg et al. (2009) consider time 
spent with a patient and time spent waiting for the service provider after first contact as 
proxies for care intensity. In this study, care intensity was proxied by the time that the 
service provider spends with the farmer, takes to respond to the case and the type of 
livestock kept (improved or local). Harris and Newman (1994) observed that the objective 
of farmers who keep improved breeds is to maximize profits through increased milk 
production. Milk production efficiency is associated with increased incidence of metabolic 
disorders, impaired fertility and other health problems such as digestive disorders, skeletal 
disorders, and mastitis (Rauw et al., 1998). Managing these problems requires technical 
skills that farmers do not possess and therefore they would need to use service providers. 
However, as Rauw et al. (1998) argue, undesirable effects resulting from increased milk 
production efficiency require a lot of care, consciousness, and diligence. This means that a 
service provider should be located close to a farmer, be easily available and willing to 
spend a lot of time closely monitoring the welfare of the animal. For these reason, the type 
of livestock is a proxy for care intensity.  
Measurability attributes is also proxied by type of disease and the farmer’s 
experience of keeping animals, educational and record keeping. Epidemic disease 
treatment always requires special skills and resources that paraprofessionals may not 
possess.  Koma (2003) observed that veterinary professionals in Uganda are mainly 
consulted to handle tasks that require special skills or when the animal fails to respond to 
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treatment. Education and experience of a farmer reduces the principle agent problem and 
Williamson’s bounded rationality problem. Thus, farmers with experience and better 
education will tend to use services of veterinary professionals (Irungu et al., 2006). Hall et 
al. (2004) contend that recording extension effort, such as health management, helps to 
reduce imperfect information and enables farmers to gain a better understanding of animal 
health management skills.  
In clinical service delivery, proxy variables regarding the scope of corruption are 
difficulty to capture for two main reasons: (1) Clinical services were privatized and not 
provided by the government and (2) because clinical services are under the private sector, 
the other form of corruption in clinical service delivery is the over prescription of drugs to 
increase sales. This information is difficult to capture using surveys and self-reporting by 
farmers and service providers. The empirical test of the hypothesis generated under 
corruption is difficult for clinical services based on surveys, but can be tested for other 
services such as vaccination, quarantines, and meat inspection, that are provided by 
government. In any case, the empirical examples cited in the literature review should 
provide appropriate insights for the hypothesis regarding corruption. However, in this 
study we use availability of veterinarians and the nation or country variable as a measure of 
state capacity. Jarman et al. (2011) suggest that the capacity country’s veterinary system 
depends on the on availability of veterinarians and level of state engagement in the 
provision of veterinary services. A number of other contextual or community factors were 
also identified and include membership in a livestock farmer association, having a bank 
account, and phone ownership.  
 
2.4.2 The model 
The interest of this paper is to determine the service attributes and contextual factors that 
influence the choice of a given system in the provision of animal health services. Using the 
case of clinical services, the study seeks to analyze the hypotheses generated from the 
literature review using the Williamson discriminating alignment hypotheses. The service 
attributes and contextual factors are indicated in Table 2 are the independent variables, 
while the dependent variable is the choice of the service delivery system. Given the binary 
nature of such choices, qualitative choice models are appropriate for analyzing these 
relationships. The most commonly used models in analyzing such relationships in the new 
institutional econometric analysis are the probit and logit models (Sykuta, 2008). In most 
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applications, the choice between the two models does not make a difference (Greene and 
William, 2007).  
As noted by Sykuta (2008), the nature of questions which transaction costs 
economics theory addresses, presents fundamental problems to statistical modeling. These 
problems include the “fallacy of dichotomous choice”, endogenous decision making, and 
self-selection. The fallacy of dichotomous choice arises when two or more systems are 
used instead of one. We therefore examine three separate models representing the use of 
different service providers: the farmer (self-treatment), veterinary, and paraprofessional. In 
clinical veterinary services, this could arise in two ways: (1) a farmer can decide to consult 
with a paraprofessional or a veterinarian and then the farmer buys the drugs treats the 
animal himself, (2) a farmer uses the services of a paraprofessional and the 
paraprofessional consults a veterinarian before treating the animals. This poses a problem 
of determining outcomes of the dependent variable (choice of the system). In the case of 
the first problem, in this study, if a farmer treats the animal himself using modern or local 
medicine or if a farmer consults with a service provider and then decides to treat the animal 
himself, this is considered self-treatment (y=1 and 0 otherwise).  In the case of the second 
problem, a farmer is considered to have used a service of paraprofessional or veterinarian if 
the paraprofessional or the veterinarian treated the animal irrespective of whether he was 
consulted or referred to (the dependent variable representing if the veterinarian or 
paraprofessional was the service used equals to one and 0 otherwise). 
Endogeneity problems arise because choice or use of paraprofessional or the 
veterinarian services depends on the availability of veterinarians or paraprofessionals 
respectively and their availability. To circumvent this problem of endogeneity, a two-step 
procedure described in Rothe (2009 and Dong(2010) was used to correct for the 
endogeneity problem. In the first stage, perceptions about the availability of service 
providers are estimated using a reduced form probit model that includes contextual factors 
or production system variables, which influence both the availability and use of the 
services of animal health service providers and the residuals were extracted. The estimates 
of the regressor and the extracted residuals were used in the second stage to estimate 
structural equation as control variables to the estimated equation. Both the structural and 
reduced form equations were estimated using maximum likelihood probit with robust 
standard errors. The coefficients of the first step errors for veterinarian availability 
(Errorvet) and paraprofessional availability (Errorpara) as shown in Table 4, were 
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positive and significant with use of veterinarian and paraprofessional services respectively. 
This suggests that availability of service providers is endogenous in the structural equation 
and the unobserved variables that affect use of the service provider’s services also 
increases their availability.  
Formally, the two step probit model is:  
 
 
where i = 1,….., N and variable  represents aspects that influence the choice of a service 
provider captured as a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the farmer used the 
services of a particular service provider and zero otherwise. The variable  is vector of 
endogenous variables,  is a vector of exogenous variables, and   is a vector of some the 
variables in . The equation  is expressed in reduced form and β and α are vectors of 
structural parameters, while is a vector of reduced form parameters.  
According to Dong(2010), the use instrumental variable which is outside the model 
is generally preferrable than using the one within functional form. However, in the absence 
of the good instrument, endogeneity can be controlled using a two-step approach (Dong, 
2010; Rothe, 2009). In this particular case, we tested different instruments including 
production system and country of farmers but both the the Sargan-Hansen test and 
Hansen's J statistic revealed that the instruments are not valid. Therefore, a two-step 
approach was most suitable alternative. Another concern with regards to this study is that 
of sampling design chosen. Since, we used one stage clustered sampling where districts 
were clusters and farmers sampled using simple random sample, probit models with and 
without cluster weights were estimated. The standard errors of probit model without cluster 
weights were much larger than those of the model with cluster weights. So, we estimated 
probit model with cluster weights and robust standard errors. Finally, we also checked for 
collinearity of variables included in the structural model. The variance Inflation factor 
(VIF) for all variables including the error terms from the first step regression were below 
10. This suggests that collinearity was not a problem.  
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2.5 Results 
Results from empirical analyses are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The log-likelihoods in 
all models exhibit robustness of the models. Table 2.3 contains results from reduced form 
estimation about farmers’ perceptions regarding the availability of service providers. 
Results show that the availability of service providers significantly varies with system of 
production and country. Uganda as opposed to Kenya has a negative relation with 
availability veterinarians and a positive relationship relation with availability of 
paraprofessionals. Based on Jarman et al. (2011) observation that the countries veterinary 
system depends on availability of veterinarians, it can be deduced that Uganda’s veterinary 
system weaker than the Kenyan systems. This can be attributed to variations in the degree 
or level of privatization and state involvement in provision of veterinary and agricultural 
services in general. Earlier studies by Bennell (1997) and  Jayne et al. (2002) reveal that 
Kenya did not completely adopt privatization policy as compared to Uganda.  The system 
variable has a negative coefficient with the availability of both paraprofessionals and 
veterinarians suggesting that pastoral livestock production systems have inadequate animal 
health service providers relative to intensive livestock production systems. This finding 
supplements the existing literature on inadequate or limited numbers of animal health 
service providers in the pastoral areas ( see Ahuja, 2004; Catley et al., 2004; Admassu et 
al., 2005) 
The availability of paraprofessionals was found to have a negative relationship with 
availability of veterinarians and the availability of veterinarians was found to have a 
negative relation with the availability of the paraprofessional, suggesting a competitive 
relationship between veterinarians and paraprofessionals. Having a phone is positively 
associated with the availability of the veterinarians, but has no significant association with 
the availability of paraprofessionals. This suggests that veterinarians are more easily 
available in areas with mobile network coverage while mobile phones do not affect 
availability of paraprofessionals because they are nearer and could be visited in person. As 
expected, results indicate that in pastoral areas, paraprofessionals have a comparative 
advantage than veterinarians.  
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Table 2.3 A reduced form probit models for availability of veterinary service 
providers 
 Availability Paraprofessional Availability of Veterinarians 
Variable  dy/dx  Std. Err.  Z dy/dx  Std. Err.  z 
Account -0. 017 0.023 -0.73 -0.001 0.017 -0.58 
Credit -0. 015 0.067 -0.22 -0.007 0.051 -0.14 
Phone  0. 107 0.069  1.54  0.203*** 0.052  3.93 
Group  0.075 0.052  1.45  0.007 0.041  0.18 
Country  0. 111*** 0.041  2.69 -0.123*** 0.032 -3.79 
System -0.331*** 0.064 -5.86 -0.295*** 0.054 -5.44 
Avail_para    -0.282*** 0.032 -8.74 
Avail_vet -0.416*** 0.050 -8.24    
Number of obs   =   476  Number of obs   =   476 
LR chi2(8)   =   136.42  LR chi2(8)   =   221.05 
Prob > chi2   =   0.0000   Prob > chi2   =   0.0000  
Pseudo R2   =   0.2067  Pseudo R2   =   0.3986 
Log likelihood   =   -261.71297  Log likelihood   =   -166.58779 
Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
The empirical results from the structural equation are presented in Table 2.4. The 
test of significance is the Wald Likelihood ratio test, which follows a chi-square 
distribution with 3 degrees of freedom and z test with a 5% significance level. The models 
for the use of a veterinarian, a paraprofessional as well as self-treatment are statistically 
significant (P<0.0001). From Table 2.4, it is apparent that variables for measurability 
attribute such as disease type, experience, skill, education, and keeping records, are 
positive and statistically significant in influencing the use of veterinarian services. 
However, experience, skill, education, disease type and keeping records have a negative 
and statistically significant influence on the use of paraprofessional services. These results 
suggests that possession of skills and experience, education and recording keeping 
positively influence the use of veterinarian services compared to paraprofessional services. 
These results support hypothesis 5, which states that with high measurability, the 
veterinarians (professionals) will have a comparative advantage over the paraprofessionals.  
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Table 2.4 A probit regression models for the use of veterinarian, paraprofessional and 
self- treatment system of providing veterinary services 
Systems  Veterinarian Paraprofessionals Self-treatment 
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. 
Age  0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001  0.001* 0.001 
Experience  0.004*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001  0.000 0.001 
Education  0.073*** 0.023 -0.047 0.032 -0.029 0.015 
Skills  0.033* 0.016 -0.102*** 0.031  0.077*** 0.017 
Records  0.137*** 0.029 -0.170*** 0.054  0.002 0.033 
Epidemic disease  0.156*** 0.032 -0.122** 0.046 -0.062 0.038 
Frequency -0.003 0.003  0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
TLU -0.007*** 0.002  0.002** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 
Numpp -0.001*** 0.000  0.001* 0.001  0.000 0.000 
Waiting-Time  0.006*** 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.007* 0.003 
Time-spent -0.035 0.025  0.112*** 0.016 -0.074** 0.026 
Improved livestock -0.100*** 0.043  0.118*** 0.026 -0.023 0.025 
Account  0.022*** 0.003 -0.038*** 0.005  0.010 0.008 
Credit -0.060** 0.023  0.074* 0.033  0.009 0.017 
Cash objective  0.079*** 0.017 -0.102*** 0.028  0.018 0.013 
Phone  0.054 0.056  0.012 0.121 -0.003 0.054 
Group -0.019 0.045 -0.068** 0.026  0.018 0.016 
Gender  0.014 0.018  0.014 0.014 -0.017 0.014 
Nation -0.020 0.067  0.078* 0.043 -0.014 0.018 
Avail_para  0.689 0.419  0.445*** 0.058 -0.414* 0.174 
Avail_vet  0.370*** 0.048  0.427** 0.160 -0.403** 0.050 
Errorvet  0.431* 0.176  0.056 0.080 -0.175 0.104 
Errorpara -0.014 0.067  0.198** 0.068 -0.113*** 0.013 
N 476 476 476 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood -364.335 -46.568 -259.965 
Wald Chi2(3) 136.71 138.10 211.12 
Pseudo R2 0.4251 0.4276 0.6993 
Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
The proxy variables for transaction intensity, such as the number of community 
members (farmers) or neighbours present during the treatment of the animal and the total 
number of livestock units, have a significant and negative influence on the use of 
veterinarian services, but have a positive influence on the use of paraprofessional services. 
The total livestock unit decreases the probability of using veterinarian services because the 
probability of animal falling sick is high (Hill et al., 2009). This translates to increased 
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frequency of transaction and transaction costs. The number of farmers present in treatment 
of the animal increases probability of using a paraprofessional services because they are 
known to the farmers as opposed to veterinarians thus, increasing the economies of scale 
for paraprofessionals relative to the veterinarians. These results support hypothesis 3 which 
states that when a service exhibits high transaction intensity and low economies of scale, 
the paraprofessionals system has a comparative advantage over the referral and 
professional system.  
Care-intensity variables, such as waiting time, were found to positively influence 
the use of veterinarian services and negatively influence the use of paraprofessional 
services, suggesting that when farmers contact veterinarians, veterinarians tend to respond 
more quickly than paraprofessionals. This suggests that professional veterinarians are more 
responsive to farmers’ needs than paraprofessionals thus countering hypothesis 4. It is also 
possible that the waiting time is not a correct proxy for care-intensity because it could 
mean that veterinarians do not have many customers and can afford to reach the farmers 
faster. Therefore, waiting time could be a good proxy for transaction intensity. However, 
the service provider’s time spent with the farmer and if a farmer keeps improved animals 
positively influence the use of paraprofessionals but negatively influence the use of 
veterinarian services. These results suggest that, even if veterinarians take a shorter time to 
respond to farmers, they cannot provide farmers with adequate attention and care. These 
results confirm our hypothesis 4 that when a service has the attribute of care-intensity, the 
paraprofessional system has high comparative advantage over the veterinarian system.  
Community capacity and particular farmers’ characteristics, like having bank 
account and keeping livestock for cash or commercial purposes, positively influence the 
use veterinarian services and negatively influence the use of paraprofessional services. 
This suggests that a veterinarian system may not survive in pastoral areas which lack banks 
or financial institutions and where livestock is kept mainly for food rather than cash. Group 
variable was found to negatively influence the use of paraprofessional services but no 
evidence exists to support that it influences the use of veterinarian services. Overall, these 
results support hypothesis 8, which states that; if the community capacity is high the 
comparative advantage of veterinary professional’s increases relative to paraprofessionals. 
Paraprofessionals could only benefit by working together with veterinary professionals.  
The country or nation variable was found to positively influence the use of 
paraprofessionals services, but no significant evidence exists to suggest that the country 
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variable influences the use of veterinarian services. This is probably because 
paraprofessionals are more available in Uganda as opposed to Kenya as shown by the 
results in Table 2.3. The non-significant evidence for use of veterinarian services and 
country could mean that veterinarians involved in provision veterinary services are few in 
both countries. Another very important result from these models is that, availability of 
paraprofessionals’ increases the use of the veterinarian services and the availability of 
veterinarians’ also increases the use of the paraprofessional services, suggesting the 
existence of synergistic relationship between paraprofessionals and veterinarians. This 
result demonstrates the need to develop a referral system and the importance of the referral 
system in improving state capacity to provide public veterinary services.  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
Previous analytical frameworks for animal health service delivery have mainly focused on 
the theory of market failures. This paper has gone an extra step to include governance 
factors and to demonstrate the application of Williamson’s transaction costs theory or 
discriminating alignment approach to animal health service delivery. The approach enables 
us to integrate insights from market failures, governance, and livestock production system 
attributes and provides a lens for analyzing and addressing governance challenges in 
animal health service delivery. Empirical results show that paraprofessionals, such as 
community animal health workers are desirable because the offer the needed care and 
attention to clients since they are located closer to clients and thus have lower transaction 
costs and may be trusted more by farmers. However, for services that require technical 
expertise, veterinarians will be more cost effective than paraprofessionals. Moreover, a 
referral system may be preferable and significant in building state and community capacity 
to provide veterinary services.  
The limitation of applying Williamson’s discriminating alignment hypotheses to 
animal health service delivery is that veterinary services have a mix of attributes. For 
example, clinical veterinary services are transaction and care intensive and require high 
technical skills. Therefore, it becomes challenging to align a particular service to a 
particular system. Moreover, the contexts in which services operate vary greatly. 
Nevertheless, the insights we gain from this approach is that it is not enough to categorize 
animal health services in terms of public and private goods. Doing so ignores governance 
attributes that ensure continuity and sustained service delivery, as well as variation in 
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technical competences of the service providers and the quality of veterinary services 
offered to livestock farmers. Such categorization of services into public and private 
assumes that the private sector can attract skilled service providers and that users are able 
to measure the quality of the services provided by these service providers. As experience 
has shown, trained veterinarians in most developing countries are found in the government 
sector. Even in the public sector, a limited number of trained veterinarians are willing to 
work in pastoral livestock production systems which have high livestock populations, 
given their remoteness. Worse still, corruption and misuse of public funds has completely 
undermined government capacity to provide veterinary services. 
In light of these observations, a solution lies in improving paraprofessional and 
veterinary relations through referral arrangements. As the results indicate, the use of 
veterinarian services is positively related to the availability of paraprofessional services. 
How referrals between veterinarian and paraprofessionals can be improved is a topic 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we recognize the importance of a synergistic 
relationship between veterinarians and paraprofessionals. Promotion of one system without 
the other reduces the use of the other system. Veterinarians are required for their technical 
expertise, while paraprofessionals are important because their availability to farmers. 
Therefore, governments of developing countries need to develop an integrated animal 
health care system consisting of government and private veterinarians and private 
paraprofessionals together. This would build state capacity and enable animal health 
markets to flourish.    
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This chapter is published with permission from Cambridge University Press to include the 
article in the thesis or dissertation provided that the original source is acknowledged. The 
original article:  The provision of veterinary services: who are the influential actors and 
what are the governance challenges? A case study of Uganda appeared in the Journal of 
Experimental Agriculture Volume 51 / Issue 03 / July 2015, pp 408-434  
Abstract: As a result of continued fiscal challenges from late 1980s to date, the 
government of Uganda liberalized and decentralized the provision of veterinary services. 
As a result, many actors are involved in providing veterinary services without adequate 
regulation and supervision. With the resurgence of infectious diseases, increased economic 
and health risks especially to the rural poor, there is need to understand relational patterns 
of actors to ensure good governance and address emerging and re-emerging animal 
diseases risks. A participatory mapping tool called Process Net-Map was used to identify 
the relevant actors and assess their influence in the delivery of clinical and preventive 
veterinary services in both pastoral and intensive livestock productions systems. The tool 
also serviced to elicit governance challenges in veterinary service delivery. The results 
reveal that important social relations in veterinary service delivery include the following: 
(1) cooperation between private veterinarians and paraprofessionals, as well as private 
veterinarians and government veterinarians in intensive production systems; and (2) 
cooperation between NGOs, government veterinarians, and community based animal 
health workers (CAHWs) in the pastoral areas. Staff absenteeism, insufficient and 
unpredictable budgets, weak legislation, exclusion of technical staff from the decision 
making process and policy illogicality were identified as major governance problems 
veterinary service delivery. The paper concludes that given the existing fiscal challenges, 
the key to improving animal service delivery in Uganda is getting priorities, policies and 
institutions right. 
Keywords: Curative Services and Preventive Services, Process Net-Map Tool
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3.1 Introduction 
The Government of Uganda adopted structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and early 
1990s. This resulted in the decentralization and privatization of clinical veterinary services 
and the downscaling of the civil service (Haan & Umali, 1992). Clinical services, breeding 
and spraying for tick control were privatized, while vaccination of animals against 
epidemic diseases, quarantines and tsetse control were retained under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). The purpose of these reforms was to 
reduce the costs of the public administration and to cut public expenditure. Although the 
share of public administration costs as a proportion of public expenditure declined, this 
effect was offset by the following problems: First, there was an increased cost of budget 
financing resulting from a significant increase in interest rates caused by the increase in 
public budgetary support and the inflow of foreign aid (Lister et al. 2006). Second, the 
creation of additional districts under decentralization resulted in increased public 
expenditure and stressed the capacity and accountability of both local governments and the 
central government. Corruption and financial indiscipline have also become serious 
problems, undermining the partnership between government and donors (Lister, 2006). 
These problems also affected the financing of veterinary service delivery, thus weakening 
the governance of veterinary services. However, studies that examine the nature of these 
governance challenges and the actions and motivation of actors involved in the provision 
of veterinary services are limited, despite the need to identify critical intervention points in 
animal disease control (Rich & Perry, 2010; Schwabenbauer, 2012).  
This study applies Social Network Analysis (SNA) to examine the governance 
problems and identify influential actors in the prevention, treatment, and control of animal 
diseases. Social Network Analysis has become an important approach for analyzing 
governance problems in health systems because many of problems with the provision of 
health care are relational (Luke & Harris, 2007). For example, Blanchet & James (2012) 
have used SNA tools to examine health care systems in Ghana. Provan et al. (2003) have 
also applied these tools to assess inter-organizational collaboration in disease prevention 
and health promotion. 
Most of the social network analysis studies use mathematical processes to estimate 
structural measures of centrality such as “degree”, “betweenness”, and “closeness” and 
“centrality” to examine actors’ perceived influence or power (Borgatti, 2005; Freeman, 
1979; Stephenson & Zelen, 1989). While potentially useful, these measures often turn out 
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to be confusing and contradictory or non-consistent (Freeman, 1979; Stephenson & Zelen, 
1989). They do not account for the fact that the behavior, decisions and interests of actors 
are socially determined (Krackhardt, 1987; Mizruchi & Potts, 1998). For example, if 
peripheral actors are able to directly influence one another, the central actor becomes the 
least powerful node in the network (Mizruchi & Potts, 1998). As a result, relating results 
from mathematically computed indicators with reality in meaningful ways often becomes a 
challenge. As an alternative approach, one could ask respondents to directly state the 
perceived influence or power level the actor has (Krackhardt, 1987).   
A promising new approach to social network analysis is the use of participatory 
social network mapping tools, which rely on the visualization of the networks by the 
respondents. Examples are the “Net-Map” and “Process Net-Map” tools, which use group-
based interviews and mapping techniques. These tools have proved to be very useful for 
both collecting network data and performing a meaningful qualitative analysis of social 
network data because they generate the social network and identify at the same time the 
social-political relations underlying the social network (Gessa, Poole, & Bending, 2008; 
Hogan, Carrasco, & Wellman, 2007; E. Schiffer & Hauck, 2010). As further detailed 
below in the section on Materials and Methods, respondents first identify the relevant 
actors and their relations, before they are asked to rate the power that they perceive each 
actor to have using a visual aid. In the process, respondents are asked to verbally provide 
the reasons why different actors have the influence level attributed to them. The 
respondents my either be key informants or actors who are themselves part of the network. 
The visualization of the network of actors can be done using computer aids or through pen 
and paper. The paper-based approach of arranging ties between actors typically yields 
more reliable results, because they are visually appealing and can usually be understood 
more easily and instantly than maps generated with the use of computer aids (Hogan et al., 
2007). Moreover, the participatory mapping tools are flexible and provide room for 
clarification of concepts during the interview. However, some of the challenges involved in 
these participatory or qualitative techniques include the following: defining the boundaries 
of the network (Heath, Fuller, & Johnston, 2009), and information distortions resulting 
from question-order effects as well as recall failures (Pustejovsky & Spillane, 2009). 
In this paper, the participatory Social Network Analytical (SNA) tool called 
“Process Net-Map” was used to examine governance challenges involved in the provision 
of veterinary services. This tool has been developed by Birner, Cohen & Ilukor (2010) and 
based on the work Schiffer & Waale (2008) with the aim to identify governance challenges 
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encountered in the implementation of development projects (see also Raabe, Birner, Sekher 
& Gayathridevi, 2010 and Schiffer and Hauck, 2010). The tool was applied in this study to 
identify the influential actors in the provision of veterinary services, to study their 
interpersonal interactions, and to identify the governance challenges in different types of 
service provision. The “Process Net-Map” tool is used to map the consecutive steps of the 
process under consideration and identifies the actors involved in this process. Thus, the 
tool circumvents the challenge of defining boundaries of a social network, because it 
follows a defined process and induces the respondents to list the actors involved the start to 
the end of the process. Moreover, questions are sequentially ordered as respondents are 
being asked to describe the process step by step. This makes it easier for respondents to use 
a recall approach. In the original Net-Map tool, respondents were asked to identify all 
actors who influence a certain outcome, an approach that makes recall more challenging. In 
this study, the Process Net-Map tool was used to generate evidence on how social and 
power relations influence the design and implementation of veterinary policies and the 
functioning of veterinary institutions. The tool was also used to identify possible strategies 
for intervention. The results were validated by conducting individual interviews with 
experts in animal health service delivery, such as representatives of the agricultural 
ministry and district governments, opinion leaders, and veterinarians working with 
international and local government organizations. The application of the tool is further 
described in Section 2. The results are presented in Section 3 and synthesized and 
discussed in Section 4. In section 5, the paper presents the conclusions. The results are 
presented in eight categories, distinguishing between clinical and preventive services and 
between pastoral and intensive systems so as to identify the actors and governance 
problems in each of these systems. 
 
3.2 Materials and Methods 
The data used in this study was collected using a combination of stakeholder discussions 
and interviews using the Process Net-Map tool developed by Schiffer and Hauck (2010). 
The application of net map tool involved three phases. In Phase 1, respondents were asked 
in step by step procedure to describe the process delivery, and to identify the actors 
involved in each step. This process provided a robust way to obtain data on established 
patterns of interaction between actors because it enabled participants to narrate what 
happens in real world. The name of the actor mentioned was written on a small card and 
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placed on a large sheet of paper. Different colored arrows where used to represent different 
types of links as in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below. In this study, the main links are information 
flow regarding the disease and the resource flow mainly drugs and money. More actors 
where added whenever the participants recalled them. The arrows were marked with 
numbers, and the respective implementation step corresponding to each number was noted 
down at the border of the paper as shown Figure 3.1 and 3.2. The description of the process 
was continued until the point was reached where the animal was treated or vaccinated.  
In Phase 2, the respondents were asked to define or state the level of influence of 
each actor in ensuring that the sick animal gets treated by putting actors on so called 
“influence towers”, which are a means of visualizing the perceived influence of the 
different actors. To build these “influence towers”, checkers game pieces were used. One 
to eight pieces were stacked on top of each other to show the level of influence of an actor, 
as perceived by the respondent. Those actors who were considered not to have any 
influence on the outcome were not assigned any checkers game piece. Accordingly, actors 
whose influence towers have eight checkers game pieces are perceived to be the most 
influential actors, while those without any checkers game pieces are considered to be least 
influential actor. Respondents were asked to adjust the towers as they deemed necessary 
and to verbally provide the reasons why different actors have the influence level attributed 
to them. The visualization of the influence levels during the interview serves as a useful 
tool to elicit information. In particular, it makes it possible to easily ask the respondent to 
explain the influence levels of different actors’ vis-à-vis each other, which would be 
difficult without visualization, especially if the number of actors is large. In Phase 3, the 
respondents were asked to identify potential problems areas which are likely to make 
veterinary service delivery ineffective. The focus was placed on eliciting the various 
governance problems that are known from the literature (see above), as well as other 
governance problems that may not have received much attention in the literature, so far. 
Table 3.1 displays the number of interviews that were conducted in the two main 
case study districts, and at the regional and national level. A total of 8 Process Net-Maps 
were produced for the study. In addition, 18 interviews without Net-Maps were conducted. 
They served to gain initial insights into veterinary service delivery in order to ensure the 
selection of the right persons to be included in process mapping exercise. Out of 18 
interviews without the Net-Maps, 12 were conducted before the Net-Maps, and 6 
afterwards to cross check and validate information generated from the Net-Mapping 
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process. In each district, four process influence Net-Maps were conducted two in each 
village with farmers, local leaders, at least two paraprofessionals and a veterinarian. Two 
Net-Maps in each district were for clinical services (endemic diseases) and the other two 
were for preventive services (epidemic diseases Control). As mentioned earlier, preventive 
services and control epidemic disease are still under the public sector while clinical 
services are under the private sector. Thus service governance problems, type and number 
actors were expected to vary according to disease type. In addition, two districts with 
distinct livestock production systems were chosen to capture variations in the institutional 
set up, social and physical factors which influence sustainability of animal health delivery 
system (Woodford, 2004). District A was selected to represent a pastoral production 
system and district B an intensive livestock production system. The names of district are 
not disclosed to guarantee anonymity of participants. 
A pastoral system in the context of this paper is a livestock production system were 
farmers keep large number of animals, mainly local breeds, for cultural, food and cash 
purposes (Ruhangawebare, 2010). Pastoral systems in Uganda are mainly characterized by 
seasonal movements in search for water and pasture and are mainly found in Karamoja and 
Ankole regions in Uganda (Inangolet et al., 2008; Kugonza et al., 2011). By contrast, an 
intensive system is one were animals are mainly of exotic breeds and cross-bred. They are 
kept mainly for commercial purposes (Garcia et al., 2008). Some few farmers keep local 
breeds as well in the intensive systems. The types of veterinary service providers in these 
systems vary and they include the government staff, private veterinarians and 
paraprofessional. In the pastoral system, there is group of paraprofessionals called 
community animal health workers (CAHWs) who have three month training in animal 
health management. In the intensive production systems, some paraprofessionals have tone 
to two year training in animal health while other have one to two year training in general 
agriculture (crop and livestock production).  
 
Table 3.1 Number and type of interviews in the two main case study districts 
 Clinical Disease Control Total interviews 
Total interviews 9 17 26 
Use of Net-Map    
with Net-Maps 4 4 8 
without Net-Maps 5 13 18 
Source: Authors 
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3.3 Results 
In the first part of this section, the results for the Process Net-Map exercises for clinical 
services are presented for both for the pastoral and intensive livestock production systems. 
In the second part, the results for the preventive services are presented.   
 
3.3.1 Actors involved in the treatment of endemic diseases  
In the pastoral livestock production system, the description of the process of the clinical 
treatment of endemic diseases presented here is based on interviews with CAHWs, the 
District Veterinary Officer (DVO), fifteen farmers and one animal health assistants. They 
identified East Coast Fever (ECF), Anaplasmosis, Heart Water, Red Water and 
Tryponamiasis as the most common diseases. In the intensive systems, the description of 
the process of treatment of endemic disease control is based on interviews with a 
government veterinarian, 3 paravets, 2 private veterinarians, and 10 livestock farmers in a 
focus group discussion in two different villages. The main endemic livestock disease 
identified respondents were East Coast Fever, Anaplasmoisis and Tryponamiasis. Using 
the Process Net-Map tool, a total of nine actors were identified as the main actors in the 
treatment of endemic diseases in pastoral systems and seven in the intensive livestock 
production systems see Figure 3.1a and 3.1b respectively. According to the interviews, 
they play the following roles in the process: 
 
a. Herdsmen  
In the pastoral system, the herdsmen are mainly children of livestock keeping households, 
who have the task to herd the animals on the common grazing land. They are the first 
actors to notice that an animal is sick. They typically report first to their mother and later to 
their father or head of household. They were ranked as most influential with the score of 8 
because they are close to animal(s) and monitor the status of the animal. If they fail to 
recognize or report a sick animal in time, the animal is likely to die. Just like in the case of 
pastoral areas, the herdsmen in the intensive system observe the sickness and reports to the 
livestock owners. In the intensive system, herdsmen are mainly hired individuals are were 
given a score of 5 because they are closer to the animal and are always able to monitor the 
situation of the animal and report to the livestock owner (see Figure 3.1b). Also, during the 
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follow ups the service provider interacts mainly with the herdsman other than the owner of 
the animals.´ 
 
b. Livestock Owners 
In the pastoral system, when herdsmen report a case to his mother, it is a common practice 
for her to use local drugs first to treat the animal. If the animal does not respond to the 
treatment, she would usually then report to the case to her husband. It is an important 
practice in the pastoral system that households would sell small ruminants (typically a 
goat) to be able to pay for drugs and veterinary services for their cattle. Only the head of 
the household can either authorize the sale of a goat or sell the goat him-self in order to 
buy drugs. Sometimes, the wife may sell chicken in the local markets to buy drugs for 
cattle. From the interviews, respondents noted that the influence of the women in livestock 
keeping households on the outcome of the treatment process mainly stems from the use of 
traditional medicine and from monitoring the animal’s health status. Together with the 
herdsmen, women are involved in the milking, and while milking, they closely observe the 
animals. In addition, because of polygamous family structure in the pastoral areas of 
Uganda, the animals are divided among the different spouses, and each spouse has her own 
animals to provide food for her children. Women have a strong incentive to oversee the 
animal’s health status, because if an animal dies, it is the woman who suffers most, as she 
loses an important source of milk and income. Because of these reasons, women in 
livestock keeping households were ranked as more influential than men. They received a 
score of 7, as shown Figure 3.1a. Men’s influence is in mobilization of resources for the 
treatment of the animal. Although, the management of the animal’s welfare rests with 
women, men have the authority in deciding whether to sell or not sell and that is why men 
were given the a score of 6. When resources or funds are mobilized, the drugs are bout and 
self-administered by either men or herdsmen with help of the women or woman. Rarely are 
services of CAHWs used.  
In the intensive livestock production system, livestock is kept mainly for 
commercial purposes. Therefore, any outbreak is taken serious because it threatens the 
livelihood of the livestock owner. When livestock owners receive the reports of sick 
animal from the herdsmen, they always seek the services of the Paravets, private 
veterinarian or government veterinarian. The respondents identified the livestock owners as 
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the most important actors because they are decision makers, control finances and 
occasionally, they treat their animals themselves. 
 
c. Middlemen 
Middle men were considered as one of the key actors in the pastoral areas and were ranked 
as more influential than the drug shops and CAHWs because they buy animals from 
farmers, thus they are the source of money used to buy drugs from drug shops, and seek 
services of CAHWs. In addition, middlemen help farmers to dispose-off the animal when 
treatment fails. They buy sick animals at a lower price; treat them and later resale at a 
higher price. Because of these reasons, they were given a score of 6, equal to men. The 
challenge, however, is that some of the animals are slaughtered and consumed before seven 
mandate days after treatment. Middle men were not considered as most important actors’ 
in intensive livestock system mainly because animals are mainly kept for dairy products 
rather than beef and the breeds kept are exotic and require attention and care. Thus 
livestock owners have the incentive to use or seek services of service providers rather than 
selling sick animals. Consumers of meat from these animals slaughtered before the 
mandatory seven days are at high risks of developing antimicrobial resistance (McEwen 
and Fedorka-Cray, 2002; Kariuki et al., 2013). 
 
d. Service providers 
In the pastoral systems, farmers mainly buy drugs from the drug shop and treat their 
animals themselves and seek the services of CAHWs when a case fails to respond. 
Consequently the drug shops were ranked as more influential than CAHWs with score of 
5-4, as in Figure 3.1a. In some cases, the NGOs, give drugs to Community Animal Health 
workers who offer services to farmers at subsidized rates. When the cases that are handled 
by CAHWs fail to respond, CAHWs which have higher education and can speak English 
consult the veterinarians. Others give up, and a farmer is forced sell the sick animal. When 
a government veterinarian is consulted, he gives advice or can visit the site if it is 
accessible. When the animals fail to respond, farmers often sell off the animals at cheaper 
prices.  
In the intensive systems, paraprofessionals are the most commonly approached 
service providers because they are available and easily accessible as compared to 
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veterinarians. If the animal is treated by the paraprofessionals and fails to respond to the 
treatment, paraprofessionals often refer the case to mainly private veterinarians and in rare 
cases to government veterinarians. In this system, respondent observed that it is rare for the 
farmers to self-treat their animals, although some farmers do self-treat especially if they 
feel the case is not very complicated and the drug is available. The drug shops are owned 
by mainly veterinarians. The paraprofessionals were regarded as the second most important 
actors to livestock owners with a score of 6 because they are available and easily accessible 
to farmers. Although there are only two active private veterinarians in district B, they were 
ranked as more important than the government veterinarians who are eight in total. They 
were given a score of 6 compared to government veterinarian score of 4 because they are 
able to work well with the paraprofessionals. Paraprofessionals refer cases to private 
veterinarians and use animal drug shops of veterinarians as contact point with farmers. 
They often consult veterinarians and give business to veterinarians by referring farmers to 
them. One veterinarian commented that “we do work with Paravets because they market us 
especially when they refer a farmer to us but at times it makes paraprofessionals insecure.”  
According to the respondents, government veterinarians are perceived to be treating 
paraprofessionals as subordinates and that is why there is always less interaction between 
the paraprofessionals and veterinarians. Secondly, most of the government veterinarians 
are working with the National Agricultural Advisory program as coordinators, a position 
which pays well and takes most of their time. They do not have time to handle cases 
referred to them and have no incentive work closely with paraprofessionals since they have 
assured income and do not need to cooperate with paraprofessionals. Most often, 
government veterinarians refer cases referred them to private veterinarians. The drug shops 
attendants were least influential but important actors each with the score of two. The drug 
shops are link between farmer and service providers. Farmers noted that if the animal is 
sick, they just have to go to the drug shop and they are sure to get at least one 
paraprofessional around the shop or a private veterinarian. In the drug shop, farmers also 
get advice on drug use for those who self-treat and general animal health management if 
they find a veterinarian in the shop. 
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1. Herdsman reports to woman 
2. Woman treats the animal using local drugs 
3. Herdsman and woman reports to man 
4. Herdsman can reports the case to CAHWs 
5. The man sells goat/chicken 
6. The man seeks the services of CAHWs 
7. The man goes to buy drug at drug shop 
8. Man takes the drug tp herdsman 
9. CAHWs buy the drugs from the drug shop 
10. Man pays the CAHWs for the service 
11. CAHWs can refer a case to veterinarian 
12. CAHWs can buy drugs from stockists 
13. DVOs can seek help from NGOs 
14. NGOs give drugs to CAHWs 
15. NGOs give drugs to drug shops 
16. Drug flow stockists to drug shop 
17. Drug flow to CAHWs 
18. CAHWs goes to treat the animal 
 
 X    Perceived level of influence (Scale 0-8) 
1. Herdsman reports to livestock owner 
2. Herdsman go directly to DVO 
3. Herdsman can go to Paravet 
4. Herdsman can go to private veterinarian 
5. Pays for the drugs at drug shop 
6. And gets the drugs 
7. Self treats the animal 
8. Livestock owner can seek services of DVO 
9. DVO buys drugs from drug shop 
10. DVO treats the animal 
11. Livestock owner pays the DVO 
12. Livestock owner can seek services of paravet 
13. Paravets buys drugs from the drug shop 
14. Paravet treats the animal 
15. Livestock owner pays the paravet 
16. Livestock owner can seek services of private 
veterinarian 
17. Private veterinarian buys drugs from the drug 
shop 
18. Private veterinarian treats the animal 
19. Livestock owner pays the private veterinarian 
20. Paravet refer the case to government or private 
veterinarian 
 
 X    Perceived level of influence on the outcome 
 
a: Network of actors Involved in clinical 
treatment of Endemic diseases in the Pastoral 
system 
b: Process and actors influence in the 
treatment endemic disease in the intensive 
system 
 
Figure 3.1 A network of actors involved in treatment of Endemic diseases 
 
e. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
Like middle men, NGOs were only recognized as influential in the pastoral areas 
especially in training and supporting CAHWs as well as the provision of extension services 
through pastoral farmer field schools (PFS). The main skills disseminated through the PFS 
are disease control and deworming. One of the farmers stated “The PFS provide us with 
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Knowledge on spraying, animal health hygiene and diseases. In our PFS, we have 
experimented hand picking of ticks against spraying and we tested different accaricides; 
local herbs against the use of modern veterinary medicines; feeding animal using salt grass 
which is diluted during rainy season against the use of mineral links made from animal 
bones and soil”. This mainly conducted under the supervision of the CAHWs. However, 
the challenge is that most NGOs programs are short lived and when the projects ends, the 
PFS also fail to perform. That is why NGOs were given a score of one as Figure below.   
 
3.3.2 Challenges to treatment of endemic diseases  
Results from process influence mapping reveal that the key problems that are encountered 
in treatment and control of endemic diseases in Uganda are the following:  
 
1. Delays in reporting 
Delays in reporting was found to be a main problem in Pastoral areas because of three 
main reasons: First, livestock keepers prefer local medicine to modern medicine, and by 
the time an animal is attended to, the disease is already out of hand. Second, even if the 
farmer wants to buy modern medicine, they have to sell another the animal to buy drugs. 
Worse still, the distance to the market to sell an animal and buy drugs is very long. The 
main means of transport used are walking and riding a bicycle. Farmers noted that 
sometimes it takes some farmers two to three days on the way to reach the drug shop. 
Third, as observed by one of respondents “the pastoralists’ culture is such that, unless the 
animal falls down or fails to walk, a livestock farmer will not seek a service of service 
provider”. 
 
2. Drug misuse   
In the pastoral systems, drug misuse occurs because of: (1) farmers tend to self-treat their 
animals yet most of them have no education. Farmers are not able to read the labels on 
drug and thus are not able to know how to apply and use the drug. (2) The low level 
education level of CAHWs and language differences limit the interaction between the 
veterinarian and CAHWs. As a result, CAHWs often overuse and administer wrong drugs 
based on wrong diagnosis. When the animal fails to respond farmers refuse to pay for the 
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service and lose the incentive to seek services of community animals’ workers. (3) The 
presence of many drug shops opened by business men without animal health qualification. 
Their objective is to sell drugs, they do not advise farmers on the use and administration of 
the drugs and sometimes they sell expired drugs. The happy cow drug NGO shop under the 
Catholic Church which often gives advice, asks farmers why they are buying drug and 
disease the animal is suffering is always closed. 
In the intensive system, drug abuse problem is common among paraprofessionals 
and farmers. The reasons for the drug abuse problem among paravets are: first, the 
paraprofessionals are trained from an institute which is not accredited. The institute does 
not have the facilities to train Paravets and thus paraprofessionals are ill equipped. 
Secondly, most of these paravets are trained in crop science or general agriculture but 
because of the existence of the market for veterinary services, crop trained 
paraprofessionals have joined the veterinary market. Thirdly paravets are driven with 
desire to make profits and tend to over and under doze the animals in order to increase 
sales and revenue. Over dozing occurs if paraprofessional’s belief that a farmer can afford 
and under dozing occurs if a farmer is not able or willing to pay for right doze. 
Paraprofessionals then decide to give lower doze equivalent to the fee a farmer is able to 
pay. One of the veterinarians remarked that “paraprofessionals always make wrong 
diagnosis and prescription, and overdose the animal and when the animal fails to respond, 
they come running to us to save their image before the farmer. For example, paravets under 
dose goats with Albendozole and when it fails to respond, they come to us and when you 
shift the treatment to trodax the animal gets well. Then you know that animal became drug 
resistant”. 
 
3. Limited qualified staff 
Veterinarians or veterinary trained staffs are very few. In district A (pastoral area) for 
example, there was only one veterinarian who is taken up with administrative work and not 
easily reached. In fact, all the farmers in who participated in net map analysis stated that 
they had never met or heard about veterinary officer. One of the CAHWs remarked: “Our 
problem is that we have only one veterinarian in the district and he is busy with 
administrative work, attending workshops and is always out of station. At times some of us 
have to consult him on phone”. The district veterinary officer admitted that it is true that he 
does not get to villages communities because he is the only veterinarian in the district. The 
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veterinarian also cited poor accommodation transport and security problems. Most areas 
are not easily accessible and his department does not have a car. Sometimes they spend one 
week to reach is work station either because roads are cut-off by water during the rainy 
season or it is insecure. Frequently, he delegates the government duties to community 
animal health workers. Occasionally he conducts consultations on phone, but since he does 
not know the local language, only CAHWs and farmers who are comfortable with English 
and have phones can consult him over the phone. In the intensive system, out of 10 
veterinarians available in the district only two were involved in providing veterinary 
services.  
 
3.3.3 The actors involved in the treatment and control of epidemic diseases  
Results from the process influencing mapping in the pastoral areas generated thirteen 
actors involved in the treatment and prevention of epidemic diseases among the Pokot 
pastoral communities. The key services in the treatment and prevention of epidemic 
diseases are disease surveillance, reporting and vaccination. As in the case of endemic 
diseases and as shown in Figure 3.2a, women and herdsmen are the first to notice the 
disease and report it to the men. If the disease is strange, unfamiliar to them or they are not 
able to handle, they report to community animal health workers. The community animal 
health workers then report to government veterinarian (DVO) and the NGOs staff. The 
government veterinarian will report to Italian cooperation laboratory (C&D) and the 
National Animal Disease Diagnostics and Epidemiology Centre (NADDEC) laboratory. 
After receiving reports from the veterinarians, C&D meets with veterinarians and 
community animal health workers to seek assistance in mobilizing communities to sample 
sick animals. Samples including blood, stool, skin scrapings, and lymph nodes among 
others are tested at C&D laboratory and results are presented to donor partners, and the 
local governments who are responsible for dissemination of the results to the communities. 
Sometimes, because of inefficiency in dissemination of the results, radio programs are 
organized by C&D and government veterinarians are invited to disseminate the confirmed 
results to livestock owners.  
When the results from the surveillance are in, quarantines are issued by the 
commissioner through the DVO and vaccinations are conducted for diseases where 
vaccines are available. Vaccines for epidemic diseases are always procured by government 
and occasionally by NGOs and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) through the 
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government. The government through the Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and 
Fisheries (MAAIF) gives vaccines free of charge but does not always provide the local 
government with logistical support for conducting vaccination campaigns. The NGOs 
therefore come in to provide transport, fuel, training and mobilization of personnel 
(CAHWs) and livestock farmers. They register communities, provide the cold chains and 
meet all the costs for carrying out the vaccination campaigns. DVOs perform coordination 
and supervisory role in vaccination and actual vaccination is done by CAHWs.  
The respondents identified the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic 
Development (MFPED) as the most important and influential actor in control of and 
treatment of epidemic diseases because it is “Mr. Money” was given a score of 8 as in the 
Figure 3.2 below. The respondent noted that the problem in vaccination and surveillance 
always comes from financing of these services. Active surveillance is not always done 
because of financial problems. The budgeting and financial releases are handled using “a 
fire fighting” approach. Money is only released when there is an outbreak as opposed to 
routine vaccination. The second most influential actors are NGOs like FAO and Italian 
Cooperation with the score of 7 because of the financial power see Figure 3.2a. The 
government veterinarians, Commissioner, and verification team were ranked as equally 
important as NGOs especially in coordinating these activities and technical guidance. The 
men were ranked more important than the CAHWs with score of 6 mainly because they 
help in restraining animals; they also control finances in case they are asked to cost share 
and above, all they the ones who identify and report the disease out breaks. The CAHWs 
were given score of 5 because they are involved in mobilizing farmers and conducting 
vaccination. The middlemen, drug shops, herdsmen, and women are the least influential 
because vaccines are procured by government and the service is offered by either NGOs or 
governments. Women and herdsmen role is always limited to identification of the diseases 
and middlemen and drug shop are important spreading information about disease 
outbreaks. 
In the Intensive system, a total of 12 actors were identified as influential actors in 
control of control epidemic disease in Mukono district. In the case of epidemic disease 
outbreaks such as Foot and Mouth disease, the farmer will report to the paravets or the 
private veterinarian and who will then report to the DVO. The latter will then report the 
outbreak to the Commissioner Livestock Health and Entomology (CLH&E) of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries. On receiving such a report the CLH&E will 
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mobilize a team from the National Animal Disease Diagnostics and Epidemiology Centre 
(NADDEC) to go to the affected district and carry out an epidemiological investigation and 
also collect samples for confirmatory diagnosis. The samples collected are tested at the 
NADDEC laboratory and once a confirmation is done, the team will report the results to 
the CLH&E indicating the action to be undertaken. Based on the results, quarantine will be 
instituted by the CLH&E in case of epidemic diseases as an immediate control measures. 
This will be followed by a vaccination campaign for diseases where the vaccines are 
available. Once the disease has been controlled, the DVO of the affected district is required 
to officially request the CLH&E to lift the Quarantine. The CLH&E usually sends a team 
from the ministry to take samples to confirm the absence of the disease. Based on the 
results the CLH&E issues a letter lifting the quarantine.  
Although it is the responsibility of the central government to provide vaccination 
services, farmers often seek vaccination services from private veterinarians who get the 
vaccines from private firms like ERAM limited, quality chemicals and other 
pharmaceuticals. In case of routine vaccination organized by government, the paravets and 
private veterinarians are given vaccines and farmers are charged a fee to cover their labor 
and transport costs. Fees vary depending on the disease for example 1000ugx for rabies 
(US$0.3), 1500ugx (US$0.45) for FMD and 2500ugx (US$0.9) for Lumpy skin disease. 
The farmers involved in exercise noted that all service providers (a government 
veterinarian, private veterinarian and paravets) charge the same price. Vaccination is often 
done at the farmer’s home or farm.  
Just like in the case of the pastoral system, respondents identified Ministry of 
Finance as the most influential actor in control of and treatment of epidemic diseases and 
they gave the ministry of Finance a score of 8 as shown in Figure 3.2b. The reason is that 
the ministry of Finance is one decide release the funds or not. The respondent noted that 
the problem in vaccination and surveillance always comes from financing of these services. 
Active surveillance is not always done because of financial constraints and even if the 
activity is budgeted like case of routine vaccinations, the Ministry of Finance often refuses 
to release the funds until outbreak occurs.  
Who Are the Influential Actors and What Are the Governance Challenges? 
67 
  
1. Herdsman and woman report the case to the man 
2. Woman treats the animal using local drugs 
3. Man buys drugs from the drug shop or market 
4. Drug received by man 
5. Man treats the animal 
6. Man reports the case to CAHWs 
7. CAHWs buys the drug 
8. CAHWs treats the animal 
9. Man pays the CAHWs 
10. CAHWs reports to DVO or NGO vets 
11. The DVO reports to NGOs 
12. The DVO reports to commissioner 
13. Money is given to VT to collect samples 
14. VT, DVO and CAHWs collect samples 
15. Lab for testing 
16. Results communicated to the commissioner 
17a. Commisioner issues the quarantine 
17b. Request money from finance 
17c. Finance release money 
18. Vaccines are given to DVOs 
19. DVOs ask CAHWs to organize farmers for 
vaccination 
20. NGOs provide rescurces to CAHWs and DVOs 
21. Animal are vaccinated 
 
 X    Perceived influence level  
1. Herdsman reports the case to the man 
2. Some owners buy drugs from the drug shop or 
market 
3. Drug received by man 
4. Man treats the animal 
5. Man reports the case to paravets/veterinarians 
6. Paravets buy the vaccines from the drug shop 
7. Service providers treat the animal 
8. Owner pays the CAHWs 
9. Paravets and CKWs report to DVO or 
veterinarians 
10. The veterinarians report to DVO 
11. The DVO reports to commisioners 
12. Money is given to VT to collect samples 
13. VT, DVO and paravets collect samples 
14. Lab for testing 
15. Results communicated to the commissioner 
16a. Commisioner issues the qurantine 
16b. Request money from finance 
16c. Finance releases money 
17. Vaccines are given to DVOs 
18. DVOs ask CAHWs to organize farmers fo 
vaccination 
19. DVOs can give vaccines to private veterinarians 
or paravets 
20. Animal are vaccinated 
         
           Poor relations between government 
veterinarian and paravets 
 
           Inadequate and unpredictable budgetary 
allocations 
 
a: Network of Actors involved in the 
treatment, prevention and surveillance of 
epidemic diseases in the intensive system 
b: Network of Actors involved in clinical 
treatment, prevention and surveillance of 
epidemic livestock diseases 
 
Figure 3.2 Actors’ Influence in the prevention of epidemic diseases 
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The second most influential actors ranked as equally important are District 
Veterinary Officer (DVO), the Commissioner Livestock Health and Entomology under 
MAAIF and the National Surveillance Team because of their coordinating role and 
technical guidance and were given a score of 7. The livestock owners (farmers) were 
ranked more important than the paravets and private veterinarians because there are close 
to the animal and can easily recognize that the animal is sick and report the sickness to the 
service providers thus earning a score of 6. The private veterinarians were ranked as more 
important than the paravets/paraprofessionals because they have technical expertise and 
link closely with the government veterinarians who are more central actors in coordinating 
epidemic diseases control at district and national level. The private veterinarians were 
given a score of 5 and paravets a score of 4. Herdsmen and drug shops were given a score 
of 2 each for their role in reporting disease out breaks see Figure 3.2b. 
 
3.3.4 Problems in treatment and control of epidemic diseases  
The key challenges identified in implementation provision of disease control services such 
as vaccination and quarantine are: 
 
1. Inadequate vaccines and budgetary allocations  
Vaccines needed for vaccination exercises are never available insufficient quantities to 
apply them to all animals in the respective region. This according to the respondents is 
because of inadequate budgetary allocation to preventive service delivery. As result some 
animals are not vaccinated which later re-infect other animals. One veterinarian stated that 
“the persistence of FMD in Teso region in 2010 even after the implementation of 
vaccination exercise was because of inadequate vaccines. Out of the 50,000 units of the 
vaccine required for vaccination, only 10,000 were availed, rendering the containment of 
FMD disease difficult”. Since vaccines are never sufficient, local governments depend on 
NGOs to implement successful vaccination campaigns. As remarked by one of government 
veterinarians, “In the pastoral areas, NGOs are indispensable to government and under the 
current situation; if NGOs pull out the government position is very weak. In recent massive 
vaccination exercises of goat plague (PPR) and CBPP for cattle in Karamoja region, most 
of the logistical and financial support was provided by NGOs and government could only 
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contribute vaccines.” The government NAADS program does not finance veterinary 
services yet livestock is the main agricultural sector in Karamoja”.  
Budgetary allocations from government are inadequate and unpredictable 
government limiting the ability of DVOs, verification team, and other governments 
departments to implement vaccination tasks. When the ministry procures vaccines, it is 
expected to provide logistical support to the local government staff for implementation of 
the vaccination campaigns. However, the ministry does not provide such logistical support 
and therefore the government veterinarians are compelled to charge farmers for each 
animal vaccinated to recover such costs. The advantage in the intensive system is that 
farmers are able to pay for these services and even though the government veterinarians 
give the vaccines to the private veterinarians, the latter are able to recover their costs. 
Respondents also noted capture of funds meant for paying paraprofessionals including 
CAHWs by the veterinarians as problem. Respondents stated that, some veterinarians are 
corrupt when funds are allocated for a particular activity they mobilize the 
paraprofessionals to help to work later refuse to pay them or pay them a fee less than what 
they are supposed to receive. This results in to a poor response of CAHWs to vaccination 
exercises, creates a poor working relationship between veterinarians and CAHWs, and 
worsens the problem of shortage of staff. Respondents also noted that budgetary allocation 
to animal health and entomology are often low and unpredictable. This observation is 
supported by findings from a study of the Economic Policy and Research center, which 
reveals that the funds received for animal health services are less that allocated funds. 
Moreover, the allocated funds are less than the total expenditure (Economic Policy and 
Research Centre, 2009).  
 
2. Political interference  
The second problem is local political interference, mainly in the implementation of the 
quarantine services. Participants noted that, when quarantines are instituted, the 
veterinarians cannot enforce them because when markets are closed, the politicians make 
“a lot of noise” and some of them lift the quarantine on their own without seeking for 
approval from MAAIF. In Bukedea district for example, local politicians sent the 
veterinary officer on forced leave and lifted the quarantine. The main reasons why 
politicians lift the quarantines are to avoid loss in revenue that would be generated when 
livestock markets are open. Secondly, they feel that they to avoid political loses or gain 
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political support by lifting quarantine regulations that are unpopular. Farmers need to sell 
livestock for school fees and other needs. The implementation of quarantine is perceived to 
affect the farmers’ welfare and is seen as a sign of failure of politicians to provide services. 
To avoid political fallout, politicians are incentivized to lift up quarantines. Apparently, the 
need for quarantines is not well understood. 
 
3. Poor relations between government veterinarians and paraprofessionals 
This was particularly a main problem in in the intensive systems. Paraprofessionals rarely 
report disease out breaks to the government veterinarians as mandated by the Animal 
Diseases Act 1964 revised edition 2005
3
. This Act provides for the prevention, control and 
eradication of animal diseases and requires that all outbreaks of epidemic animal diseases 
must be reported to the nearest veterinary authority who should in turn report to the 
Commissioner Livestock Health and Entomology within 24-48 hours using the fastest 
means. Their relationship is poor because government veterinarians perceive them as 
subordinates, and are not cooperative with paravets when they are consulted majorly 
because they are perceived as less qualified. Additionally, government veterinarians have 
no incentive to build good professional relationships with paravets since they have assured 
government salary. Worse still the veterinary surgeons act is outdated and ineffective in 
strengthening veterinary and paravet relations. The DVOs always depends on reports from 
private veterinarians. The relationship between the paravets and private veterinarians is 
good because the paravets often consults them and considered as colleagues irrespective of 
the level of training. This mainly because private veterinarians need to survive and it is 
through such networks with the paravets that they get new clients.  
 
4. Poor management of government veterinarians.  
Another serious problem identified by the respondents is poor personnel management. The 
personnel management can be explained in terms of limited opportunities for promotion in 
local government. These are limited because of the following reasons: it depends on the 
availability of funds, and is it influenced by local politicians. Merit and academic 
qualification is not given priority as long as the applicant has a bachelor’s degree in 
veterinary medicine. Veterinarians noted that it is common in Uganda to find the District 
                                                 
3
 Animal Diseases Act 1964  http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/statutory-instrument/2005/38  
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Veterinary office (DVO) with a bachelor’s degree and his subordinates’ (veterinary 
officers) with master’s degrees. This has created challenges in supervision veterinarians by 
the DVO. As a consequence, most DVOs do not assign duties to his subordinates’ and staff 
are often absent from their duty stations. One of the government veterinarian stated that “I 
left my district to come to offer private services in another district because I have a 
master’s degree and my boss has a bachelor’s degree in veterinary medicine. He does not 
assign me responsibilities. So I decided to make myself productive, I get a government 
salary for free, I am in good terms with my boss and my business is doing well”.  
 
5. Policy inconsistency 
The creation of autonomous institutions like National Agricultural Advisory Services 
(NAADS) which has its own governance structure has resulted in the duplication of 
responsibilities and multi or dual accountability. The NAADs program was established by 
an Act of parliament, the NAADS Act, 2001
4
 to spearhead the transformation of extension 
services from public sector supply driven to private sector demand driven. Under NAADs, 
local governments have to hire NAADs staff and MAAIF staff in both crop and livestock. 
These staffs perform the same task but NAADS staff are facilitated and paid well. NAADs 
personnel are paid 400 Euros per month compared to the 135 Euros paid the under local 
government. This has undermined the traditional public services system because NAADs is 
running a parallel system yet is also under government/MAAIF. Also, under decentralized 
governance system, technical and financial lines of management are separated as district 
veterinary offices (DVOs) have to report to both MAAIF for technical matters, and the 
Ministry of Local Government and district local government for administrative matters. 
This has also destroyed the chain of command from the center to district which is a key to 
animal disease control (FAO, 2011; OIE, 2011).   
Respondents stated that “Decentralization and NAADs has broken the chain of 
command. Disease reporting and quarantine implementation has become problematic. The 
DVO reports to Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) who is head of all civil servants in 
district, the District council and political heads who are locally elected leaders, and thus he 
has no incentive to report to central ministry. DVOs cannot report outbreak of certain 
disease because the local government of officials would fire them or suspend them from 
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 The NAADS Act, 2001 
http://www.kituochakatiba.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=921&Itemid=36  
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office. The director of animal resources in Uganda noted  a case of Bukedea district were 
the veterinarian was sent on forced leave to pave way for lifting the quarantine. If 
quarantines are issued, politicians can suspend the veterinarians to lift the quarantine since 
they are appointed by the district service commission and not public service. Therefore, 
veterinarians serve the interests of the local government leaders other than the technical 
leaders at MAAIF”.  
 
6. Exclusion of technical expertise in program planning 
Another problem cited by respondents relates to planning and implementation of animal 
health programs or activities. Respondents noted that “the technical leaders of the 
department of Livestock Health and Entomology under MAAIF take only the third position 
in the decision making. Major decisions and policies are made in planning committees 
composed of economists and accountants without the technical expertise of the staff who 
then have to implement the animal health programs. Most respondents cited example of the 
so-called “Non Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services5 (Non 
ATAAS), where planning and provision of agricultural services are planned based on 
commodities. Non ATAAS is part of MAAIF Agricultural Development and Investment 
Plan (DSIP) 2010/2011-2014/2015 with the objective of pursuing private sector led and 
market oriented agricultural development through a commodity approach (MAAIF, 2012). 
According to the respondents, this planning design does not reflect the implementation 
structure of the ministry and thus cannot be effectively implemented. The problem of 
exclusion of technical staff from MAAIF in agricultural policy reform is discussed in detail 
by Kjær and Joughin (2012) and has led to lack of ownership of reforms and the 
development of inadequate implementation strategies (Bahiigwa et al., 2005; Kjær and 
Joughin, 2012). 
 
3.4 Synthesis, Discussion and policy recommendations 
3.4.1 Synthesis 
The study has identified a number of actors that are involved in the delivery of veterinary 
services in Uganda. The number and type of actor depends on the type of the service and 
                                                 
5
 Non ATAAS report http://www.agriculture.go.ug/userfiles/Final%20Synthesis%20Report%20-%20NON-
ATAAS%20DSIP%2014%20November%20%202012-2.pdf  
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production system for example, CAHWs and NGOs are involved both in curative and 
preventive services in pastoral systems, but not in intensive productive systems. The 
NGOs’ main influence in pastoral communities is in the provision of preventive services. 
The influence each actor has depends on following factors irrespective of the type of 
service and production system:  
1) Control of financial resources 
2) Closeness to the animal 
3) Education level and availability of the service provider 
4) Ability of the veterinarians to communicate with paravets and farmers 
5) Relationship between the paraprofessionals and the veterinarians 
 
Table 3.2 below shows the relationship between service type, production system 
and veterinary service delivery problems. The sign  indicates that, for that particular 
service in the given production system, the problem is recurrent and  means that the 
problem is very recurrent. 
 Clinical services: As shown in table 3.2, drug abuse, delays in reporting, and 
staffing problem and government staff absenteeism are very recurrent problems in 
pastoral communities. Low staffing levels and absenteeism by the government 
veterinarians is mainly attributed to poor infrastructure in the pastoral areas. Also, 
language barriers between the veterinarians and community animal health workers 
and veterinarian and farmers were found to be a very recurrent problem in delivery 
of curative services in pastoral communities. In the productive system in Mukono, 
the recurrent problems in delivery of clinical veterinary services were drug misuse, 
and personnel management issues and poor paravets and veterinarians relations.   
 Preventive services: In the case of preventive services, delayed reporting of  
epidemic animal diseases, capture of resources by the veterinarians especially 
during vaccination exercises, political interference, insufficient and unpredictable 
budgetary allocations were found to be very recurrent both productive areas and 
recurrent in pastoral areas. Absence of cooperation between paravets and 
veterinarians was considered recurrent problem in Mukono. Exclusion of 
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veterinarians in decision making at the ministry level was found to be major 
challenges in delivery of preventive services. 
 
Table 3.2 Service type, production system and service delivery problems 
Service and 
production 
system 
Drug 
Abuse 
Delayed 
reporting 
Absensteism 
and staffing 
problem 
Capture by 
veterinarians 
Language 
problems  
Finance and 
political 
interfearence  
Paravets and 
Veterinarians 
relations  
Clinical services 
(pastoral areas)  
       
Clinical services 
(productive areas) 
       
Preventive 
services (Pastoral 
areas)  
       
Preventive 
services 
(productive areas) 
       
 
3.4.2 Discussion and Policy options  
The emerging picture is that challenges of veterinary service delivery in Uganda are linked 
to institutional pluralism, decentralization and budgetary constraints that limit effectiveness 
of the existing institutions. Consequently, given the existing fiscal challenges, the key to 
improving animal service delivery in Uganda rests on getting priorities, policies and 
institutions right. Creating an independent ministry responsible for livestock may be 
advantageous in advocating for veterinary policy, legislation and education. Countries like 
Kenya and Tanzania which have independent ministries of livestock have put in place 
veterinary legislation that guides the provision of veterinary services. For example, 
Tanzania passed a Veterinary Act in 2003
6
 and Kenya in 2010,
7
 but Uganda still depends 
on the Veterinary Surgeons Act of 1958
8
 . Uganda, too, used to have an independent 
ministry of livestock industry and fisheries before 1992 but was merged with ministry of 
agriculture with the objectives of enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of public 
expenditures and rationalizing the use of resource (Kuteesa et al., 2006). 
However, this turned out to be counterproductive and has negatively affected 
delivery of agricultural services including veterinary services (Semana, 2002). A number 
                                                 
6
 The Veterinary Act, 2003 
http://www.mifugo.go.tz/documents_storage/Veterinary%20Act%2016%202003.pdf  
7
 The Veterinary Surgeons and Para-Professionals Bill, 2010 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2010/Vet._Surgeons_and_Paraproffs_Bill__2010
.pdf  
8
 The Veterinary Surgeons Act of 1958  http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/277  
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of other autonomous institutions such as National Agricultural, Research Organization 
(NARO) in 2005, NAADS (2001), and Dairy Development Authority (DDA) in 1998 were 
created to improve delivery of agricultural service including livestock (Lukwago, 2010). 
However, the creation these autonomous institutions have instead increased public 
expenditure while service delivery has stagnated or continued to decline. Programs under 
some of these institutions like NAADs could be implemented by the public extension 
system instead of running parallel systems that performing the same functions (Rwamigisa, 
2013). This could reduce the financial or budget problems and rivalry that exists between 
MAAIF and some of these institutions. 
Another challenge to provision of veterinary services identified in this study is 
limited number of active veterinary professionals and difficulty in attracting and retaining 
veterinary staff especially by local governments in marginal areas. This paper proposes 
three strategies to ensure availability of enough qualified veterinary staff in Uganda and 
they include the following: first, centralizing the administration of veterinary staff. This 
paper argues that administrative decentralization which was aimed at empowering farmers 
and local leaders to supervise and monitor extension staff is not appropriate for veterinary 
services because veterinary services requires an efficient chain of command to ensure the 
quality. Decentralized administration of veterinary staff fragments the chain of command 
and reduces the responsiveness of the veterinary system (Petitclerc, 2012). In addition, the 
local leaders or politicians have captured decentralized power and have used it to interfere 
with provision of preventive veterinary services.   
Secondly, there is need to recruit holders of diploma in veterinary science at sub 
county level other than restricting to only degree holders. Veterinarians are difficult retain 
i, motivate and will require higher wages compared with paraprofessionals who hold 
diplomas in veterinary medicine (Leonard et al., 1999). The third strategy is supporting 
veterinary training and education. It is impossible to have enough qualified veterinary staff 
both diploma and degree holders to offer veterinary services in Uganda without appropriate 
funding. Funding of veterinary education needs to target students from pastoral or marginal 
areas. A government scholarship similar to the one of the Ministry of Health scholarships 
fund for hard to reach and priority areas
9
 aimed at training medical personnel would be 
needed in animal health. As argued by Bellemain and Coppalle (2009) and Fanning et al. 
                                                 
9
 The Ministry of Health scholarships fund for hard to reach and priority areas 
http://health.go.ug/docs/scholarships.pdf  
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(2009) veterinary education is a key to improving governance of veterinary services and 
reduce animal disease economic and health risks.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In the delivery of veterinary services in Uganda, we have generated a number of key 
actors, determined their influence levels and examined governance challenges. Results 
have revealed that, the influence of actors depends on closeness to animal (care), controls 
of financial resources, education level, and availability of service provider in both 
production systems. In pastoral areas, a veterinarian’s lack of understanding of the local 
language was found to be major problem provision of clinical services. Financial and 
budgetary indiscipline, political interference, poor legal environment, lower staffing levels, 
staff absenteeism, drug abuse, delayed reporting and capture resources by veterinarians 
were the major problems in the delivery of veterinary services. In addition, exclusion of 
technical staff from decision making process and policy illogicality has greatly affected 
provision of veterinary services. To improve veterinary service provision in Uganda, 
government needs to get it its policy right. The governance structure needs to address the 
governance challenges identified above. In particular, government needs to realign 
NAADS program within the ministry structures to avoid duplication of tasks and improve 
personnel management, strengthen veterinary legislation to support veterinarian and 
paraprofessional relations, invest in veterinary education and training to train more 
veterinarians and paraprofessionals. Additionally, government should reconsider the policy 
of hiring degree veterinarians at lower local government. It the diploma holder trained 
veterinary paraprofessionals who are willing to be in local communities even with low pay.  
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Abstract 
Referrals between paraprofessionals and veterinarians are seen as a solution for improving 
disease surveillance, detection, and reporting as well as ensuring prudent use of 
antimicrobial agents in animals. This paper used data collected from paraprofessionals in 
Kenya and Uganda to identify factors influencing referrals to veterinarians by 
paraprofessionals using a probit regression model. The results show that the determinants 
of paraprofessional referrals to veterinarians include the following: paraprofessional’s 
mobile phone ownership, gender, and training, as well as attendance of short term 
trainings, annual assessments, and membership in paraprofessional associations. The paper 
argues that legislation or supervision of paraprofessionals as well as expansion of mobile 
phone ownership by paraprofessionals, supporting the formation of paraprofessional 
associations, and investing in short term training are important factors for strengthening 
referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians.  
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4.1 Introduction  
In the 1980s, governments of developing countries shifted their policies for providing 
veterinary services from state-led to market-led approaches and limited their role to the 
supply of public goods services such as vaccination, meat inspection, and the control of 
zoonotic and contagious animal diseases. However, market-led approaches have performed 
below expectation, especially in rural and marginal areas because of pervasive market and 
governance challenges (Pica-Ciamarra and Otte, 2008; Racloz et al., 2013). As a result, the 
focus has shifted from the debate on market-led versus state-led services to improving the 
quality and coverage of both private and public veterinary services to reduce the negative 
impacts of animal diseases on public health and food security (Pica-Ciamarra and Otte, 
2008). Over-reliance on the paraprofessionals in most developing countries, including 
Kenya and Uganda, has been associated with imprudent use of antimicrobial agents (De 
Haan et al. 2001; Peeling and Holden 2003). This has affected on-farm food safety 
management, resulting in increased antimicrobial resistance in both animals and humans 
(Pastoret and Chaisemartin, 2011; Schneider, 2006). Reducing the negative impacts of 
animal diseases on public health and food security requires effective and timely animal 
disease surveillance, detection, reporting, and response as well as a prudent use of 
veterinary drugs, in particular antimicrobial agents (Angulo et al., 2004; Dórea et al., 2011; 
Grace et al., 2012; Jebara, 2004; Kahn, 2006; King et al., 2004).  
To improve the quality of veterinary services and reduce animal disease-related 
risks through correct disease diagnosis and adequate drug prescription, the expert 
committee of World Animal Health Organisation strongly recommends strengthening 
linkages between individual veterinarians and paraprofessionals (Vallat, 2004). Woodford 
(2004) and Ahuja and Kurup (2006) argue that paraprofessionals should refer to 
veterinarians to ensure appropriate prescription of drugs and adherence to standards of 
veterinary practice. In addition, Catley et al. (2004) argue that referrals would prevent 
misdiagnosis and incorrect drug usage, as well as improve disease surveillance and 
reporting. Referrals are also critical in sustaining the delivery of quality veterinary 
services, especially in marginal areas, which typically have the lowest ratio of veterinarians 
to animal population (Catley and Leyland, 2004; Diop and Bessin, 2004; Hassan, 2003; 
Leyland and Catley, 2002). Lastly, Koma (2000) argues that referral networks are 
important for veterinarians to stay in business since paraprofessionals already have well 
established markets due to the reluctance of farmers to pay premiums to veterinarians for 
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services that can also be provided by paraprofessionals. Moreover, paraprofessionals are 
closer and more easily accessible to farmers than veterinarians.  
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no empirical study examining factors 
that influence referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians in a developing country. In 
addition, much of the focus on strengthening referrals between paraprofessionals and 
veterinarians has been on improving veterinary legislations and building the capacity of 
regulatory institutions to supervise paraprofessionals. However, no study has been 
conducted to examine whether such supervision indeed has a positive impact on referrals 
between paraprofessionals and veterinarians. As argued by Leonard (2000), supervision 
may increase conflict between veterinarians and paraprofessionals because veterinarians 
tend to treat paraprofessionals as subordinates rather than as colleagues. This often 
interferes with a positive relationship between paraprofessionals and veterinarians and 
negatively affects referrals (Leonard, 2000). Moreover, legislation and supervision have 
budgetary implications because they may involve recruiting more veterinarians who have 
to be paid and facilitated to perform their duties. According to Rubarema (2010), this 
makes veterinary legislation less attractive to policy makers. Therefore, alternative ways of 
building referral networks need to be devised. 
The objective of this paper is to assess whether supervision and other factors 
influence referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians. To achieve this objective, the 
paper uses cross-sectional data from service provider surveys conducted in Kenya and 
Uganda. A probit regression model is applied to determine the factors that influence the 
likelihood of a paraprofessional’s decision to refer a case to a veterinarian in any given 
year.  
 
4.2 Materials and Methods  
4.2.1 Data  
The data used in this study were collected in 2012 from animal health service providers in 
the districts of Kiambu and North Pokot in Kenya and in the districts of Mukono and 
Amudat in Uganda. Mukono and Kiambu districts are located in a region where intensive 
livestock production systems are practiced, while Amudat and North Pokot districts are 
located in a region characterized by pastoral systems. The two production systems differ in 
terms infrastructure and in the supply of and demand for animal health services. These are 
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the most important factors influencing the development of sustainable animal health 
service delivery systems and also the category of veterinary paraprofessionals operating in 
the particular area (Woodford, 2004). Most veterinary paraprofessionals in the pastoral 
areas, often called Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), have no formal 
education but receive a short training of about three weeks (Mugunieri et al., 2004). The 
other categories of paraprofessionals are those with diplomas or certificates in animal 
health and are mainly found in the intensive system (Oruko and Ndung’u, 2009).  
According to the World Animal Health Organization (OIE), a veterinary 
paraprofessional is “a person who, for the purposes of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 
is authorized by the veterinary statutory body to carry out certain designated tasks 
(dependent upon the category of veterinary para-professional) in a territory, and delegated 
to them under the responsibility and direction of a veterinarian” (OIE, 2013). This 
definition implies that all service providers do not hold degrees in veterinary medicine 
qualify as veterinary paraprofessionals if they are mandated and recognized by the 
veterinary statutory body. For the purpose of this analysis, we consider all service 
providers who lack a degree in veterinary sciences as paraprofessionals. This is because 
many service providers are not mandated by the veterinary statutory body and are not 
under the direction or supervision of veterinarians (even in Kenya).  
To collect data for this study, a total of 88 service providers, including 6 
veterinarians and 82 paraprofessionals were interviewed. In Uganda, 12 out of the 
estimated total of 15 paraprofessionals operating in Mukono district were interviewed, and 
26 out of the estimated 30 paraprofessionals operating in Amudat district. In Kenya, 42 out 
of the estimated 55 paraprofessionals operating in Kiambu district were interviewed. The 
only two paraprofessionals in North Pokot district were also interviewed. There are few 
paraprofessionals in this district because Kenya’s veterinary board outlawed 
paraprofessionals who lack formal training in animal health. They are the only service 
providers in this district. However, paraprofessionals from Amudat district extend their 
services to North Pokot district. The two districts border each other, movement is free and 
the inhabitants are of the same tribe (the Pokots). In the pastoral districts of Amudat and 
North Pokot, we were not able to interview veterinarians because the only veterinarian 
operating in each district could not be reached during the three weeks we were present in 
each district, because they were always absent from the district. In Mukono district, we 
were only able to interview one veterinarian because out of 11 veterinarians residing in this 
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district, he was the only one actively involved in the provision of veterinary services.  In 
Kiambu district, we were able to interview five veterinarians, three of whom were private 
service providers and two were government veterinarians.  
The sampling design consists of non-probabilistic sampling techniques, namely 
convenience and snowball sampling, because animal health service providers were difficult 
to reach and some lack animal health training and were therefore not willing to be 
interviewed because of their illegal operations. Magnani et al. (2005) argue that when 
sampling hard-to-reach and ‘hidden’ subpopulations, non-probabilistic sampling 
techniques are best, yet are subject to sample selection bias. The target was to interview as 
many service providers as possible. Therefore, any service provider whom the research 
team could meet was interviewed. In the last two days of the survey, the researchers waited 
for service providers at animal drug shops, which were meeting points for all service 
providers and the easiest way of reaching them. As an incentive to participate in the 
interviews, service providers received US $10 as compensation for their time. The 
compensation is, on the average, equivalent to the professional fee charged by 
veterinarians to handle a case. As a result, we interviewed over 80% of the 
paraprofessionals in the study districts. This sampling strategy follows Marshall (1996), 
who proposes generating a large sample to represent the population if probability sampling 
is not possible. Thus, we are confident that the sample size is a good representation of the 
underlying population in each livestock production system. As we have no reason to 
assume that the service providers who could not be reached are inherently different from 
our sample, the number of excluded service providers will not introduce a significant bias 
in the study. However, care should be taken when attempting to apply the results to other 
areas which have different characteristics. Data were collected using a structured 
questionnaire, which was administered using handheld Android tablet computers 
programmed with the “Survey To-Go” software.  
The data are clustered based on districts. Therefore, paraprofessionals’ responses 
could be correlated or invariant within the district or cluster, which makes ordinary or 
standard probit regression models unsuitable because it could lead to erroneous hypothesis 
testing. To address this problem, a probit model with robust standard errors was estimated 
by clustering at the district level. This allows us to obtain heteroscedasticity and within-
cluster error correlation consistent estimators (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009), permitting us 
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to perform valid hypothesis testing in the presence of heteroscedasticity and within-cluster 
error correlation (Arellano, 1987).  
 
4.2.2 Model Specification  
To examine determinants of referrals, the observed outcome  equals 1 if the 
paraprofessional referred a case to a veterinarian in the previous year and equals 0 
otherwise. If the probability of a paraprofessional referring to a veterinarian is denoted 
as , then the probability mass function for the observed outcome  is , with 
 Considering the discrete nature of a 
paraprofessional’s decision to refer or not, qualitative choice binary models are most 
suitable, including linear probability, logit, and probit models (Scott and Freese, 2006). 
Using binary models, the probability of a paraprofessional referring to a 
veterinarian  is expressed as a function of the underlying predictor variables represented 
by a vector x. The outcomes of the models can be given a latent variable interpretation to 
provide a link with the linear regression model. Since  is the observed binary outcome 
that a paraprofessional referred a case to a veterinarian in the previous year, the underlying 
continuous unobservable or latent variable can be expressed as the following single 
index model: 
 
Although  is not observed, we can observe that  
 
Therefore, 
 
The linear probability model suffers from three important shortcomings: the error 
term is heteroscedastic and may possess elements of non-normality; and the predicted 
value of the dependent variable may not fall within the unit interval (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Whereas generalized least square models may solve the problem of heteroscedasticity, the 
problem of estimating parameters of a threshold decision model remains unresolved when 
truncating values of the dependent variable through logit analysis (Jones et al., 1989; Press 
and Wilson, 1978; Scott and Freese, 2006). The probit model overcomes problems of the 
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other models because of its ability to generate bounded probability estimates for each 
observation (Tambi, 1999). For this reason, we apply the probit model in this study. 
To estimate a probit model, we consider the classical model of rationality which 
considers paraprofessionals as rational agents who are interested in maximizing their utility 
such that the likelihood of the j
th
 paraprofessional referring a case to a veterinarian will 
depend on the following utility indexes: 
 
Utility indexes are linearly related to a vector of explicit attributes or features of the 
paraprofessional and can be expressed as in the subsequent function of specific attributes 
or features of a paraprofessional below:  
 
In Equation (5), is a row vector of the j
th
 paraprofessional attributes,  denotes 
a column vector of parameters to be estimated, and  where MVN is a 
multivariate normal distribution function. The random error term is included in 
Equation (5) to capture the effects of all unmeasured variables that influence the likelihood 
of the j
th
 paraprofessional referring a case to a veterinarian. The higher the utility index , 
the higher the likelihood is that a paraprofessional refers to a veterinarian. Therefore, a 
paraprofessional will refer if the utility of referring where is a constant 
threshold (Kwakyi and Epperson, 1989; Tambi, 1999). 
The likelihood of a paraprofessional referring to a veterinarian is assumed to be 
independent of other paraprofessionals’ decisions to refer, such that  are independently 
distributed:  
 
where  and the covariance matrix  is the identity matrix of order m. 
 
Based on Scott and Freese (2006), the probit model on which the utility function 
depends can be specified as:  
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where  is a vector of binary variables, such that  if a paraprofessional referred a case 
to a veterinarian in the previous year and equals 0 otherwise, and is a vector of predictor 
variables that predict or explain a paraprofessional’s decision to refer to a veterinarian. 
These variables are assumed to be independent and uncorrelated with the error term 
(Tambi, 1999; Wooldridge, 2002)  
A maximum likelihood (ML) probit model was estimated using STATA 12. The 
ML estimates of the parameters maximize the value of the probability density 
function . Diagnostic tests to detect the presence of collinearity were 
performed by computing the correlation coefficients and the variance inflation factor for all 
variables in the model. As mentioned above, sample selection bias could arise from the 
non-random selection and clustering of paraprofessionals (Moulton, 1990; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). A probit model with cluster robust standard errors was estimated to account 
for the sample selection bias. 
To predict the effect of the change of a predictor on the probability of a 
paraprofessional referring to a veterinarian in the previous year, marginal probabilities are 
computed. For continuous variables, such as the number of untrained paraprofessionals and 
age, marginal effects were estimated at their mean values of the predictor variable. The 
marginal probability was computed by multiplying the computed coefficient 
estimate with the probability density function  of the probit model evaluated at 
mean values of the predictor variables. For dichotomous predictors, the marginal 
probability was calculated as the difference between the standard probability density 
function of the probit model when   and for the discrete variable. 
The descriptions of the predictor variables are presented in table 4.1. 
Paraprofessionals were categorized as those with formal training in veterinary science or 
animal health and those with no formal training in animal health. Those with no formal 
training in animal health include (a) those with formal education that hold diplomas or 
certificates in related fields like crop or general agriculture and (b) those with just three 
weeks of training in animal health. The paraprofessional associations are the Kenya 
Association of Livestock Technicians (KALT) and the Community Based Animal Health 
Works’ Associations, which are formed by service providers with the support of donors 
such as the European Union (EU) through development organizations such as the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO). The supervision of paraprofessionals is, in principle, 
regulated by the Veterinary Statutory Board, which works with local governments 
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veterinarians. The board is supposed to assign each trained paraprofessional to a 
veterinarian as the basis to be licensed to offer services in the particular area. However, as 
indicated above, the number of veterinarians employed by the local governments is very 
limited especially in the pastoral production systems. This limits the ability of the 
Veterinary Statutory Board to regulate the activities of paraprofessionals. However, the 
veterinarians employed by NGOs often act as supervisors of some paraprofessionals. They 
also organize training seminars for paraprofessionals. In the intensive system, 
paraprofessionals also can enrol for short course at nearby universities.  
 
Table 4.1 Description of variables used to analyse referrals from paraprofessionals to 
veterinarians based data collected from 82 paraprofessionals in Uganda and 
Kenya 
Variable Description Impact 
Refers 1 if the paraprofessional referred a case to a veterinarian in the previous year,0 otherwise NA 
Phone 1 if the paraprofessionals owns a phone, 0 otherwise + 
Gender 1  If  male and 0 if female - 
Age The age of the paraprofessional - 
Education 1=No-education, 2=Primary, 3= High school, 4=Certificate, 5=Diploma ,6=Degree - 
Assess If the paraprofessional is annually assessed and supervised by a veterinarian, 0 otherwise + 
Seminars 1 if the paraprofessionals has attended short term trainings (seminars), 0 otherwise + 
Association 1 if the paraprofessional is a member of a service provider association, 0 otherwise + 
Disease 1 If the most prevalent animal disease is an contagious disease (Anthrax, FMD, PPR and 
CBPP), 0 for non-contagious disease (ECF, Anaplasmosis, Mastitis and Helminths) 
+ 
System 1 if the paraprofessional is from pastoral systems, 0 otherwise + 
Training 1 if the paraprofessional has formal training in animal health, 0 otherwise - 
Number of the 
Untrained  
The number of paraprofessionals not trained in animal health operating in the operation 
area as reported by paraprofessionals 
- 
 
Diseases were classified as contagious and non-contiguous animal diseases since 
this classification captures the “nuisance” potential of the disease to the local economy 
(local trade and animal movements) as well as clinical severity (Cros et al., 2010). Clinical 
severity is known to influence referrals (Bickell et al., 1992). Out of the eight diseases 
reported by paraprofessionals, those that have the potential for very serious and rapid 
spread, namely Anthrax, Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Peste des Petits Ruminants 
(PPR), and Contagious Bovine Pleurapneumonia (CBPP), were categorized as contagious 
diseases, while East Cost Fever, Anaplasmosis, Mastitis, and Helminths were categorized 
as non- contagious (non-notifiable) diseases. In Kenya and Uganda, contagious animal 
Determination of Referrals from Paraprofessionals to Veterinarians in Uganda and Kenya 
89 
diseases are required by law to be reported to government authorities or government 
veterinarians. On the other hand, tick borne disease and other non-contagious diseases are 
handling by livestock farmers and private veterinary service providers (Choudhury et al., 
2011; GOK, 2008).  
 
4.3 Results  
4.3.1 Diseases handled by paraprofessionals 
Table 4.2 shows the most prevalent animal diseases observed paraprofessionals in their 
operation areas. About 91% of the respondents in the intensive system reported non-
contagious disease as the most prevalent disease and only 9% reported contagious disease. 
Similarly, 61% of the paraprofessionals in the pastoral system reported non-contagious 
disease and 39% reported contagious disease as the most common disease. Among the 
non-contagious diseases, East Cost Fever was reported as the most prevalent disease in 
pastoral areas, while mastitis and East Cost Fever were reported as the most prevalent 
diseases in the intensive livestock system. Contagious bovine pleurapneumonia (CBPP) 
and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) were reported as the most common contagious 
diseases in pastoral system, while Anthrax and FMD were reported as the most common in 
the intensive livestock system. 
 
Table 4.2 Classification of animal diseases and their prevalence by livestock 
production system 
Disease 
Classification 
of the disease 
Overall sample Pastoral system Intensive System 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Anthrax Contagious 02 2.44 00 0.00 02 3.70 
East Cost Fever 
(ECF) 
Non-contagious 33 40.24 17 60.71 16 29.63 
Anaplasmosis Non-contagious 06 7.32 00 0.00 06 11.11 
Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD) 
Contagious 05 6.10 02 7.14 03 5.5 
Peste des petits 
ruminants(PPR) 
Contagious 02 2.44 02 7.14 00 0.00 
Mastitis Non-contagious 26 31.71 00 0.00 26 48.15 
Helminths Non-contagious 01 1.22 00 0.00 01 1.85 
Contagious 
bovine 
pleurapneumonia 
(CBPP) 
Contagious 07 8.54 07 25 00 0.00 
Total  82 100 28 100 54 100 
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4.3.2 General characteristics of paraprofessional 
In this section, we present data on the general characteristics of the paraprofessionals and 
on their referrals in the two production systems for the two countries. As shown in Table 
4.3, about 35% of paraprofessionals referred a case to a veterinarian in the previous year. 
The proportion of paraprofessionals that referred cases to veterinarians in the intensive 
livestock production system is significantly higher than in the pastoral system. However, 
the proportion of paraprofessionals that referred cases to veterinarians in the previous year 
in Kenya is not significantly different from those in Uganda. This result suggests that 
regardless of the country, in the study areas paraprofessionals from pastoral areas are less 
likely to refer cases to veterinarians. The proportion of paraprofessionals owning phones in 
the intensive system and in Kenya was significantly higher compared to those in the 
pastoral system and in Uganda, respectively. In terms of gender, the proportion of female 
paraprofessionals was significantly higher in the intensive system and in Kenya relative to 
that in the pastoral system and in Uganda, respectively.   
 
Table 4.3 Characteristics of paraprofessionals by livestock production system and 
country 
Variables 
Overall sample Livestock Systems Country 
Mean Std.dev Intensive Pastoral Difference  Kenya Uganda  Difference 
Refer 0.354 0.481 0.444 0.179  0.266** 0.409 0.289  0.120 
Phone 0.854 0.356 1.000 0.571  0.429*** 0.979 0.718  0.261*** 
Gender 0.854 0.356 0.796 0.964 -0.168* 0.750 0.974 -0.224** 
Age 36.33 9.646 35.907 37.143 -1.235 35.841 36.895 -1.054 
Education 3.476 1.259 4.204 2.071  2.132*** 4.023 2.842  1.181*** 
Assess 0.463 0.502 0.593 0.214  0.378*** 0.545 0.368  0.177* 
Seminars 0.085 0.281 0.130 0.000  0.130 0.000 0.184 -0.184** 
Association 0.427 0.498 0.481 0.321  0.160 0.545 0.289  0.256* 
Disease 0.195 0.399 0.093 0.393 -0.300** 0.091 0.316 -0.225* 
Untrained 4.731 6.773 4.556 5.071 -0.516 1.364 8.632 -7.268*** 
Training  0.512 0.503 0.778 0.000  0.778*** 0.955 0.000  0.955*** 
System 0.341 0.477       
 
The proportion of paraprofessionals who are annually assessed and are members of 
a paraprofessional association was significantly higher in Kenya, while the proportion of 
paraprofessionals who had ever attended short term trainings (seminars) was significantly 
higher in Uganda. Notably, none of the paraprofessionals in the pastoral system or in 
Kenya had attended short-term training or seminars since starting work. Moreover, the 
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proportion of paraprofessionals annually assessed was significantly higher in the intensive 
system. However, the proportion of paraprofessionals who were members of 
paraprofessional associations and those who had attended short-term training since 
beginning work are not significantly different in the two production systems. 
The mean number of paraprofessionals not trained in animal health as reported by 
paraprofessionals is significantly higher in Uganda as compared to Kenya. The proportion 
of paraprofessionals who reported contagious diseases as being the most common disease 
in their operation areas was significantly higher in Uganda and in the pastoral system 
compared to that in Kenya and the intensive system, respectively. This suggests that 
contagious diseases are more prevalent in pastoral systems relative to intensive systems 
and in Uganda relative to Kenya. This could be the case because paraprofessionals in 
pastoral areas and in Uganda do not have formal training in animal health, and because the 
pastoral districts studied have few or absentee veterinarians, which affects referrals, disease 
surveillance, reporting, and prevention.  
 
4.3.3 Relationships among the study variables 
To assess the association of the predictor variables, we examine Pearson correlation 
coefficients (see Table 4.4). The results show that owning a mobile phone and being 
female, being regularly assessed, and being a member of a paraprofessional association are 
positively and significantly associated with referrals to veterinarians. Male 
paraprofessionals, those that operate in the pastoral livestock production system, and those 
trained in animal health are less likely to refer cases to veterinarians. There are also 
significant correlations between various predictors, such as a negative correlation between 
gender and assessment as well as gender and age. These results suggest that male 
paraprofessionals are younger and are less likely to be supervised compared to their female 
counterparts. ‘Paraprofessionals’ training in animal health is positively and significantly 
correlated with owning a mobile phone, education, assessment, and association 
membership. The results also imply that female paraprofessionals are more likely to be 
trained in animal health, that trained paraprofessional are less likely to attend short 
trainings or seminars, that contagious diseases are less prevalent in the areas where animal 
health trained paraprofessionals operate, and that trained paraprofessionals do not operate 
in areas where many untrained paraprofessionals operate. The results also reveal that 
paraprofessionals from pastoral areas are less likely to refer cases to veterinarians, to own 
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mobile phones, to be assessed, to be trained in animal health, and to have attained a higher 
education level as compared to those operating in the intensive production system. 
Although the variable representing the production system was correlated with most 
predictors, this variable was not dropped when estimating the probit model because most 
of the predictors may be strongly dependent on the livestock production system. Moreover, 
its variance inflation factor was 7.79, which indicates moderate collinearity as values from 
5 to 10 represent moderate collinearity (Midi et al., 2010). This does not discount the 
regression analyses (O’brien, 2007). In addition, the variable representing 
paraprofessionals’ training, which is shown in table 4.4, is correlated with most predictors. 
This variable, too, was kept in the model because some of the predictors, such as attending 
seminars or trainings and membership in associations, depend on the training of 
paraprofessionals. The variance inflation factor for this variable equals 10.26, which 
indicates moderate collinearity. According to O’brien (2007), VIFs between 10 and 20 do 
not by themselves discount the results of the regression analyses. 
 
4.3.4 Empirical probit estimates 
The estimates derived from the probit model are presented in Table 4.5. The statistical test 
of significance is the likelihood ratio test, which follows chi-square distribution with 10 
degrees of freedom and the z-test with a significance level of 5%. Based on the goodness 
of fit measured by McFadden R-squared with the likelihood ratio as the basis of inference, 
the predictor variables explain 41% of the variation of paraprofessionals’ decisions to refer 
cases to veterinarians. The null hypothesises that all predictors are jointly zero can be 
rejected (p< 0.001), indicating that the model is overall statistically significant.  
The results indicate that the prevalence of notifiable or contagious diseases and 
paraprofessionals’ assessment, phone ownership, and membership in a paraprofessional 
association increase the probability that a paraprofessional refers to a veterinarian. On the 
other hand, being male and operating in an area with more informally or untrained 
paraprofessionals have a negative influence on a paraprofessional’s decision to refer to a 
veterinarian. No evidence was found to suggest that age and attendance of short term 
trainings or seminars significantly influence referrals from paraprofessionals to 
veterinarians. Several diagnostic checks were undertaken, which confirm the findings 
presented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.4 Pearson correlation coefficients showing the relationship among the study variables including referrals from paraprofessional to 
veterinarians in Uganda and Kenya 
  Refer Phone Gender Age Education Assess Seminars Association Disease Untrained Training System 
Refer  1.000                       
Phone  0.234*  1.000                     
Gender -0.343** -0.072  1.000                   
Age  0.145  0.001 -0.228*  1.000                 
Education  0.188  0.310** -0.131 -0.097  1.000               
Assess  0.489**  0.172 -0.253*  0.133  0.274**  1.000             
Seminars  0.139  0.117  0.122  0.033  0.168  0.062  1.000           
Association  0.290**  0.155 -0.144  0.079  0.163  0.130 -0.009  1.000         
Disease -0.042 -0.209  0.132 -0.204 -0.199 -0.135 -0.149 -0.169  1.000       
Untrained  0.003  0.020  0.194  0.053  0.028  0.217*  0.418*** -0.046  0.038  1.000     
Training  0.161  0.425*** -0.325** -0.077  0.543**  0.233* -0.315*  0.237* -0.204 -0.516***  1.000   
System -0.264* -0.58***  0.216*  0.056 -0.789*** -0.35** -0.201 -0.167  0.319**  0.042 -0.731*** 1.000 
Level of Significance of Pearson correlation coefficient: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
9
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Table 4.5 Probit regression model describing the association between referrals from 
paraprofessionals to veterinarians and predictor variables based on the 
sample of 82 paraprofessionals from Uganda and Kenya 
Variable βa SEb 95%CIc P-valued 
Phone  0.285 0.035 0.21 - 0.35 0.000 
Gender -0.531 0.105 (-)0.74 - (-)0.32 0.000 
Age  0.004 0.006 (-)0.01 - 0.02 0.535 
Supervision  0.583 0.129 0.32-0.83 0.000 
Seminars  0.009 0.079 (-)0.14-0.16 0.908 
Association  0.374 0.106 0.16- 0.58 0.000 
Epidemic Disease  0.441 0.086 0.27 - 0.61 0.000 
Training -0.732 0.108 (-)0.94 - (-)0.52 0.000 
Untrained -0.040 0.008 (-)0.05 - (-)0.02 0.000 
System -0.456 0.080 (-)0.61 - (-)0.30 0.000 
McFadden R squared = 0.381; N=82; 
a 
marginal effects; 
b 
standard error; 
c 
95% confidence 
interval; 
d
 P-value of the overall effect  
 
4.4 Discussion 
Results from the descriptive statistics show that the proportion of paraprofessionals who 
referred to veterinarians in the previous year is 0.34. The predicted probability of a 
paraprofessional referring to a veterinarian in the previous year was 27%. These results 
generally indicate a low level of referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians. Referrals 
are particularly low in pastoral livestock production systems. Below, we discuss the factors 
that had a significant influence on these referrals. 
Table 4.5 shows that paraprofessionals’ ownership of a mobile phone increases the 
probability of referring to a veterinarian by 0.285 (i.e. 29 percentage points) assuming all 
other factors are held constant. This is likely because mobile phones reduce the costs of 
information, communication, and access (Aker, 2011; Muto and Yamano, 2009; Urquieta 
and Alwang, 2012), which may enable paraprofessionals to easily communicate and refer 
cases to veterinarians. This result is supported by a study examining referrals between 
general practitioners and veterinary specialists (Amanda, 2007). Rapid and effective 
communication is also needed to build strong social connections or networks (Bayes, 
2001). This suggests that mobile phones and mobile network coverage are imperative to 
building strong referral networks between paraprofessionals and veterinarians.  
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Paraprofessionals operating in areas where contagious diseases are more prevalent 
are more likely to refer to veterinarians by 44.1 percentage points compared to 
paraprofessionals in areas where non-contagious disease are more prevalent, assuming all 
other factors are held constant. These results suggest that paraprofessionals who deal 
mainly and more frequently with contagious animal diseases are more likely to refer to 
veterinarians. This finding is supported by a study on referrals between general 
practitioners and specialists in human health care (O’Donnell, 2000). Admittedly, the 
paraprofessionals interviewed in this study stated that they only refer to veterinarians if the 
case is complicated, a disease is a contagious one, and if the animal fails to respond to the 
treatment.  
Paraprofessionals who are annually assessed or supervised are by 58.3 percentage 
points more likely to refer to veterinarians as compared to paraprofessionals who are not 
assessed or supervised, assuming all other predictors are held constant. This result is in 
agreement with findings by Abodunrin et al. (2010) who studied determinants of referral 
practices of Tradition Birth Attendants in Nigeria and found that a high number of 
supervisory visits are associated with more frequent referral. This finding suggests that a 
well-established veterinary structure enabling the supervision of paraprofessionals would 
significantly influence referrals to veterinarians. Moreover, supervision is important in 
building paraprofessionals’ confidence in veterinarians and their skills. A study by 
Brunetto et al. (2011) on the supervisor-nurse relationship shows that supervision increases 
a nurse’s satisfaction (trust) with his or her supervisor and reduces role ambiguity. The 
literature also suggests that regulation and supervision in the veterinary structure should be 
designed in a collegial manner, as failing to do so could result in distrust (Aghion and 
Algan, 2010) and thus reduce referrals. In fact, Leonard (2000) argues that a low level of 
referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians may be explained by the fact that 
veterinarians treat paraprofessionals as subordinates rather than as colleagues. Similar 
implications have been found for nurses (Brunetto et al., 2011). The results also show that 
membership in a paraprofessional association positively influences referrals. This is mainly 
true for paraprofessionals who have a formal training in animal health since Pearson 
correlation coefficients show that there is an association between paraprofessionals with 
animal health training and membership in a paraprofessional association. This result 
provides evidence for the need to organize and support the formation paraprofessionals’ 
associations.  
Determination of Referrals from Paraprofessionals to Veterinarians in Uganda and Kenya 
96 
The marginal probability of the gender variable suggests that male 
paraprofessionals are by 53.1 percentage points less likely to refer to veterinarians relative 
to their female counterparts, assuming all other factors are held constant. This is consistent 
with findings by Chan and Austin (2003) and Franks et al. (2000), who found that female 
physicians have higher referral rates. We also found that the increase in the number of 
paraprofessionals in the area who lack training in animal health is negatively associated 
with referrals by paraprofessionals working in that area. This suggests that in areas with 
more untrained paraprofessionals, referral networks are more difficult to build. This could 
result from the fact that veterinarians may have been driven out of such areas, implying the 
phenomenon of a “lemon market” in animal health: As farmers cannot distinguish between 
poor or good quality services, only providers of cheap and low quality services remain in 
the market (Ly, 2003). The term “lemon market” was coined by Akerlof (1970) with 
reference to the market of used cars. He pointed out that because sellers of used cars have 
more information while the average buyer cannot readily distinguish a poor quality used 
car (“lemon”) from a high quality used car, sellers of high quality used cars are likely to be 
driven out of the market.  
Problems of referrals are also more severe in pastoral areas because most 
paraprofessionals and clients are not well educated and cannot speak English, which 
restricts them from interacting with veterinarians. Most veterinarians are not from the same 
ethnic background, which is a further obstacle, as also found by Eregae (2003). It is, 
therefore, not surprising the paraprofessionals in pastoral systems are less likely to refer 
cases to veterinarians as compared to those in intensive systems. Although notifiable or 
contagious animal diseases are more prevalent in pastoral areas, the absenteeism of 
veterinarians in these areas also limits referrals. As highlighted above, we were not able to 
interview any veterinarians in the pastoral districts due to the following reasons. First, there 
was only one veterinarian employed by government in the districts we analysed. Second, 
according to respondents’ information, government veterinarians are typically absent from 
their duty station in these districts and therefore are not performing their mandated 
regulatory and supervisory roles. Nevertheless, supervision significantly influences 
referrals there.  
The results also show that paraprofessionals who have had formal animal health 
training are less likely to refer to veterinarians. This result is supported by Rosenthal et al. 
(1996), who found that physicians with experience and specialized knowledge on 
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particular cases are less likely to refer to specialists. This is to be expected because 
paraprofessionals with formal training are capable of handling most cases themselves as 
compared to those with no formal training, which reduces the need to refer cases to 
veterinarians.  
This study has identified a number of factors influencing referrals by 
paraprofessionals to veterinarians in Kenya and Uganda. A better understanding of these 
factors is needed to build linkages between paraprofessionals and veterinarians. This is of 
particular importance in improving disease surveillance and reporting, as well as ensuring 
correct disease diagnosis and drug prescription. The results can be used to help 
paraprofessionals more easily consult with veterinarians and refer cases to them. This 
would also benefit veterinarians by increasing their clients, thereby providing them with 
recognition for their quality services. The results of this study are also useful in guiding 
investment decisions by government, regulatory institutions, and development partners that 
aim at improving referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians. Such investments 
include hiring more veterinarians in local governments to work with paraprofessionals who 
are operating privately, supporting the formation of paraprofessional associations, 
providing paraprofessionals, especially those in pastoral areas, with mobile phones and 
support the expansion of mobile network coverage in those areas.  
The results from this study reveal that supervision, an increase in the number of 
trained veterinarians, and a reduction in the number of untrained animal health 
paraprofessionals are among the factors that increase referrals from paraprofessionals to 
veterinarians. But then, this requires a strong veterinary legislation and a well-established 
and staffed veterinary structure (FAO, 2011). Although the costs of implementing 
veterinary legislation, establishing well-structured veterinary infrastructure, and 
supervising paraprofessionals would be significant for national budgets (Rubarema, 2010), 
policy makers need to prioritize veterinary  legislation and funding because it has 
significant externalities with regard to both humans and animals. A recent report by the 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) on the global mapping of hot spots for 
zoonotic diseases, such as tuberculosis (TB), brucellosis and Rift Valley fever, finds that 
13 zoonoses are responsible for 2.4 billion cases of human illness and 2.2 million deaths 
annually (Grace et al., 2012). Grace et al. (2012) estimate that approximately one in eight 
heads of livestock (ruminants) in poor countries, including Kenya and Uganda, are affected 
by brucellosis, which decreases milk and meat production in cattle. Moreover, consumers 
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of these livestock products are at risk of getting infected with brucellosis if the source 
animal was infected (Baldi and Giambartolomei, 2013; Bender et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 
2001). Therefore, improving referrals may decrease the prevalence of such diseases and 
have a significant impact on both human and animal health, which would have 
implications not only for national budgets via lower health costs, but also through 
economic development by improving individuals’ well-being.  
The presence of zoonotic diseases worsens poverty and hunger situations among 
livestock dependent communities. The ILRI study quoted above found a 99 per cent 
correlation between country levels of protein-energy malnutrition and the burden of 
zoonoses. In most developing countries, the zoonoses burden is worsened by poor disease 
surveillance and reporting systems, resulting in delayed response and massive under-
reporting.  For example, Grace et al. (2012) estimate that 99.9 per cent of livestock losses 
do not appear in official disease reports in Africa. As Catley et al. (2004) argue, improving 
referrals between paraprofessionals and veterinarians is key to improved disease 
surveillance and reporting in developing countries and in ensuring timely response to 
disease outbreaks.  
Results from this study also have policy implications with regard to private sector 
engagement. We found that expanding paraprofessionals’ mobile phone access, 
encouraging paraprofessionals to form associations, and conducting seminars or short-term 
trainings would improve linkages and promote the development of referral networks 
between paraprofessionals and veterinarians, thus improving the quality of veterinary 
services.  
This study has some limitations. Cross-sectional data rather than case specific data 
were used since we had to rely on self-reported data by paraprofessionals. Thus, case-
specific information such as diagnostics and subclinical infections as well as client-related 
factors could not be included in our analysis. In addition, we were not able to verify from 
veterinarians whether a specific paraprofessional had in fact referred cases to them in the 
previous year. Nonetheless, studies on referrals often rely on cross-sectional data 
(Bachman and Freeborn, 1999). In addition, self-reported data about referrals have been 
found to be useful in analysing referrals in human health care (Bachman and Freeborn, 
1999; Sobal et al., 1988). Interviewing clients for case-specific information on whether 
their cases were referred from the paraprofessional to the veterinarian would be 
problematic, especially in developing countries, because clients (farmers) are often unable 
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to differentiate between paraprofessionals and veterinarians as both are called “animal 
doctors” (Leonard, 2000). Paraprofessionals are, thus, the gatekeepers to referrals in animal 
health care. 
There may also be a concern that the relatively low sample size (82) could mean 
that the results are not representative. However, in each study site, we interviewed more 
than 80% of the paraprofessionals that are actively engaged in providing veterinary 
services. As we have no reason to assume that the sample is biased, the results can be 
considered to be representative of the study area. In addition, our sample size compares 
well with the sample size of 72 in a study by Tambi (1999), which estimated determinants 
of demand for private veterinary services. Although we recommend that future studies 
collect longitudinal data which capture client- and case specific information on 
veterinarians and paraprofessionals, this study provides a good understanding of 
determinants of referrals between paraprofessionals and veterinarians.  
 
4.5 Conclusions  
Improving referrals can result in better disease surveillance as well as in better reporting 
and response to contagious animal diseases, thereby reducing the disease burden (risks) for 
both humans and animals . However, referrals by paraprofessionals to veterinarians are 
currently very low, mainly because of low mobile phone network coverage, a high number 
of paraprofessionals not adequately trained in animal health, and low levels of supervision. 
Therefore, investments in training, expanding mobile phone network coverage, providing 
mobile phones to practicing paraprofessionals, increasing the number of trained 
paraprofessionals and veterinarians, as well as increasing the supervision of 
paraprofessionals is vital in building referrals networks in the provision of animal health 
services. 
 
4.6 References 
Abodunrin, O.L., Akande, T.M., Musa, I.O., Aderibigbe, S. a, 2010. Determinants of 
referral practices of clients by traditional birth attendants in Ilorin, Nigeria. Afr. J. 
Reprod. Health 14, 77–84. 
Aghion, P., Algan, Y., 2010. Regulation and distrust. Q. J. Econ. 123, 1015–1049. 
Ahuja, V., Kurup, M., 2006. Assessment and Reflections on Livestock Service Delivery in 
Andhra Pradesh: A Synthesis, Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative. 
Determination of Referrals from Paraprofessionals to Veterinarians in Uganda and Kenya 
100 
Aker, J.C., 2011. Dial “A” for agriculture: a review of information and communication 
technologies for agricultural extension in developing countries. Agric. Econ. 42, 
631–647. 
Akerlof, G. a., 1970. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. Q. J. Econ. 84, 488–500. 
Amanda, L.D., 2007. Focus On Referral Issues: 2006-2007 American Animal Hospital 
Association (AAHA) Forums on Vetreinaryians -Veterinary specialist Referral 
Issues Report on key Findings and Best Practices. 
Angulo, F., Nunnery, J., Bair, H., 2004. Antimicrobial resistance in zoonotic enteric 
pathogens. Rev. Sci. Tech. 23, 485–496. 
Arellano, M., 1987. Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within-groups Estimators. Oxf. 
Bull. Econ. Stat. 49, 431–434. 
Bachman, K.H., Freeborn, D.K., 1999. HMO physicians’ use of referrals. Soc. Sci. Med. 
48, 547–57. 
Baldi, P., Giambartolomei, G., 2013. Pathogenesis and pathobiology of zoonotic 
brucellosis in humans. Rev. Sci. Tech. 32, 117–125. 
Bayes, A., 2001. Infrastructure and rural development: insights from a Grameen Bank 
village phone initiative in Bangladesh. Agric. Econ. 25, 261–272. 
Bender, J.B., Hueston, W., Osterholm, M., 2006. Recent animal disease outbreaks and their 
impact on human populations. J. Agromedicine 11, 5–15. 
Bickell, N., Pieper, K., Lee, K., 1992. Referral patterns for coronary artery disease 
treatment: gender bias or good clinical judgment? Ann. Intern. Med. 116, 791–797. 
Brunetto, Y., Farr-Wharton, R., Shacklock, K., 2011. Supervisor-nurse relationships, 
teamwork, role ambiguity and well-being: Public versus private sector nurses. Asia 
Pacific J. Hum. Resour. 49, 143–164. 
Cameron, A.C., Trivedi, P.K., 2009. Microeconometrics using stata. Stata Press College 
Station, TX. 
Catley, A., Leyland, T., 2004. Para-veterinary professionals and the development of 
quality, self-sustaining community-based services. Rev. Sci. Tech. 23, 225–252. 
Chan, B.T., Austin, P.C., 2003. Patient, physician, and community factors affecting 
referrals to specialists in Ontario, Canada: a population-based, multi-level 
modelling approach. Med. Care 41, 500–511. 
Choudhury, V., Van Engelen, A., Sebadduka, S., Valdivia, P., 2011. Uganda dairy supply 
chain Risk Assessment. 
Cros, C., Toulouse, R.C.S., Ape, C., 2010. Listing and Categorisation of Priority Animal 
Diseases , including those Transmissible to Humans ”. Paris. 
Diop, B.A., Bessin, R., 2004. Links between non-professionals agents and the Official 
Veterinary services in Sub-sahara Africa. Rev. Sci. Tech. 23, 147–156. 
Dórea, F.C., Sanchez, J., Revie, C.W., 2011. Veterinary syndromic surveillance: Current 
initiatives and potential for development. Prev. Vet. Med. 101, 1–17. 
Determination of Referrals from Paraprofessionals to Veterinarians in Uganda and Kenya 
101 
Eregae, M., 2003. Participatory market research in business planning for private pastoral 
veterinary practice in Turkana district, Kenya. Master of science in Veterinary 
Epidemiology and Economics Thesis, University of Nairobi, Kenya. 
FAO, 2011. Good emergency management practice: the essentials. FAO Animal 
Production and Health Manual. 
Franks, P., Williams, G.C., Zwanziger, J., Mooney, C., Sorbero, M., 2000. Why do 
physicians vary so widely in their referral rates? J. Gen. Intern. Med. 15, 163–8. 
GOK, 2008. National Livetsock Policy. Repub. Kenya, Minist. Livest. devevelopment 
Sess. Pap. NO 2 1–53. 
Grace, D., Mutua, F., Ochungo, P., Kruska, R., 2012. Mapping of poverty and likely 
zoonoses hotspots. International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). 
Haan, C. De, Holden, S., Peeling, D., 2001. The role of para-veterinarians in the delivery 
of veterinary services in Africa: Results of a Survey of Chief Veterinary Officer ’ s 
Opinions, in: OIE International Scientific Conference. pp. 115–122. 
Hassan, A., 2003. Restructuring of veterinary services through consolidation of private 
veterinary practice and introduction of new approaches for integration of target 
groups in the, in: Compendium of Technical Items Presented to the International 
Committee or to Regional Commissions. pp. 157–166. 
Jebara, K., 2004. Surveillance, detection and response: managing emerging diseases at 
national and international levels. Rev. Sci. Tech. 23, 709–715. 
Jones, E., Batte, M.T., Schnitkey, G.D., 1989. The impact of economic and socioeconomic 
factors on the demand for information: A case study of Ohio commercial farmers. 
Agribusiness 5, 557–571. 
Kahn, L.H., 2006. Confronting zoonoses, linking human and veterinary medicine. Emerg. 
Infect. Dis. 12, 556–61. 
King, L., Marano, N., Hughes, J., 2004. New partnerships between animal health services 
and public health agencies. Rev. Sci. … 23, 717–726. 
Koma, L.M.P.K., 2000. Can private veterinarians survive in Uganda?, in: Leonard, D.. 
(Ed.), Africa’s Changing Markets for Health and Veterinary Services : The New 
Institutional Issues,. Macmillan Publishers Ltd, London, pp. 145–165. 
Kwakyi, P., Epperson, J., 1989. Probit analysis of market participants’ attitudes toward 
selected market alternatives for us farmers' stock peanuts. Agribusiness 5, 107–119. 
Leonard, D., 2000. Africa ’ s Changing Markets for Health and Veterinary Services : The 
New Institutional Issues, World. Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 
Leyland, T., Catley, A., 2002. Community-based animal health delivery systems: 
improving the quality of veterinary service delivery, in: Revue Scientifique et 
Technique Seminar. Tunis, Tunisia: Organisation of Veterinary Services and Food 
Safety. World Veterinary Congress. pp. 1–15. 
Ly, C., 2003. Management and Impact of Auxiliaries on pastoral Production and 
Veterinary Service Delivery in Senegal, in: Leonard David (Ed.), African Changing 
for Health and Veterinary Services. Macmilan Press Ltd, London and St maartins 
Press New York, London. 
Determination of Referrals from Paraprofessionals to Veterinarians in Uganda and Kenya 
102 
Magnani, R., Sabin, K., Saidel, T., Heckathorn, D., 2005. Review of sampling hard-to-
reach and hidden populations for HIV surveillance. AIDS 19 Suppl 2, S67–72. 
Marshall, M.N., 1996. Sampling for qualitative research. Fam. Pract. 13, 522–5. 
Moulton, B., 1990. An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregate 
variables on micro units. Rev. Econ. Stat. 72, 334–338. 
Mugunieri, G.L., Omiti, J., Irungu, P., 2004. Integrating community-based animal health 
workers into the formal veterinary service delivery system in Kenya. Agrekon 43, 
89–100. 
Muto, M., Yamano, T., 2009. The Impact of Mobile Phone Coverage Expansion on Market 
Participation: Panel Data Evidence from Uganda. World Dev. 37, 1887–1896. 
O’brien, R., 2007. A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation factors. Qual. 
Quant. 41, 673–690. 
O’Donnell, C. a, 2000. Variation in GP referral rates: what can we learn from the 
literature? Fam. Pract. 17, 462–71. 
OIE, 2013. Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 22nd ed. World Organization for Animal 
Health. 
Oruko, L., Ndung’u, L., 2009. An analysis of animal healthcare service delivery in Kenya, 
in: Kirsten, J.F., Dorward, A.R., Poulton, C., Vink, N. (Eds.), Institutional 
Economics Perspectives on African Agricultural Development. International Food 
Policy Research Insitute, pp. 257–272. 
Pastoret, P., Chaisemartin, D., 2011. The importance of governance and reliable veterinary 
certification. Rev. Sci. Tech. 30, 347–352. 
Peeling, D., Holden, W., 2003. Community based animal health workers - threat or 
opportunity? An overview. The IDL Group. 
Pica-Ciamarra, U., Otte, J., 2008. Animal Health Policies in Developing Countries–A 
Review of Options. Pro-Poor Livest. Policy Initiat. 
Press, S., Wilson, S., 1978. Choosing between logistic regression and discriminant 
analysis. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 73, 699–705. 
Racloz, V., Schelling, E., Chitnis, N., 2013. Persistence of brucellosis in pastoral systems. 
Rev. Sci. Tech. 32, 61–70. 
Rubarema, V.R., 2010. Challenges of reforming national veterinary legislatin: the 
expereince of Uganda, in: OIE Global Conference on Veterinary Legislation 
Djerba, Tunisia 7-9 December 2010. 
Schneider, H., 2006. Capacity building for veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals. 
FAO Anim. Prod. Heal. Proc. 
Scott, L., Freese, J., 2006. Regression models for categorical dependent variables using 
Stata. Coll. Station. Tex. StataCorp LP. 
Sobal, J., Muncie, H.L., Valente, C.M., Levine, D.M., DeForge, B.R., 1988. Self-reported 
referral patterns in practices of Family/General Practitioners, Internists, and 
Obstetricians/Bynecologists. J. Community Health 13, 171–183. 
Tambi, N., 1999. Probit analysis of livestock producers’ demand for private veterinary 
services in the high potential agricultural areas of Kenya. Agric. Syst. 59, 163–176. 
Determination of Referrals from Paraprofessionals to Veterinarians in Uganda and Kenya 
103 
Taylor, L.H., Latham, S.M., Woolhouse, M.E., 2001. Risk factors for human disease 
emergence. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 356, 983–9. 
Teerenstra, S., Melis, R.J.F., Peer, P.G.M., Borm, G.F., 2006. Pseudo cluster 
randomization dealt with selection bias and contamination in clinical trials. J. Clin. 
Epidemiol. 59, 381–6. 
Urquieta, N.R.A., Alwang, J., 2012. Women rule: potato markets, cellular phones and 
access to information in the Bolivian highlands. Agric. Econ. 43, 405–415. 
Vallat, B., 2004. The role of private veterinarians and veterinary para-professionals in the 
provision of animal health services [WWW Document]. World Anim. Heal. Organ. 
URL http://www.oie.int/for-the-media/editorials/detail/article/the-role-of-private-
veterinarians-and-veterinary-para-professionals-in-the-provision-of-animal-healt/ 
(accessed 3.5.13). 
Woodford, J., 2004. Synergies between veterinarians and para-professionals in the public 
and private sectors: organisational and institutional relationships that facilitate the 
process of privatising animal health services in developing countries. Rev. Sci. 
Tech. 23, 115–135. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 6th ed, 
The MIT Press 0. The MIT press, Cambridge, Massachussets London England. 
 104 
5 DO PARAPROFESSIONALS PROVIDE QUALITY 
VETERINARY SERVICES? RESULTS FROM A ROLE 
PLAY EXPERIMENT IN RURAL UGANDA 
John Ilukor and Regina Birner
  
This chapter is published with in Open access Journal and it is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited. The 
original article: Measuring the quality of clinical veterinary services for Cattle : an 
application of a role play experiment in rural Uganda appeared in the Journal BMC 
Research Notes Volume 7, Pages. 1–12. doi:10.1186/1756-0500-7-894 
Abstract 
The study uses a role play experiment to analyze how the interaction of farmers and service 
providers influences the quality and the demand for clinical services. The game was played 
in four rounds, and the quality of clinical services was measured by scoring the accuracy of 
a service provider prescribing the appropriate drug for selected animal diseases in each 
round. Statistical tests were performed to establish whether the quality of services provided 
by different types of paraprofessionals and veterinarians differ. Learning curves for service 
providers were constructed to examine whether the quality of services provided by 
paraprofessionals improves as they continue to interact with veterinarians. Belief updating 
curves were constructed for farmers to examine whether they change their beliefs about 
paraprofessionals after receiving information about the quality of their services. A probit 
regression model for binary panel data was estimated to determine the factors that 
influence farmers’ decisions to change service providers. The results show that the ability 
to identify the signs of different diseases and the accuracy of prescriptions by veterinarians 
is not significantly different from that of paraprofessionals trained in veterinary science. 
However, the ability of service providers who are not trained in veterinary medicine to 
perform these tasks is significantly lower than that of service providers trained in 
veterinary science. The continued interaction between paraprofessionals and veterinarians 
gradually leads to an improvement in the ability of paraprofessionals trained in general 
agriculture and social sciences to perform these tasks. This is not the case for 
paraprofessionals with no formal training or education. Farmers do not easily change their
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beliefs about paraprofessionals even if they receive information on their lack of ability to 
diagnose diseases correctly and describe the correct drugs. Belief updating depends not 
only on the outcome of the previous round, but also on the gender of the farmer and the 
livestock production system. This paper argues that the slow pace in which farmers update 
their beliefs about paraprofessionals limits paraprofessionals’ willingness to learn or 
consult with veterinarians. However, the use of “animal health cards” (records of diagnoses 
and treatments) could induce paraprofessionals to provide services of better quality and to 
enable farmers to measure the quality of services, thus improving the quality of veterinary 
services in the long run. 
 
Key words: Belief updating, lemon market, role play game, veterinary services, Uganda 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This paper is concerned with measuring and assessing the quality of clinical veterinary 
services in developing countries, using Uganda as an example. The existence of 
veterinarians and paraprofessionals of varying skills and training can be a major problem in 
animal health markets (Leonard et al, 1999). Qualified veterinarians have to compete with 
less qualified and unqualified practitioners. Moreover, professionals trained in general 
agriculture have both crop and livestock training may be involved in providing the same 
service, but of heterogeneous quality (Boden, 1996). Livestock farmers who have no skills 
or training in veterinary science are not able to perfectly measure or determine the quality 
of services being offered by these service providers. The inability of a farmer to assess and 
measure the quality of the service creates motivation problems such that a farmer is not 
willing to pay a premium fee for the service because he cannot judge the quality of the 
service he or she receives. As a result, service providers that deliver high quality services 
are forced to accept low payment since they cannot convince the farmer that their services 
are of high quality (Ly, 2003). Service providers interact repeatedly with farmers and if 
farmers fail to differentiate the quality of the service, high quality service providers are 
displaced or nudged off the market since the institutions that are required to ensure the 
quality of veterinary services in developing countries are missing or weak (Leonard, 2000). 
Akerlof (1970) describes this interface between quality heterogeneity and asymmetric 
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information resulting in the disappearance of a market with quality goods and services as a 
“lemon market”. 
As argued by Ly (2003), a “lemon market” has occurred in animal health markets in 
most developing countries. In Kenya, even in productive areas, veterinary 
paraprofessionals have dominated the animal health markets (Oruko and Ndung’u, 2009). 
In Uganda, Koma (2000) found that it is very difficult for private veterinarians to break-
even because farmers are not willing to pay a veterinarian a premium for a service that can 
be offered by the paraprofessionals at lower cost, thus leaving the paraprofessionals to 
dominate the market. The dominance of the veterinary paraprofessionals in the provision of 
veterinary services, although useful in reducing costs and increasing access, has been 
criticized on the grounds that this has resulted in a decline in the quality of veterinary 
services (Cooper et al., 2003; Mugunieri et al., 2004). To improve the quality of clinical 
veterinary services, there are increased calls for an improved relationship between 
veterinarians and paraprofessionals (Schneider, 2011). Ahuja (2004) argues that because 
farmers are unable to measure the quality of services due to information failures, 
professional veterinarians and strong regulatory institutions are needed to ensure provision 
of quality services.  
The economic literature on the provision of animal health services emphasizes that 
if farmers had information about the quality of service offered, they would be able to 
update their beliefs and more readily seek services of veterinarians who offer quality 
services. Belief updating (belief change) is the act of changing a previously held belief to 
take into account new information (Lang, 2007). By seeking quality services, 
paraprofessionals or low quality service providers would strive to consult with 
veterinarians in order to maintain and build their reputation. However, this “information 
externality” related to this interaction has not been analyzed in the animal health literature. 
Although information exchange among farmers is not an economic activity, information 
externality is used in this paper to describe the effect of information sharing among farmers 
on the service provider. This effect can be an increase or decline of in demand of services 
of a particular service provider (Hendricks and Kovenock, 1989; Nakamura, 1993). Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2011) and Morgan and Sefton (2001) contend that information externalities 
influence beliefs and decisions, and consequently the value of reputation building, price, 
quality and demand for products or services.  
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However, in the context of clinical veterinary services, this effect will depend on 
how farmers update their beliefs, and whether service providers value their own reputations 
(Schmidt, 1993). Cole (1989) argues that belief updating in light of new information is 
always difficult because of a lack of a mental model that allows a person to combine 
different factors. Bennett and Hauser (2013) also argue that health care decisions are 
complex, difficult to comprehend and have to be made within a limited amount of time. 
Therefore, because of limited time and cognitive abilities farmers may fail to change their 
beliefs about paraprofessionals upon receiving new information. In this study, a role play 
game was used to assess the influence of information on farmers’ beliefs about service 
providers and the quality of clinical services. In particular the study aimed at answering the 
following questions: (1) Does the quality of services provided by paraprofessionals differ 
with that provided by veterinarians? (2) Does quality improve in the long run as 
paraprofessionals and veterinarians interact? (3) Do farmers update their beliefs about 
service providers? And (4) what factors influence farmer belief updating? 
To answer these questions, a role play game was chosen because it captures 
complexities without losing relevance to reality (Bolton, 2002). Role playing allows for the 
accurate capture of information externalities generated through social interaction and 
learning. Green (2002) compared game theory, role playing and unaided judgement in 
assessing decision making in conflict situations and found out that 37% of the assessments 
based on game theory, 28% of the unaided assessments and 64% of the role play games 
assessment were correct. Armstrong (2002) also compared role playing and unaided expert 
opinions and found that role playing predicted 56% of 146 predictions correctly, compared 
to 16% of 172 predictions of unaided expert opinions. Consequently, both concluded that 
role play games are the most accurate and consistent method of assessment and decision 
forecasting. Schelling (2011) argues that role play games are a useful tool for predicting 
and assessing outcomes that are complex in nature. Since veterinary service delivery is 
complex in nature (Bossche, Thys, and Elyn, 2004), role play games are a promising tool 
for assessing the influence of information externality on farmers’ behaviour and the quality 
of veterinary services. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 covers materials and 
methods, Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 discusses the findings and provides a 
conclusion.   
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5.2 Materials and Methods 
5.2.1 Design of the game 
The experimental data used in this paper were collected from two different districts in 
Uganda (referred to here as A and B to ensure the anonymity of the participants). District 
A is located in a pastoral production system and District B in an intensive livestock 
production system. Subjects were recruited from each district. The subjects included the 
farmers, paraprofessionals and veterinarians. They were asked whether they agreed to 
participate in a role play game. Farmers were told they would be paid and their pay-off 
would depend on the outcome of the transaction (treatment of a sick animal in the role 
play) and their ability to negotiate with service providers for the fee the providers would 
charge. The farmers were provided with an initial endowment of 6,000 Uganda Shillings 
(US$2) in each round, which was approximately three times the daily wage for unskilled 
labour in the study regions. If the outcome was positive, a farmer would be paid a reward 
covering the difference between the fee of the service provider and the initial endowment. 
A positive outcome was one where the animal was cured, which happened if the service 
providers identified the right drug for the disease of the animal under consideration. If the 
outcome was negative, the farmer received nothing. A negative outcome means that the 
animal died because the service provider was not able to identify the appropriate treatment. 
Service providers were informed that their earning would depend on their reputation with 
farmers, which determined the number of farmers who demanded their service, and the 
professional fee they charged. Service providers were also told that they could refer a case 
to other service providers if they wished, but they should give the reason for referring. The 
cost of transport and drugs were considered as dead weight costs and hence not included in 
the game.  
A total of 51 farmers were recruited to participate in the experiment, 26 in the 
pastoral livestock production system (10 female and 16 male) and 25 in the intensive 
livestock production system (12 female and 13 male). In each production system, it was 
planned to recruit two veterinarians and five paraprofessionals to participate in the game. 
In District A (pastoral area), however, veterinarians are usually absent from their duty 
stations because there are few trained veterinarians from these areas, and professionals 
from non-pastoral ethnic groups are often reluctant to work in pastoral areas because of the 
harsh climate and poor infrastructure (Hassan, 2003). Therefore, two government animal 
health assistants with a two year diploma training in veterinary medicine were asked to act 
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as veterinarians in the role play. Their performance in terms of disease diagnosis and drug 
prescription was later compared with that of veterinarians in District B and it was found 
that there was no statistically significant difference in their scores. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that this replacement does not affect the results. The training level of the 
paraprofessionals differed between the districts. In the pastoral system, two of the 
paraprofessionals had diplomas in social science with three months of training in animal 
health, and the other three had either primary or no education, and they also had received 
three months of training in animal health. Three paraprofessionals in the intensive 
production system had certificates in general agriculture, and two had diplomas in general 
agriculture. In the intensive system, the three livestock diseases that were identified as the 
most common ones were East Coast Fever, Anaplasmosis, and Tryponamiasis. In the 
pastoral systems, these diseases and two more, namely, Heart Water and Red Water were 
most common.   
The game proceeded as follows: Farmers were given a so-called “animal medical 
card” with the name of the disease written on it both in the local language (Pokot and 
Luganda) and in English. The animal medical cards were distributed to the farmers on a 
random basis. Farmers were asked to choose any service provider of his or her choice to 
treat the respective disease. Every farmer who participated in the game knew at least one 
veterinarian and one professional from earlier interactions. The service provider chosen by 
the farmer had to list the signs associated with the disease (corresponding to performing a 
clinical diagnosis in real life) and prescribe the drugs. The service provider also had to 
agree on the costs of treatment with a farmer. The costs were broken down into the 
professional fee, cost of drugs and transport fee. All this information was written down on 
the animal medical card. Two of the paraprofessionals in the pastoral areas who could not 
read or write in English were assisted by hired university students with no veterinary 
training. The students were instructed to write only what the paraprofessionals told them to 
write. The cards were later handed back to the farmers who presented the cards to the 
researcher. The researcher would then assign the outcomes based on drug prescription. 
Outcomes were categorized as positive and negative. As indicated above, a positive 
outcome is one where the animal is cured (appropriate drug prescribed) while a negative 
outcome is one where the animal died (wrong drug is prescribed). The signs of the diseases 
and the treatment are presented in Table 5.1 below. It was designed by consulting the 
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practicing veterinarians, the Merck Veterinary manual
10
 and the OIE technical disease 
cards
11
.  
The game was played in four rounds, and at the beginning of each round, the 
farmers received a new medical card. At the end of each round, both farmers and service 
providers received information about the outcomes, and their pay-offs were awarded. After 
the game, the participants were invited to share their reflections, and finally, a meal was 
served.  
 
5.2.2 Analysis of data 
To analyse the effect of information externalities on the demand and quality of clinical 
veterinary services, the degree of accuracy in identifying the signs of the disease listed on 
the animal medical card and prescribing the appropriate treatment were used as indicators 
of quality of service provision. After every round, the participants were able to consult and 
share their outcomes with others. The scores for every round were computed and analysed. 
They are also presented in Table 5.1. For identifying the cardinal signs for each disease, 
service providers were given a score of one point for each sign listed in the table and the 
total score was transformed into percentages. In the case of drug prescription, scores were 
awarded based on the drugs prescribed by the service providers. As shown in Table 5.1 
below, if a service provider prescribed one of the main drugs, he was given a score of 8 or 
9. He also received 1 or 2 points for all supplementary drugs, depending on the disease. 
These scores were transformed into percentages and since eight points was the lowest score 
for prescribing the main drug, the pass mark could be set at 80% 
The data from the role play were entered into a data base and analysed as follows: 
Scatter diagrams were used to analyse the quality of clinical diagnosis and drug 
prescription for each disease. Learning curves were constructed to examine whether quality 
improved with experience or after paraprofessionals interacted with veterinarians. Learning 
curves are used in clinical medicine to measure quality of service, and they are derived by 
graphically plotting performance against experience gained from acquisition of new 
information or knowledge from prior experience (Waldman, 2003). Hopper et al. (2007) 
argue that a steep learning curve implies that skills are acquired rapidly because the 
                                                 
10
 The Merck Veterinary manual for veterinary professionals http://www.merckmanuals.com/vet/index.html  
11
 OIE technical disease cards http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/technical-disease-cards/  
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procedure is simple. In this particular case, a steep slope would mean service providers are 
consulting or learning from each other to build and maintain their reputation. Farmers’ 
belief updating curves were also constructed to examine whether farmers update their 
beliefs or change their beliefs about types of service providers. The slope of the curve 
measures the level of belief change or updating (Danes et al, 1978; Hogarth and Einhorn, 
1992). Service providers were categorized into veterinarians and paraprofessionals. The 
latter were further differentiated by field and level of training. The mean scores in drug 
prescription for each category in each round were computed and plotted on a Cartesian axis 
in order to construct the learning curves. In addition, the total number of farmers seeking 
services from the different categories of service providers in each round was computed, 
and the results were used to construct farmers’ belief updating curves.  
 
Table 5.1 Clinical signs and drugs for specific animal diseases 
Disease Clinical signs Main drug(s) Scores Supplementary 
drugs  
Scores 
East Coast Fever High temperature of about 
40
0
C, swollen lymph nodes, 
increased breathing loss of 
appetite, nasal discharge, 
cough, white discharge in 
the eyes 
Butarex, 
Parvexion, 
Clexion and 
Aflexion 
8 multivitamins and 
oxy-tetracycline 
2 
Anaplasmosis High temperature (41
0
C), 
severe constipation, loss of 
appetite, loss of body 
weight, increased breathing 
and dry mouth 
Imisol 8 salts, 
multivitamins and 
oxy-tetracycline 
2 
Trypanosomiasis High temperature, stunning 
hair, loss of body weight, 
lacrimation (crying), blood 
discharge from the ears or 
skin, mucus discharge and 
brown urine. 
Suriname, 
Diminazene 
and Ethidium 
9  oxy-tetracycline 1 
Heart Water  Turning in circles, grinding 
of the teeth, sensitivity to 
touch, nasal discharge and 
high temperature 
Oxy 
tetracycline 
9 Multivitamins 1 
Red Water Reddish urine, high 
temperature, loss of appetite, 
laboured breathing and 
weight loss 
Imisol, 
Diminazene 
and Berenil 
9 Multivitamins 1 
Source: Authors 
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Non-parametric statistics were used to perform statistical tests because the Shapiro-
Wilk test for normality and the Doornik-Hansen test for multivariate normality showed that 
the data violated the normality assumption. Since the normality assumption was violated, 
parametric tests were considered to be less powerful than the non-parametric tests because 
they do not assume normality (Sawilowsky, 1990). A panel probit model with random-
coefficient that allows for unobserved heterogeneity in farmers’ belief updating in each 
round was estimated to determine factors that influence farmers belief updating. In the 
model, belief updating is measured as a farmer’s decision to change to a different service 
provider from the previous service provider. A random effects model was chosen because 
(1) the observations are many but the number of rounds are few (R=4), thus a fixed effect 
model would give inconsistent estimates, and (2) a random effects model allows one to 
make inferences about the whole population, something that cannot be done with a fixed 
effects model (Maddala, 1987). Maddala further notes that the probit model is well suited 
for estimating random effects because it produces correlation among errors yet logistic 
distribution is very restrictive for this purpose. Gibbons and Hedeker (1994) used it to 
predict the likelihood of some doctors experiencing malpractice claims and in this paper it 
is used to determine factors that influence livestock farmers’ decision to change service 
provider.     
 
5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Analysis of service quality by disease 
In the materials and methods section, it was noted that animal health assistants with a 
diploma in veterinary science were asked to act as veterinarians in pastoral areas. 
Therefore, it was imperative to test whether there is a significant difference in the quality 
of their services (clinical diagnosis and drug prescription). A Kruskal-Wallis and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric test for equality was performed and results showed 
that there is no statistical evidence that the scores of government health assistants in the 
pastoral areas in clinical diagnosis and prescription were different from the scores of the 
veterinarians (p<0.05). The mean score achieved by government animal health assistants 
for identifying all signs of the disease (clinical diagnosis) were 58% and the mean score for 
drug prescription was 98%. The respective scores achieved by veterinarians for clinical 
diagnosis and drug prescription for were 53% and 99%, respectively. Consequently, the 
term “veterinarian” as used in this paper includes both the veterinarians and the 
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government animal health assistants trained in veterinary science, who acted as 
veterinarians in the role play in the pastoral area. Paraprofessionals included service 
providers with a diploma and or a certificate in agriculture or social science. Community 
animal health workers (CAHWs) are those service providers who have received some 
training in animal health services, but do not hold a diploma or certificate. 
Figure 5.1 is composed of 6 figures. Figure 5.1a is a scatter diagram of the overall 
scores in clinical diagnosis and drug prescription. Results show that the veterinarians’ 
average score in drug prescription was always close to 100%, but in identifying the signs 
of the respective diseases, sometimes the veterinarians scored below 50% and this was 
mainly because veterinarians were not keen on listing all the clinical signs. For 
paraprofessionals, the results show high heterogeneity both in clinical diagnosis and drug 
prescription. This could be a result of variation in the training of the different types of 
paraprofessionals (see above). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was performed 
to find out whether there is a statistically significant difference between veterinarians and 
paraprofessionals in both clinical diagnosis and drug prescription. Results showed that 
there was a statistically significant difference between paraprofessionals and veterinarians 
in drug prescription, but not clinical diagnosis. Consequently, the following discussion of 
the results will mainly focus on drug prescription as a measure of the quality of service.  
Figures 5.1b to 5.1f are scatter diagrams for clinical diagnosis and prescription for 
each disease. The results show that there is a major problem in drug prescription by 
paraprofessionals, especially in the treatment of ECF and Anaplasmoisis (see Figures 5.1b 
and 5.1c below). Six of the cases in ECF had a score of below 80% in drug prescription, 
four of which are from the intensive production system and two from the pastoral system. 
Three cases of wrong prescription were from the same service provider, who had a diploma 
in crop science. This service provider was not interested in consulting with other service 
providers even after receiving the information that his prescription was inaccurate. He kept 
on prescribing Oxytetracycline, multivitamins and Imisol for ECF. The remaining case in 
the intensive system was handled by a service provider with a certificate in general 
agriculture.  In the pastoral area, the two cases of inaccurate prescription were from a 
service provider who did not have any formal education, and the cases were recorded in 
rounds one and two. He also did not consult with veterinarians or other service providers. 
The prescription in both cases was only Oxytetracycline. 
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a) The scatter diagram for veterinarians and 
paraprofessionals overall scores in diagnosis scores 
in the treatment 
b) Veterinarians and paraprofessionals scores in the 
treatment of East Coast Fever 
  
c) Veterinarian and paraprofessionals scores in the 
treatment of Anaplasmosis 
d) Veterinarian and paraprofessionals scores in the 
treatment of Trypanosomiasis 
  
e) Veterinarian and paraprofessionals scores in the 
treatment of Heart Water 
f) Veterinarain and paraprofessionals scores in the 
treatment of Red Water 
 
Figure 5.1 The scatter diagrams for veterinarian and paraprofessional scores in diseases 
diagnosis and drug prescription 
 
For Anaplasmoisis, there were thirteen cases with a score of below 80% in drug 
prescription; six cases were from the intensive system and seven from the pastoral system. 
Unlike in the case of ECF, in which cases of inaccurate prescription were from specific 
paraprofessionals, cases of inaccurate prescription in Anaplasmoisis were distributed over 
different paraprofessionals in both production systems. In the intensive system, these 
service providers prescribed mainly multivitamins, Oxytetracycline, Butarex, Suriname, 
and Diminazene. In the pastoral areas, the prescriptions were mainly Oxytetracycline, 
multivitamins, and the following treatment: mixing either one litre or one-half litre of the 
cooking oil with one sachet OMO washing detergent. This sounds strange but both service 
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providers and farmers argued that using cooking oil and washing detergent yields positive 
outcomes for Anaplasmosis. In the case of Tryponamiasis, there were five cases where the 
score was below 80% in drug prescription, and all of these cases were from pastoral 
system. Two of the cases were from one service provider trained in social science, and 
three from service providers with no formal education. The drugs prescribed were Berenil 
and Oxytetracycline. Red Water and Heart Water had three cases each that recorded a 
score below 80% in drug prescription. All the cases were attributed to paraprofessionals 
without formal education, and the prescription for all the diseases in six cases was pen-
strep. The Kruskal-Wallis test was also used to test whether drug prescription varies 
according to disease and according to type of service provider. The results showed that 
there is evidence that drug prescription varies according to disease (p<0.05).  
 
5.3.2 Learning curves and quality of veterinary Services  
To test whether there is a statistically significant difference between the scores of 
veterinarians and paraprofessionals in drug prescription and in clinical diagnosis, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was performed. The results show that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the scores of paraprofessional and veterinarians regarding 
drug prescription, but not regarding clinical diagnosis (p<0.05). The mean scores attained 
by paraprofessionals in clinical diagnosis and drug prescription were 50% and 72%, 
respectively. Veterinarians had a mean score of 99% in drug prescription and 56% in 
clinical diagnosis. The scores of clinical diagnosis were low because veterinarians were not 
keen to list all the clinical signs probably because there was no physical animal involved in 
the game and they could not remember all the signs. Since scores of clinical diagnosis were 
not statistically significant between paraprofessionals and veterinarians, accuracy in drug 
prescription was considered as measure of quality to be analysed further.  
To test whether there is a significant difference in drug prescription regarding field 
of training, production system, and rounds, the Kruskal-Wallis test was performed. The 
results show that the mean scores of drug diagnosis differed significantly by field of 
training and production system (p<0.01). However, only scores of drug prescription in 
rounds one and four were significantly different (p<0.05). This could be attributed to the 
fact that farmers take a long time (in the role play, this means more than one round) to 
change their beliefs about the paraprofessionals. Thus, paraprofessionals have limited 
incentives to consult with more knowledgeable service providers and improve their 
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knowledge. As the feedback meeting held after the game revealed, there are trade-off in 
consulting with other veterinarians. On one hand, consulting with veterinarians may 
increase the likelihood of losing a client to a veterinarian because farmers would lose 
confidence in them and veterinarians would use that as an opportunity to discredit them in 
front of their clients. On the other hand, consulting with veterinarians helps 
paraprofessionals to save face in front of their clients by avoiding negative outcomes. 
The learning curves of the service providers were constructed by plotting the 
average scores in each round (see Figures 5.2 below). Figure 5.2 is composed of three 
figures (Fig a-c). Figure 5.2a shows the learning curves of paraprofessionals and 
veterinarians. The veterinarians’ curve shows that veterinarians are operating at maximum 
with an average score of 99% in drug diagnosis. Paraprofessionals had a score below the 
80% pass mark. In round one, the average score of paraprofessionals in drug prescription 
was 60%, and in round two it was 75%. The 15% increase can be associated with the desire 
to build a reputation and to save face in front of the farmers. As a result paraprofessionals 
consulted with veterinarians after receiving the outcomes in round one. In round three, the 
average scores were 74% which is not significantly different from 75% (the score in round 
two). As noted above, the paraprofessionals did not want to show famers that they do not 
have skills and competence because consulting veterinarians would increase the risk of 
losing clients to veterinarians. However, the poor performance (outcomes) in round three 
forced them to consult with the veterinarians to save face in front of the clients, resulting in 
an increase in the average score to 88% in round four. 
Figure 5.2b shows learning curves of service providers by field of training. The 
learning curves for service providers trained in veterinary science shows that they operate 
at maximum as expected. The scores of service providers with a social science background 
were 71, 91, 90 and 88 in rounds one to four, respectively. The scores represent an 
asymptotic curve as shown in Figure 5.2b, while paraprofessionals with agricultural 
training had a slow but gradually increasing learning curve with scores of 74, 79, 82, and 
94 in rounds one to four, respectively. These curves suggest that paraprofessionals with 
training in social science are more ready to learn than paraprofessionals with agricultural 
training. In other words, paraprofessionals trained in social science easily consult 
veterinarians but still do not reach the level of performance in drug prescription that the 
veterinarians obtain. The paraprofessionals with agricultural backgrounds have potential 
but this depends on how farmers update their beliefs about paraprofessionals. The scores of 
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paraprofessionals trained in agriculture and social science were not significantly different 
at p<0.05.  
 
   
a) Learning curves by type of the 
service provider 
b) Learning curves by field of 
training of service providers 
c) Learning curves by livestock 
production system 
 
Figure 5.2 The learning curves and quality of veterinary services 
 
The learning curves of paraprofessionals with no formal education took the shape 
of a sigmoid curve. In round one the score was 24%, in round two it was 45%, in round 
and 33% and in round four 77%. The poor performance in round one to three can be 
explained by the unwillingness to consult with veterinarians, and the improved 
performance in round four can be explained by the loss of farmers to other providers and 
the need for reputation building. The learning curves in Figure 5.2c show that the quality of 
clinical veterinary services in the pastoral system is lower than that in the intensive system. 
The learning curve of intensive system is gradually increasing, while that of the pastoral 
system takes a sigmoidal shape.  
 
5.3.3 Demand for clinical services 
To measure the effect of information on demand, the demand for services of the veterinary 
and paraprofessionals was measured in each round. Moreover, farmers’ belief updating 
curves were constructed to assess whether farmers update their beliefs about different types 
of service providers. The farmers’ belief updating curves are shown in Figure 5.3 which 
composed of four figures (a-d). Figure 5.3a and 5.3b present the farmers’ belief updating 
curves with regard to the services of veterinarians and paraprofessionals in the intensive 
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and pastoral system, respectively. The curves show that in the intensive system, farmers do 
not easily update their beliefs about paraprofessionals. The belief updating curves were 
perfectly inelastic even with experience of interaction up to round three. This means that 
even when farmers get negative outcomes, they still go back to the same paraprofessional 
or seek services of another paraprofessional but not services of veterinarians. As revealed 
by farmers during the feedback meeting, they would go back to the same paraprofessionals 
even when the previous outcome was negative because of the following reasons: (1) they 
knew them and would always want to give them the benefit of the doubt. (2) The 
paraprofessionals were available compared to the veterinarians. In round four, the demand 
for veterinary paraprofessional services declined while that of veterinarians increased. In 
the pastoral systems, the demand for the services of veterinarians gradually increased while 
that of paraprofessionals gradually decreased. This suggests that livestock farmers in 
pastoral areas update their beliefs about their paraprofessionals much faster than farmers in 
the intensive system (p<0.001). This could be attributed to the fact that the scores of 
veterinarians and paraprofessionals are significantly different in the pastoral system 
(p<0.05) but not in the intensive system (p<0.05). 
Figure 5.3c shows the results for the farmers’ belief updating curves with regard to 
service providers by field of training. Service providers with agricultural training were 
found only in the intensive livestock system while those with no formal training and with 
social science training were found only in the pastoral livestock production system. The 
farmers’ belief updating curves for service providers trained in social sciences and 
agriculture were inelastic between rounds one and three and a decline was recorded in 
round four. The farmers’ belief updating curve for veterinary-trained service providers 
gradually increased while that of service providers without formal education gradually 
declined. The gradual increase in demand of service from providers trained in veterinary 
science can be associated with the gradual decline in demand from service providers 
without formal education since the demand for paraprofessionals trained in agriculture and 
social science remained constant up to round three. However, in round four the decline in 
the demand for service providers trained in social sciences and agriculture can be 
associated with the increase in the demand for services of veterinary-trained service 
providers since the demand for service providers without formal education remain 
constant.  
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providers in the pastoral system  
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providers of different fields of training  
d) The likelihood of changing to veterinarian or 
paraprofessional 
 
Figure 5.3 The farmers’ belief updating curves 
 
A random-effects probit model for panel data was estimated to determine the 
factors that influence the likelihood of a farmer changing to another service provider. 
Three models were estimated because of collinearity in the variables. In model one, sex of 
farmer, pay-offs of farmers, fees charged by service provider and livestock production 
system were included in the model. Farmers’ education level and previous outcome were 
excluded because they were correlated with production system and pay-offs, respectively. 
In model two, variable or production system was dropped and farmers’ education was 
included. In model three, the pay-off variable was dropped and the outcome variable was 
included and standardized beta values of the independent variables were reported because 
they reveal which of the independent variables have a greater effect on the likelihood to 
change service providers. Results from model one show that the gender of the farmer, the 
pay-off farmers received in the previous round and the production system significantly 
influence farmers’ decision to change the service provider (see results in Table 5.2). Being 
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female and having a high pay-off reduces the likelihood of changing service providers. 
Farmers in the intensive production system are more likely to change service providers. As 
the descriptive statistics show, most of the changes were made from one paraprofessional 
to another and not to a veterinarian at least up to round four, see Figure 5.3a below. In 
model one; the livestock production system had a high significant effect on the decision to 
change, followed by pay-off and gender.   
 
Table 5.2 Random-effects panel probit model results for farmer’s decision to change a 
service provider 
Independent Variables Probit Model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female farmers  -0.530* (-2.10) -0.25 (-1.08) -0.494* (-1.97) 
Farmers’ pay-off from 
previous transaction  
-0.908*** (-3.42) -0.465* (-2.02)    
Fees charged in previous 
transaction 
-0.117 (-0.47) -0.01 (-0.04)  0.176 (-0.71) 
Intensive livestock production 
systems 
 1.372*** (-4.75)      0.966*** (-3.73) 
Farmers with education      0.581* (-2.53)    
Previous outcomes           0.676** (-2.76) 
N 142   142   139  
Wald chi2(4) 25.68   11.31   20.8  
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In Model 2, results show that an educated farmer is more likely to change service 
providers than an uneducated farmer and education had a higher significant effect than 
pay-off. In Model 3, results revealed that the outcome of the previous transaction 
influences a farmer’s decision to change service providers, but the livestock production 
system had a higher significant effect, followed by outcome and sex. In all models a fee 
charged by service providers in the previous transaction does not influence the decision to 
change providers. The likelihood that farmers change service providers was predicted 
using Stata post-estimation commands and the results showed that farmers are more likely 
to change to veterinarians than to paraprofessionals, as shown in Figure 5.3d. 
 
5.4 Discussion and implications for clinical veterinary service delivery 
The objective of this study was to examine whether and how acquisition of new 
information about performance of the service provider influences farmers’ beliefs about 
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service providers and the quality of clinical services. The results show that the quality of 
services, as measured in the role play game, that are offered by veterinarians is not 
significantly different from that of services offered by paraprofessionals trained in 
veterinary science. However, the quality of services provided by paraprofessionals who are 
not trained in veterinary science is significantly lower than those provided by service 
providers trained in veterinary science. This indicates that on-the-job training does not 
substitute formal education in veterinary science. Within the classification of non-
veterinary science training, paraprofessionals with no formal education or training provide 
a significantly poorer quality of service than paraprofessionals with agricultural or social 
science training. Even with continued interaction between paraprofessionals and 
veterinarians, the quality of veterinary services offered by non-educated paraprofessionals 
failed to reach 80% accuracy for drug prescription. Disease diagnosis and drug prescription 
were particularly problematic for paraprofessionals who were not trained in veterinary 
science when handling cases of Anaplasmosis. 
Learning curves reveal that continued interaction between the veterinary trained 
service providers and service providers with no formal veterinary training leads to 
improved quality of veterinary services. The learning curve for crop trained service 
providers was slowly increasing while those of the social science trained service providers 
assumed an asymptotic curve. The learning curve for service providers with no formal 
education took a sigmoid shape. Hopper et al. (2007) suggest that the slow rise learning is 
an indication of a difficult task, while the asymptotic curve can be associated with quick 
learning. However, in this particular case, the slow rise in the learning curve can be 
attributed to low propensity to consult, while asymptotic curve can be attributed to high 
propensity to consult. The temporal deterioration in performance, as shown by sigmoidal 
curves of paraprofessionals, especially those with no formal education, could be a result of 
lapses and over-confidence (Stepanov, Abramson et al , 2010; Thomassen, 1998). This 
could also be because of high demand for services of the service provider and attainment of 
a plateau-like (optimal position) position (Waldman, 2003). This is true in a sense that 
when a service provider has many clients and is confident of his skills then he has no 
interest in consulting with other providers. Therefore, to ensure quality farmers should be 
able to “punish” poor service providers and as Cohen et al. (2007) argues, mentorship 
arrangements between paraprofessionals and professionals should be developed to ensure 
quality.  
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The results contradict the findings by Peeling and Holden (2004), Oakeley et al. 
(2001) and Admassu et al. (2005), which show that paraprofessionals provide quality 
services. For example, Oakeley et al. (2001) conducted a random survey of veterinary 
service providers, including Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), who were 
only trained on the job, to examine the level of accuracy in drug diagnoses among different 
types of service providers. Their results showed that 85% of the diagnoses made by 
CAHWs were accurate. However, Curran and MacLehose (2002) dismissed this finding on 
grounds that they do not have proper research design to assess the level of drug 
prescription, and in any case no scores were presented. In addition, the three studies cited 
above do not consider the role of information, behaviour of farmers and service providers 
in making animal health management decisions in real life. Chilonda and Van 
Huylenbroeck (2001) argue that the study of the behaviour and decision-making processes 
of farmers, service providers and their interactions in different livestock production 
systems is a key to development of sustainable policy options for successful delivery of 
quality veterinary services to small-scale farmers.   
The role play game has been identified and tested in the literature as a tool that can 
serve as an accurate and consistent method of assessment and decision forecasting 
(Armstrong, 2001; Dionnet et al., 2007). In this study, it was applied to analyse decisions 
and behaviours of both farmers and service providers. The results show that while 
paraprofessionals with no veterinary training were found to be of low quality compared 
with service providers with veterinary training, farmers changed their beliefs about non 
veterinary trained paraprofessionals rather slowly, thus providing few incentives for these 
paraprofessionals to provide quality services. The slow pace by which farmers were 
updating their beliefs about non veterinary trained service providers was because these 
paraprofessionals were available when veterinarians were not. Even when farmers change 
their decisions about a service provider they have to change from non-veterinary trained 
paraprofessional to another non veterinary trained paraprofessional. They have no choice 
but to go to service providers who are available since trained veterinary science service 
providers are few or not available to attend to their needs. Interaction between 
paraprofessionals and veterinarians therefore is a key to improving quality of veterinary 
services but this depends on farmers’ ability to “punish” service providers who provide 
poor quality services by shifting to quality service providers. Model results show this 
depends on their education level, outcomes of the service, and gender. The fee charged for 
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the previous transaction was found not to have significant impact on farmers’ decision to 
change their service provider.  
These findings are consistent with findings by Ahuja et al. (2003). They found out 
that price is not an important determinant of farmers’ decision to use services of an 
alternative service provider. In fact, Leonard (2000) argues that the issue is not that farmers 
are poor and unable to afford veterinary services, but rather that farmers have failed to 
distinguish qualifications of different services providers and the quality of services they 
offer. The use of animal health cards or animal medical cards has a strong potential as a 
tool to enable farmers to distinguish and measure quality of clinical veterinary services. 
Most farmers in the game expressed their excitement with the use of the animal health 
cards as a tool to make service providers accountable. The tool can be useful in providing 
proper record keeping and monitoring of antimicrobial agents used in animals. Farmers can 
use exercise books and service providers could be asked to write their diagnosis and 
prescription in these books.  
The role play experiment used in this study assumes that farmers do not self-treat, 
yet in reality farmers do treat the animal themselves. Self-treatment as an option was 
excluded because to include it the game would mean promoting unethical behavior. 
Secondly, the game assumed that the risk of an animal dying even when treated correctly is 
zero and yet an animal can actually die even with the right treatment because of delayed 
reporting and drug administration (Casadevall and Scharff, 1994). This may have been a 
reason why farmer’s belief updating was slow. Thirdly, the limited number of participants 
could limit validity of the results, but since “real” participants (farmers and service 
providers) were involved in the game, the results are still meaningful and valid.  
In summary, this paper presents a systematic study on how the interactions of 
farmers, veterinarians and paraprofessionals influence the quality of clinical veterinary 
services in rural Uganda. Results reveal the quality of veterinary services provided by 
paraprofessionals with veterinary training are not significantly different from those of 
veterinarians. However, the quality of services offered by paraprofessionals without 
veterinary training is significantly lower than that of veterinary trained service providers, 
but would improve as they interact with trained service providers. Even though services 
offered by paraprofessionals without veterinary training would increase in quality from 
continued interaction with veterinarians, there are challenges of sustaining paraprofessional 
interaction with veterinarians. As the results show, increased risks of losing clients, limited 
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number (availability) of veterinarians and the slow pace by which farmers update their 
beliefs impede paraprofessional and veterinary interaction. From a policy perspective, 
investment in two years of training for veterinary paraprofessionals is a promising strategy 
for improving the quality of veterinary services since farmers are willing to pay for the 
private clinical veterinary services. 
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6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Animal diseases pose a great threat to animal production and are a major source of waste 
and inefficiencies (FAO, 2011). They also present a serious threat to human health arising 
from zoonotic and food borne diseases (Grace et al., 2012; Perry and Grace, 2009; 
Randolph et al., 2007). To minimize losses in animal production and risks to humans, it is 
important to build cost-effective institutional arrangements that address governance 
challenges in the provision of veterinary services to increase livestock productivity, 
enhance economic growth, and ensure food security (FAO, 2011; Forman et al., 2012; 
IFAH, 2012; Sansoucy, 1995). Building strong and cost-effective institutional 
arrangements for providing veterinary services or animal health care systems requires a 
clear understanding of the institutional frameworks and actors involved (FAO, 2011; 
IFAH, 2012). This thesis aims at making a contribution towards addressing challenges 
encountered in the provision of veterinary services by examining the institutional 
environment and actors involved in the provision of animal health services. The thesis: 
develops a framework for analyzing institutional arrangements for providing veterinary 
services based on market failures, governance attributes, and contextual factors; examines 
supply and demand processes to identify challenges in the provision of veterinary services; 
and assesses competencies of different service providers using innovative tools, such as 
Process Net-Map and role play experiments. This final chapter presents a summary of the 
main results, outlines the contributions of the thesis to the existing literature, discusses 
methodological and data limitations, and makes recommendations for veterinary policy and 
future research.  
 
6.1 Summary of the main results  
Chapter 2 presented a framework for the economic analysis of institutional arrangements 
for providing veterinary services based on transaction cost economics theory. Riviere-
Cinnamond (2004) argue that the economic analysis of veterinary markets should focus on 
the analysis of supply and demand processes to provide a broader view of veterinary 
markets to include transaction costs that arise from the economics of governance attributes, 
such as political interference, self-interested behavior, and transaction costs. Similar views 
were expressed by Ahuja (2004) who argues that economic frameworks for analyzing the 
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provision of veterinary services should account for political, institutional, and context-
specific factors that influence the provision of veterinary services. As an analytical basis, 
Williamson’s “discriminating alignment hypothesis” was adopted. This hypothesis states 
that services with different attributes have to be aligned with different institutional 
arrangements that vary in their competencies to achieve an economically efficient result. 
Using this framework, we hypothesized that if a service is characterized with transaction-
intensity and high care-intensity, a paraprofessional system has a comparative advantage 
over the veterinary system. If a service is characterized by high measurability problems, 
professionals will have a comparative advantage over paraprofessionals. However, if the 
scope for corruption and political interference is high and if a service exhibits mixed 
attributes in terms of measurability, externality, care intensity, and transaction intensity, an 
integrated or referral system has a comparative advantage over professional or 
paraprofessional systems.  
The results from an empirical analysis of animal health service provision in Kenya 
and Uganda show that paraprofessional services are indeed used because they offer the 
needed care and attention to clients because they are located closer to clients and, thus, 
have lower transaction costs resulting from repeated transactions, while veterinarians are 
required for technical expertise. Furthermore, the results reveal the existence of a 
synergistic relationship between veterinarians and paraprofessionals. The use of 
paraprofessional services is positively related to the availability of professionals and the 
use of professional veterinarian services is positively related to the availability of 
paraprofessionals. The results support our hypotheses that if a service is characterized with 
transaction and care-intensity, the paraprofessional system has a comparative advantage 
over the veterinary system and if a service is characterized with high measurability 
problems, professionals will have a comparative advantage over paraprofessionals. 
However, clinical services have a mix of these attributes and paraprofessionals alone 
cannot be relied upon to provide these services. A referral systems or an integrated animal 
health system is required if paraprofessional and professional veterinarians work together. 
Using the transaction costs framework, we found that pastoral livestock production 
systems have a greater necessity for government interventions compared to intensive 
livestock systems. However, empirical results show that both the private and public sector 
are strong in the intensive livestock system compared to the pastoral livestock system. The 
major contribution of this chapter to the literature is that animal health service policies 
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need to consider the service attributes and the context in which animal health services are 
being offered. The institutional arrangements or policy options adopted should be able to 
strengthen the relationships between paraprofessionals and professional veterinarians.   
Chapter 3 applied a participatory research method, namely, a mapping tool called 
Process Net-Map, to examine the process of animal health service delivery in order to 
identify the main influential actors and elicit governance challenges in the provision of 
clinical and preventive veterinary services in both pastoral and intensive livestock 
productions systems. This is the first study that examines the process of providing animal 
health services and elicits problems encountered in the provision of these services. The 
number and type of actors, their influence, and governance challenges depend on the type 
of service, production system, and institutional level or administrative unit, such as 
household, local government, and national level (Woodford, 2004). Although most studies 
on pastoral livestock production systems have shown that Community Animal Health 
Workers (CAHWs) play an important role in the provision of clinical veterinary services 
(cf. Catley et al., 2004; Peeling and Holden, 2004), our results reveal that the role and 
influence of CAHWs in providing veterinary services is limited because of their inadequate 
training and low level of education which limits them from referring cases to veterinarians 
and interacting with them. Moreover, they do not have drugs and financial resources to 
operate drug shops. As a result, farmers prefer to buy drugs and treat animal themselves. A 
similar observation was observed in northern Ghana (Mockshell et al., 2013). In the 
provision of preventive services, such as vaccination, we found that CAHWs play an 
important role, but resource capture by veterinarians has greatly reduced the morale of the 
CAHWs.  
In the intensive livestock production systems, Ly (2003) and Oruko and Ndung’u 
(2009) find that paraprofessionals dominated animal health markets. Results from the 
Process Net-Map analysis in this thesis also reveal that paraprofessionals are more 
influential than veterinarians in the provision of clinical services in the intensive livestock 
production system. However, competition and poor relations between veterinarians and 
paraprofessionals in the provision of clinical veterinary services have greatly affected the 
provision of preventive services, such as vaccination and disease surveillance. This is 
worsened by the fact that most paraprofessionals in Uganda are trained in general 
agriculture rather than in animal health (see Chapters 4 and 5). The quality of services that 
they provide is generally low (see Chapter 5). In both pastoral and intensive livestock 
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production systems, absenteeism by government veterinarians, limited opportunities for 
career progress, weak veterinary structures, and inadequate and unpredictable budgetary 
allocations are found to affect the provision of veterinary services. Moreover, the provision 
of preventive veterinary services mainly depends on decisions of officials from the 
Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) rather than officials 
from the Ministry of Agriculture. Active surveillance and routine vaccinations are not 
always implemented because of financial problems. Budgeting and financial releases are 
handled using “a fire fighting” approach. Money is only released when there is an outbreak 
as opposed to routine vaccination. The Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic 
Development (MFPED) does not consider vaccinations a priority without a disease 
outbreak. The budgetary allocations on disease control and prevention are re-allocated to 
other activities, such as administration. Considering these governance challenges at the 
macro level, it is therefore important to support paraprofessional and professional 
veterinary relations for two reasons: (1) to ensure that farmers receive better quality 
services amidst these problems and (2) to help build a coalition to pressure the government 
to create an environment that facilitates the adoption of good veterinary practices from 
improved relationships between paraprofessionals and professionals. As argued by Heaney 
and Lorenz (2012), coalition and strong pressure from interest groups influence policy 
process and policy makers. The success of the British veterinary profession and association 
between 1881 and 1919 was based on these kinds of coalitions that resulted in the 
recognition of the certificate holders in 1879 (Boden, n.d.).  
Chapter 4 identified factors that influence referrals of cases from paraprofessionals 
to veterinarians. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study carried out in a 
developing country that aimed to assess the factors that influence the decisions of 
paraprofessionals to refer cases to veterinarians. The findings suggest that mobile phones 
and mobile network coverage are imperative to build strong referral networks between 
paraprofessionals and veterinarians and that this could be because mobile phones reduce 
the costs of information, communication, and access (Aker, 2011; Muto and Yamano, 
2009; Urquieta and Alwang, 2012). The results also suggest that paraprofessionals who 
more frequently deal with contagious animal diseases are more likely to refer cases to 
veterinarians, which may be because these diseases are supposed to be reported to 
government veterinarians or because paraprofessionals have limited skills to handle such 
diseases.  Female paraprofessionals are more likely to refer to veterinarians than male 
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paraprofessionals, which may be because female paraprofessionals are more likely to be 
supervised. Referrals were also found to be limited in pastoral areas mainly because 
paraprofessionals and clients are not well-educated and cannot speak English, which 
restricts them from interacting with veterinarians. Most veterinarians are not from the same 
ethnic background, which is a further obstacle and is supported by findings in Eregae 
(2003). Moreover, the sheer number and availability of veterinarians in pastoral areas are 
limited, which also limits referrals.  
In Chapter 5, we examined interaction among farmers, veterinarians, and 
paraprofessionals in the provision of clinical veterinary services using a role play 
experiment. The main objective was to provide empirical evidence on a topic that is 
contested both in the literature and in debates on veterinary policy: the quality of services 
provided by paraprofessionals with no formal veterinary training. Studies by Peeling and 
Holden (2004), Oakeley et al. (2001), and Admassu et al. (2005) offer evidence that 
paraprofessionals provide quality veterinary services. However, Curran and MacLehose 
(2002) attribute these to poor research design and argue that the conclusion that 
paraprofessionals provide quality services needs to be confirmed by well-designed studies. 
Our results show that the ability to identify the signs of different diseases and the accuracy 
of prescriptions by veterinarians are not significantly different from that of 
paraprofessionals who are trained in veterinary science. However, the ability of service 
providers who are not formally trained in veterinary medicine to perform these tasks is 
significantly lower than that of service providers trained in veterinary science. This finding 
point to the limited effectiveness of short-term trainings typically provided to community 
animal health workers or to persons with formal training in fields other than veterinary 
science.  
The role play suggests that the continued interaction between paraprofessionals and 
veterinarians gradually leads to an improvement in the ability of paraprofessionals trained 
in general agriculture and social sciences to perform these tasks and that this is dependent 
on the monetary and social incentives offered by farmers. This is not the case for 
paraprofessionals without any formal training or education. Therefore, the findings indicate 
that paraprofessionals with non-formal veterinary training and formal training in a different 
field that are not able to perform correct drug prescriptions could perform better over time 
if they work closely with veterinarians. The study also indicates that the provision of 
curative services by community animal health workers without any formal training is 
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rather problematic. Thus, Chapter 5 provides evidence of the importance of veterinary 
education and the strengthening of veterinarian-paraprofessional relations in ensuring the 
provision of quality veterinary services. The chapter also demonstrates the potential of role 
play experiments in measuring the quality of veterinary services. One can derive from the 
study that the use of animal health cards or animal medical cards has a strong potential as a 
tool to enable farmers to distinguish and measure the quality of clinical veterinary services 
they receive. The tool can also be useful in providing proper record keeping and 
monitoring of antimicrobial agents used in animals. Farmers can use exercise books and 
service providers could be asked to write their diagnosis and prescriptions in these books. 
Obviously, such a system will have to be linked to appropriate incentives to ensure that 
record keeping takes place.  
 
6.2 Limitation of methods and recommendations for future research 
This study employed a range of methods and techniques, including qualitative, 
experimental, and quantitative, each of which has its own limitations and strengths. In 
Chapter 2, we developed a conceptual framework for analyzing veterinary services 
centered on Williamson’s discrete alignment approach derived from transaction cost theory 
of economics of governance. The main limitation of applying this approach arises from the 
difficulty in measuring transaction costs, thus leading to estimation of reduced form 
equations between observed attributes and institutional arrangements (Masten et al., 1991). 
These estimations are based on proxy variables for specific attributes (Battu et al., 2002; 
McMaster and White, 2013). However, there are no universally agreed proxies for specific 
attributes of governance (Carter and Hodgson, 2006; David and Han, 2004). As argued by 
Carter and Hodgson (2006), even if the reduced form estimates are consistent with 
Williamson’s model, this does not mean that transaction costs are minimized. In addition, 
the framework has also been criticized because it is focused on comparative static analysis 
rather than dynamic analysis, and thus ignores the role of innovation, learning, and 
complementary institutions (Amable, 2000; Langlois, 1992; Nooteboom, 2004). However, 
Birner and von Braun (2009) have demonstrated that such effects can be captured. The 
shifts in hypothetical transaction costs, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, reflect the effect of 
innovations (mobile phones) and learning (acquiring skills), as well as the complementarity 
of institutional arrangements (referrals). Overall, despite the methodological and data 
limitations, the major contribution of this analytical framework can be seen in integrating 
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governance challenges into the economic analysis of veterinary services and in offering a 
number of policy options that address these challenges in efforts to improve veterinary 
service delivery in developing countries.  
In Chapter 3, the Process Net-Map tool was applied to identify actors and elicit 
governance challenges in the provision of veterinary services. The implementation of the 
Process Net-Map exercise requires assembling stakeholders that have experience in the 
service delivery process and having a good understanding of the influence (power) among 
participants (Schiffer and Hauck, 2010). The challenge, therefore, is the selection of 
network members to participate in the mapping process as it requires prior knowledge of 
the main actors. Moreover, all actors at all levels of service delivery need to be represented 
to provide information regarding their roles and to facilitate the complete mapping of 
actors and identification of challenges and strategies for addressing them. To overcome 
these limitations, we conducted in-depth interviews to generate insights on which type of 
actors to invite to participate in the “Process Net-Map”. However, it was not possible to 
bring all actors, especially those involved in the provision of preventive veterinary 
services, together. As a solution, we conducted multiple net-maps at different levels and 
later joined them together. In addition, we conducted in-depth interviews with some 
respondents who did not participate in Process Net-Map to corroborate and validate 
information generated during the Process Net-Map and to fill-in missing information, 
which is recommended by Fiol and Huff (2007).  
In Chapters 2 and 3, the need for improving the relations between paraprofessionals 
and professional veterinarians was highlighted. In Chapter 5, we found evidence that the 
interaction between paraprofessionals and veterinarians will lead to an improved quality of 
veterinary services if paraprofessionals have at least some type of formal training. The 
important question that remained was how to improve those relations. In Chapter 4, we 
assessed the determinants of referrals from paraprofessionals to veterinarians. This 
assessment had some data limitations. The data used was cross-sectional rather than case-
specific, like data on the history of previous treatments. We relied on self-reported data by 
paraprofessionals and, thus, client-related factors and information from veterinarians were 
not included in the analysis. In addition, we were not able to verify from veterinarians 
whether a specific paraprofessional had referred cases to them in the previous year. In 
addition, the sample size used was small and from only two districts in each country. 
Although we recommend future studies to collect longitudinal data which capture client, 
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case specific, and veterinarian and paraprofessional information for a richer analysis of 
referrals, this chapter still provides a good understanding of the determinants of referrals 
between paraprofessionals and veterinarians.  
In Chapter 5, we used a role play game to measure the quality of services provided 
by different service providers and to assess whether the interaction between 
paraprofessionals and professional veterinarians will result in improved service delivery. In 
the implementation of the role play game, it was assumed that farmers do not treat the 
animals themselves because this would have posed ethical challenges (considering official 
restrictions on the application of veterinary drugs). Yet, in reality, farmers do treat animals 
themselves. Secondly, transaction costs arising from accessing service providers and drug 
costs were considered as a dead weight loss and assumed not to affect the farmer’s choice 
of a service provider. Thirdly, the game assumed that the risk of an animal dying when 
correctly treated is zero, even though an animal in reality can die with the right treatment 
because of delayed reporting and drug administration (Casadevall and Scharff, 1994). 
Thus, for future research, we recommend that a natural experiment should be conducted in 
a way that farmers are given a book containing animal health medical cards and that 
farmers should record all the details for each case treated.  
 
6.3 Policy recommendations 
Considering the governance challenges inherent in the provision of animal health services, 
this thesis aimed at generating policy options that can work in environments in developing 
countries where governance challenges are widespread. The results presented in the 
chapters above provide a range of insights on the policy options needed to address and 
mitigate these inherent governance challenges.  
 
a) Strengthening the relationship between paraprofessionals and professional 
veterinarians  
The results provide evidence regarding the need for a strong and well-integrated referral 
system among farmers, paraprofessionals, and professional veterinarians, the government 
and drug sellers. In Chapter 2, we hypothesized that referral systems would be the most 
cost effective in providing animal health services and this was confirmed by the empirical 
results which showed the existence of a synergistic relationship between veterinarians and 
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paraprofessionals. In Chapter 3, the results revealed that farmers, paraprofessionals, 
professional veterinarians, the government, and private actors are interlinked and that all of 
them have significant and different roles in the provision of animal health services. For 
example, livestock owners or other household members monitor animals and are often the 
first to notice that animals are sick. But, they do not have the necessary skills, knowledge, 
and drugs. Therefore, they have to depend on service providers. Since paraprofessionals 
are geographically closer to households than veterinarians, they are the first to receive 
cases of sick animals and refer cases they cannot handle to veterinarians who can handle 
such cases or report to the local and central government depending on whether the disease 
requires notification. However, the point of weakness in these linkages is in the poor 
relationships between paraprofessionals and professional veterinarians. Farmers have no or 
limited access to veterinarians, but paraprofessionals can access veterinarians. Therefore, 
strengthening paraprofessional and professional veterinarian relations is important in 
ensuring timely reporting, treatment, and reduced tendencies of self-treatment, thus 
reducing waste and efficiency in animal production. In Chapter 4, we found a number of 
factors that influence relations between paraprofessionals and professional veterinarians, 
including the supervision of paraprofessionals by professionals, expansion of mobile phone 
ownership by paraprofessionals, formation of paraprofessional associations, and 
investment in short-term training. Formation of veterinary and paraprofessional 
associations will be useful to forge a sense of unity, professionalism, and local reputation, 
as well as to build linkages between paraprofessionals and veterinarians (Boden, 1996; 
Leonard et al., 2002; Ly 2002; Catley, 2004). 
 
b) Improved targeting of livestock extension service delivery  
The results from this study can be used to target interventions in the provision of livestock 
extension services. In Chapter 3, we found that livestock owners and herdsmen, a group 
often neglected, are influential in the provision of veterinary services. Our findings show 
that women play an important role in the detection and treatment of livestock diseases, 
especially in pastoral systems. However, women and herdsmen or herd managers have 
been found to be less likely to receive extension services compared to male livestock 
owners (Ragasa et al., 2013). This finding implies that veterinary extension services should 
focus not only on household heads, but also on female household members and herdsmen. 
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This could contribute to timely reporting, treatment, and disease control, thus reducing the 
risk of animal loss and disease spread to other animals, livestock farms, and humans.  
 
c) Public veterinary systems should target pastoral areas  
The results from this thesis show that private professionals and paraprofessionals trained in 
veterinary science have come to play an important role in intensive livestock production 
systems after the withdrawal of the government. However, this is not the case in pastoral 
livestock production systems, where experience has shown that market failures could not 
be overcome. Our findings also indicate that the effort to close this gap by promoting 
community animal health workers with no formal and rather limited informal training has 
proven to be a rather problematic answer to this problem, especially when these service 
providers are expected to fulfill a major role in providing curative services, as this may 
lead to an inefficient use or potentially dangerous misuse of veterinary drugs. These 
insights suggest that stronger government engagement in the provision of veterinary 
services in pastoral or extensive livestock system is required. The study findings indicate 
that there are more government veterinarians in the intensive livestock system than in 
pastoral systems because of the difficulty in attracting and retaining veterinary staff in 
pastoral areas. Leonard et al. (1999) show that veterinarians are difficult to retain and 
motivate and that they will require higher wages compared to paraprofessionals who hold 
diplomas in veterinary medicine. Our study results indicate that such paraprofessionals are 
a viable alternative to veterinarians with university degrees. Therefore, governments 
should consider recruiting paraprofessionals trained in veterinary science who hold 
diplomas. They could be hired at lower levels of government, such as sub counties in the 
case of Uganda. This group of service providers is more likely to stay and work in rural 
areas than veterinarians with university degrees. As further discussed below, governments 
and donors could support the training of para-professionals who come from pastoral areas, 
such as by providing specific scholarship opportunities for students from those areas. This 
could further increase the likelihood that graduates will work in their areas of origin and 
that communication problems from difference languages would be reduced.  
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d) Enabling farmers to measure the quality of services they receive  
A stronger focus on government services in pastoral areas will be more effective if it is 
combined with measures that empower clients to hold service providers accountable. This 
will help overcome governance challenges inherent in public sector service provision and 
which led to privatization in the first place. One of the principle problems of empowering 
clients is the difficulty of the livestock owner to measure the quality of animal health 
service they receive from service providers. Animal health service providers are consulted 
because they are assumed to have specialized knowledge or skills, but the livestock 
keepers have limited ways of knowing whether the service providers’ skills and efforts are 
appropriate to solve their problem (Ly, 2003). If a farmer is not able to measure the quality 
of service received, that farmer’s ability to provide the right incentives to the service 
provider is limited. The use of animal health medical cards, as suggested in Chapter 5, may 
offer an avenue to address this problem. Most farmers in the game expressed excitement in 
the use of animal health cards as a tool to hold service providers accountable. The tool can 
also be useful in providing proper record keeping and monitoring of antimicrobial agents 
used in animals. Farmers should be encouraged to use exercise books and service providers 
could be asked to write their diagnosis and prescription in these books. The tool could help 
farmers distinguish qualifications of different services providers and the quality of services 
they offer. The tool could also help reduce or eliminate non-educated paraprofessionals in 
the market and reduce competition. In France, the veterinary association developed the 
VETELEVAGE software package for monitoring of prescription and use of medicines at 
the farm level. The computerized register is shared by farmers and veterinarians. 
Veterinarian interventions and prescriptions as well as farmer interventions and 
administered treatments are recorded. The application makes it easy to monitor herd 
performance, treatment protocols, and antibiotic prescriptions (Brard, 2013). Obviously, a 
computer system is not applicable in the pastoral areas under consideration in this thesis. 
However, similar principles could be applied. Pilot projects and experiments with such 
systems will be useful in developing and testing report card systems. The experience with 
citizen report cards could be useful (cf. Thampi and Sekhar, 2006). 
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e) Investing in veterinary education  
The results in Chapter 5 indicate that paraprofessionals without any formal education have 
insufficient capacity to perform a correct prescription of drugs, which has rather 
problematic effects. Therefore, there is a need to invest in veterinary education to ensure 
that enough qualified veterinary staff (both diploma and degree holders) are available to 
offer veterinary services. As indicated above, there would be advantages if promising 
students from pastoral areas have access to this type of training. Governments in 
developing countries could support and encourage recognized universities or tertiary 
institutions to establish training centers in livestock producing areas to encourage the 
training of veterinary para-professionals. In human health care, most tertiary training 
institutions are available in the marginal or rural areas in most developing countries, 
including Uganda and Kenya. Regrettably, this is not the case for animal health. This 
approach would have a considerable potential for increasing enrolment rates because of 
reduced access costs (Benson, 2001). In addition, development partners (donors and 
NGOs) and governments could establish scholarship programs that target the training of 
community-based animal health workers or students from livestock producing areas or 
hard-to-reach and marginalized livestock producing areas. A similar scholarship
12,13
 
program is being implemented in Uganda by the Ministry of Health to support human 
resource development in the provision of human health care services in marginal areas. 
Such an intervention for animal health would ensure that marginal areas have sufficiently 
qualified veterinary staff to offer quality veterinary services. Otherwise, the livestock 
sectors in those areas will continue to be disadvantaged by unqualified service providers 
and as a result drug misuse, disease outbreaks, and delays in disease reporting and 
surveillance challenges will persist. This will inflict significant losses to farmers, health 
care systems, and to the economy as a whole. In conclusion, without investment in 
veterinary education, weak paraprofessional and professional veterinarian relations, a 
reliance on non-formally trained paraprofessionals, and the inability of livestock producers 
to measure the quality of services they receive, the animal health care system cannot 
effectively address threats from emerging and re-emerging animal diseases.    
                                                 
12
The Ministry of Health scholarship fund for hard-to-reach and priority areas 
(http://health.go.ug/mohweb/?page_id=695).  
13
 The Ministry of Health scholarship fund for hard-to-reach and priority areas 
(http://health.go.ug/docs/scholarships.pdf). 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Household Questionnaire 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
1 University of Hohenheim, Institute of Social and Institutional Change for Agricultural 
Development in Tropic and Sub tropics and Food Security Centre. Research Project on 
Institutional Arrangements for Livestock Service Delivery. This survey questionnaire module 
is to be used in a household survey for livestock keepers 
2 Location of household:  
Latitudes  
Longitudes  
Altitudes  
3 Enumerator Name Lokomo simon peter 
Brenda Nanyonga 
Amongin Georgin 
Achilla John Bosco Eragu 
Kyambade Miriam 
John Ilukor 
4 Date of interview  
5 Name of Respondent  
6 District Amudat 
Masaka 
Pokot Kenya 
Kakemega 
7 Sub – county Karita 
Amudat 
Loroo 
8 Parish (LC2)  
9 Village (LC1)  
10 A1: Household size  
 
A2-Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
11 Name of the house hold member  
12 Age and if less than one year write 00  
13 Sex of the HH member Male/Female 
14 OFF-FARM ACTIVITY: Does household member engage 
in off-farm activities? 
Yes/No 
15 RELATIONSHIP TO HEAD 1= Head 
2=Spouse (wife/husband) 
3=Child (son/daughter) 
4=Grandchild 
5=Parent/parent-in-law 
6=Son/daughter-in-law 
7=Other relative 
8=Adopted/foster/stepchild 
9=House-help 
10=Non-relative 
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16 Education 1=None 
2=Primary 
3=Middle/JSS 
4=Vocational 
5='O' level/SSS 
7='A' level 
8=College training 
9=Tech/Proof 
10=Tertiary 
11=Koranic 
12=Don't know 
17 Can he or she read or write? Yes/No 
18 Marital status 1=married, 
2=consensual union, 
3=separated 
4=divorced 
5=widowed 
6=never married 
19 Occupation 1=Farming 
2=Teaching 
3=Artisan 
4=Office worker 
5=Civil servant 
6=Health worker 
7=Trading 
8=Unemployed 
9= Non- Agric labor 
10=Student/ Pupil 
11= Infant 
20 Religion of the household member 1=Traditional 
2=Muslim 
3=Christian 
4=No religion 
21 Migration: Does this HH Member migrate during the year? Yes/No 
22 If yes, how many months  
23 What % of time is spent on farming? If a household 
member has farming in addition to another occupation 
 
24 Does your HH own land Yes/No 
25 How many parcels  
26 Do you want to add information about another HH member Yes/No 
 
Land Holding Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
27 Parcel number  
28 Name of the Parcel  
29 Size in acres  
30 Use of the parcel 1= Crop 
2= Livestock 
3=Mixed 
4= Fallow 
5= Forested 
6=Settlement 
31 Date when the parcel was acquired. (note we are mainly 
interested in the year) 
 
32 Mode of acquisition 1 = Purchased 
2 = Inherited 
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3 = Rented 
4=Agift 
33 Tenure 1 = Freehold with title 
2 = Freehold without title 
3 = Rented 
4 = Communal 
5=Leased 
34 How is the parcel used for livestock 1=Grazing 
2=Growing feed for livestock 
3=Housing 
35 Do you want to add more information about another parcel Yes/No 
 
B: FARM INPUTS-loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
36 Farm inputs in the farm Spraying machine 
Tractor 
Plough 
Trailer/cart 
Ear tag application 
Hoe 
Axe 
Rake 
Shovel 
Cooling machine 
Hay equipment 
Fencing equipment 
Vehicle 
Drenching gun 
Feed /Water trough 
Water pump 
Irrigation pipe 
Computer 
Feedlot equipment 
Breeding equipment 
37 How many  
38 Price u bought it  
39 Add more information about another farm equipment Yes/No 
 
OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME-loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
40 OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME Petty trade 
Employment as casual labor 
Formal employment 
Remittances from relatives 
Government pensions 
Dividend on shares 
Interest on savings 
Renting out houses 
41 Average income per year  
42 Add more information about another income source Yes/No 
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D1-Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
43 Can you please tell me each individual crop that your 
household planted in last year? 
1=Bananas 
2=Cassava 
3=Maize 
4=Sorghum 
5=Sweet potatoes 
6=Ground nut 
7=Beans 
8=Coffee 
9=Millet 
44 What area was planted in acres  
45 What type of cultivation did you use? 1= Mono-crop/2= Inter-crop 
46 Type of fertilizer used 0 = None/1= Manure 
2 = Chemical/3 = Both 
47 Cost of land preparation  
48 Tools Used 1= Manual tools 
2= Animals & machinery 
3 =Tractor services 
49 Cost of the seed per kg  
50 Quantity of the fertilizer in Kgs  
51 Cost of the fertilizer used per bag  
52 What was the total labour that was hired to produce crop 
for each of the following activities? (man days) 
 
 Land clearing  
 Planting  
 Weeding  
 Harvesting  
53 Hired labour costs per day per person on average?  
54 Total amount that was harvested (see the units in the next 
question) 
 
55 Units of the harvests Kg/Bag/Basin/Calabash/Tin 
56 Total amount that was sold?  
57 Unit Price for which it was sold  
58 Where did you sell most of the crop 1= Farm gate 
2 = Village market 
3 = Distant market 
4 = Buyer’s premises 
5 = Cooperative /Association 
Premises 
6 = Central collection point 
7 = Farmer’s House 
59 Who was the main buyer of your crop? 1 = Exporter 
2 = Farmer cooperative or 
association 
3 = Consumers 
4 = Relative/Friend 
5 = NGO 
6 = Local Women 
7=I sell at the local market 
8=Middlemen 
60 What was the average value of sale  
61 If you did not sale at the farm gate what do you estimate to 
be the total transportation cost to the point of sale? 
 
62 How were you paid? 1 = Paid in full on delivery 
2 = Paid certain amount on 
delivery and rest later 
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3 = Paid full amount later 
4 = Given inputs/credit prior 
to delivery 
63 Do you want to add  information for another crop Yes/No 
64 Does your hh keep cattle Yes/No 
 
E-Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
65 Type livestock kept Improved sheep 
Improved Goat 
Sheep 
Improved Cattle 
Local Cattle 
Bullock 
Chicken 
Pigs 
Local Goats 
66 Type of breed of the animal 1 = Holstein Friesian 
2 = Ayrshire 
3 = Guernsey 
4 = Jersey 
5 = Sahiwaal 
6 = Zebu 
7 = Boran 
8 = Ankole 
9 = Torgenberg 
10 = Angora goat 
67 No. of animals for selected Livestock type  
68 No. of Male, value and number sold in last one year  
Number male  
Value in Uganda shillings  
Number sold  
69 No. of Female, value per animal and number sold  
Number female  
Value in Uganda shillings  
Number sold  
70 No. of Young animal, value and number sold  
Number young animal  
Value in Uganda shillings  
Number sold  
71 Where did you sell them from At the farm 
Market 
72 For how long have you been keeping livestock species 
(Years) 
 
73 Did your parents keep this livestock species Yes/No 
74 Are animals owned by different household members Yes/No 
75 How did you acquire the Animal 1= NGO 
2=Government 
3=Parent 
4=Friend 
5= Bought Using my own 
resources 
6= Cattle raids 
76 Improved variety mode of acquisition 1=NGO 
2=Government 
3=Parent 
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4=Friend 
77 What is livestock farming system for this animal 1=Intensive 
2=Extensive 
78 What extensive grazing system do you use Tethering 
Communal grazing 
Nomadic pastoralism 
79 What intensive grazing system do you use for grazing Zero grazing 
Paddock 
Strip grazing 
80 Did you have to buy the fodder Yes/No 
81 Cost purchasing fodder in Uganda shillings  
82 If no, what is source of fodder Cut and carry from my own 
farm 
Cut and carry from another 
farmers farm 
83 Cost of transporting to the farm  
84 How long did it take to carry / transport (estimate time per 
day X 30 days) 
 
85 Did you have to buy feed supplements Yes/No 
86 How many times in last 12 months  
87 Cost of  buying feed supplements per bag  
88 Cost of transporting the feed by  Bag  
89 Most important three reasons for keeping livestock 1=Meat/2=Cash 
3=Milk/4=Estate 
5=Gift/6=Status 
7=Culture 
90 Add more information on another livestock Yes/No 
91 In the last one year, did you use AI services Yes/No 
 
F1-loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
92 The service was administered by 1= Vet office 
2=Vet-Assistant 
3= CAHW 
4=NGO 
93 Did you have to pay for the service Yes/No 
94 Type of organization that  is offering the scheme 1=Govt 
2=NGOs 
3=Private 
4=Animal research institute 
95 How much did you pay per animal in Uganda shillings  
96 How were you able to contact the service provider? 1=Public transport 
2=Personal phone 
3=Walk 
4=Ride a motorbike /Bicycle 
97 How long was the visit of the person? (hours)  
98 Did you have to pay for his food? Yes/No 
99 Amount  
100 Did you have to pay for the person’s transport costs Yes/No 
101 Amount  
102 How satisfied were you with the performance of the 
person? 
1= Very satisfied 
2=somewhat satisfied 
3=somewhat dissatisfied 
4=Very dissatisfied 
103 Reasons for dissatisfaction?  
104 Add more information about another time you received AI Yes/No 
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services 
105 In the last one year, have you ever used a bull service 
scheme? 
Yes/No 
 
F2-Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
106 How many times have used a bull service scheme in last 12 
months 
 
107 Source of the Bull 1=Govt 
2=NGOs 
3=Private 
4=Animal research institute 
108 Who keeps the Bull 1=Farmer 
2=Government official 
3=Extension staff 
109 Did you have to pay for the service Yes/No 
110 How much did you pay per animal in Uganda shillings  
111 How do you use the service 1= Bring the bull to my home 
2= Take the cow to the bull 
3=Communual 
112 Do you pay a fee to person in charge of the bull Yes/No 
113 How satisfied were you with the performance of the bull 
service scheme? 
1= Very satisfied 
2=somewhat satisfied 
3=somewhat dissatisfied 
4=Very dissatisfied 
114 Reasons for dissatisfaction?  
115 Add more information about another time you used the 
service 
Yes/No 
116 Have there been any livestock cases which require 
treatment last 12 months?  or has any livestock suffered 
from any livestock diseases in last one year? 
Yes/No 
 
F3-Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
117 Livestock diseases Mastitis 
East Cost fever 
Foot and mouth disease 
Bovine tuberculosis 
Anthrax 
Rift valley fever 
East Cost fever 
Foot and mouth disease 
118 How often did it occur in year  
119 Did you seek treatment Yes/No 
120 Last treatment month of the disease January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
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October 
November 
December 
121 How did you treat the disease? 1=Self treated 
2= Advice from drug seller 
3=Livestock worker (CAHW, 
Vet, P) 
122 If self-treated what did you do? 1. The use of local herbs 
2=Seek advice from local drug 
seller 
3= Advice from another 
farmer 
123 If livestock worker name of person  
124 From which organisation? 1=NGO 
2=CAHW 
3=Private Vet 
4=Drug seller 
5=Government 
7=LGA 
8=Traditional animal doctor 
9=Vet. Service department 
125 Are you satisfied with the services of the livestock service 
provider? 
Yes 
No 
126 How satisfied were you with the performance of the 
person? 
1 =Very satisfied 
2 = Somewhat satisfied 
3 = Somewhat satisfied 
4=Very dissatisfied 
127 What type of animal was affected by this disease? 1=Sheep 
2=Goat 
3=Cattle 
4=Chicken 
5=Pig 
128 How did you contact the livestock service provider 1 = By phone 
2 = By bicycle 
3 = By motorcycle 
4 = By car 
5=  without request 
129 How long did it take the livestock service provider to 
come? in Hours 
 
130 Did you have to pay for veterinary medicine Yes/No 
131 Amount in Uganda shillings  
132 Did you have to pay for the person’s time? Yes/No 
133 Amount in Uganda shillings  
134 How long was the visit of the person? (hours)  
135 Did you have other expenses (e.g. for offering tea or food?) Yes/No 
136 Amount in Uganda shillings  
137 Did you have to pay for the persons transport costs? Yes/No 
138 Amount in Uganda shillings  
139 Was there any other community members present at that 
visit? 
Yes/No 
140 How many  
141 Did the animal die? Yes/No 
142 Do you have any knowledge or methods of controlling? Yes/No 
143 Add more information about another visit and disease or 
another time you seeked forthe service 
Yes/No 
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F7  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
144 Do you know any case where there was livestock 
quarantine? 
Yes/No 
145 Was there any quarantine service in the past year? Yes/No 
146 Who was involved in the quarantine service? 1= Government 
2= NGO 
3= Local community leaders 
4=Other 
147 Which type of animals was quarantine issued on? 1=Sheep 
2=Goat 
3= Cattle 
4=Pigs 
148 Which disease East Cost fever 
Foot and mouth disease 
Bovine tuberculosis 
Anthrax 
Rift valley fever 
PPR 
CBPP 
CCPP 
149 Was it enforced Yes 
No 
150 How did the quarantine affect you? Could not sell 
Animal died 
No effect 
Could not buy an animal 
151 Estimate the cost of the lost animals to you  
 
F8-Loop  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
152 How do you rank the attitude of the Service provider ( 1-4)  
CAHWs  
Governement veterinarian  
Private veterinarian  
Ethno Veterinarian  
153 Rank in terms of Accessibility ( 1-4)  
Govt. Vet. officer  
Private Vet. officer  
CAHWs  
Traditional vets  
154 Rank in terms of value of information  
Government Veterinarian  
Private veterinarian  
CAHWs  
Ethno Veterinarian  
155 Rank in terms of time spent with you  
Government Veterinarian  
Private veterinarian  
CAHWs  
Ethno Veterinarian  
156 Rank them in terms of having drugs you need.  
Govt. Vet. officer  
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Private Vet. officer  
CAHWs  
Traditional vets  
157 Rank service delivery systems in terms of cost of drugs  
Govt. Vet. officer  
Private Vet. officer  
CAHWs  
Traditional vets  
158 Rank in terms of number of service providers availability  
Government Veterinarian  
Private veterinarian  
CAHWs  
Ethno Veterinarian  
159 Rank them based on effectiveness of the treatment  
Govt. Vet. officer  
Private Vet. officer  
CAHWs  
Traditional vets  
160 Rank them in terms  acceptability and reliability  
Govt. Vet. officer  
Private Vet. officer  
CAHWs  
Traditional vets  
 
F9-Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
161 Type of livestock sold 1=Improved goat, 
2=Local goat 
3=Improved cattle, 
4=local cattle, 
5=Sheep, 
6=Pig, 
7=Poultry 
162 How many did you sell ( please refer to the particular sale)  
163 Unit price  
164 Who was the main buyer for the livestock? 1=Slaughter house 
2 = Traders from the city 
3 = Farmer cooperative or 
association 
4 = Consumers 
5 = Relative/Friend 
6 = NGO 
7 = Local Women 
8= I sell them at the local 
market 
9=Sold at home 
165 What was the distance in kms  
166 Total transportation cost  
167 How were you paid? 1 = Paid in full on delivery 
2 = Paid certain amount on 
delivery and rest later 
3 = Paid full amount later 
4 = Given inputs/credit prior 
to delivery 
168 What form was the payment? 1 = Cash 
2= Cheque 
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3=Barter trade 
169 How satisfied are you with the marketing channel? 1= Very satisfied 
2=Somewhat satisfied 
3=Somewhat dissatisfied 
4=Very dissatisfied 
170 Do you have access to market information? Yes/No 
171 How did you receive your market information? 1= From a friend through use 
of a mobile phone 
2= Agric. market  Information 
service 
3=From local the market 
172 Do want more information about animal sold Yes/No 
 
G-services Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
173 Have you ever received or performed following services in 
your farm? Vaccination, Spraying, Dipping, Castration and 
Deworming 
Yes/No  
 
174 Select the Service Vaccination 
Spraying 
Dipping 
Castration 
Deworming 
Branding 
175 How Often did you use this service in last one year  
176 Did you hire people to help in offering this service? Yes/No  
177 Number of people hired  
178 Unit costs per labour per day  
179 Do you pay them per day Yes/No 
180 Hours of HH labour spent per day in the activity  
181 Are family member paid for the service Yes/No 
182 Do you need to add more information about another service Yes/No 
 
H  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
183 H1. Do you have a savings account with any formal or 
informal financial institution? 
Yes 
 
No (no financial institution 
around but interested) 
No (not interested) 
184 H2. Did you access credit for farming purposes in the last 
one year? 
Yes/No 
185 Form of credit Cash 
In Kind 
186 Type of provider: 1 = Bank 
2 = Cooperative 
3 = Trader / shop 
4 = Money lender 
5 = Friends and relatives 
6 = Merry-go-rounds 
187 Purpose of loan? 1=cropping activity 
2=Livestock activity 
3= Home consumption 
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4=Health expenditure 
5=School fees 
6=Marriage 
188 Amount (sh) (if kind estimate value)  
189 Interest rate in %  
190 Payment interval 1 = per Day 
2 =  per Week 
3 =  per Month 
4 =  per Year 
191 Have you had problems in repaying the loan Yes/No 
 
I-Institutions  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
192 Are you a member of any FB0 or farmer related to 
livestock? 
Yes/No 
193 Name of the  FBO  
194 Who facilitated the formation of this FBO or farmer group NAADS group 
NGOs 
Community members 
themselves 
195 Member since which year 2011 
2010 
2009 
2008 
2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
2001 
2000 
1999 
1998 
1997 
1996 
1995 
1994 
1993 
1992 
1991 
1990 
1989 
1988 
1987 
1986 
1985 
1984 
1983 
1982 
1981 
1980 
196 Do you have any function in this FBO? Yes/No 
197 If yes: which function or position  
198 How many members are there in this group?  
199 What are the major activities of this FBO? 1=credit supply 
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2=joint purchase of inputs 
3=joint selling of outputs 
4=joint agro-processing 
5=FBO receives agricultural 
extension 
6=Joint cultivation 
200 During the last one year how often do have meetings Once a week 
Twice a month 
Once a month 
4 times a year 
3 times a year 
once a year 
201 During the past one year how many times have you 
attended FBO meeting? 
 
202 Were there meetings during the last year that you did not 
attend? 
Yes/No 
203 In case you do not attend all FBO meetings, what are major 
reasons for not attending 
1=had other work to do 
2=topic not of interest 
3= Family problem 
4=Transport challenges 
5=I did not like my leaders 
204 In last meeting how long did it take? (Hours)  
205 Did you lose opportunity to earn income because you went 
for this meeting 
Yes/No 
206 how much  
207 How much did you spend to sustain yourself in the meeting  
208 Did you a receive an allowance from the association or 
FBO meeting 
Yes/No 
209 How much  
210 Do you have to pay a membership fee to be a member? Yes/No 
211 How much per year  
212 Did you have to pay a fee/contribution when the FBO was 
established? 
Yes/No 
213 how much?  
214 Does your FBO have a constitution of by laws? 1.  Yes 
2.  No 
3. Don’t know 
215 Were you involved in the development of the 
constitution/bylaws? 
Yes/No 
216 To your knowledge, were your FBO leaders or leaders of 
other association involved in any meetings that local 
government (LG) organized to plan livestock related 
activities in this District/area? 
Yes/No 
217 Was there a discussion among the FBO members on what 
LG should do? 
Yes/No 
218 How much influence do you think your FBO has on LG’s 
priorities? 
1 = high 
2 = some 
3 = little 
4 =no influence 
219 To your knowledge, were your FBO leaders involved in 
any meetings that the District council organized to plan 
their activities in this District/area? 
Yes/No 
220 Was there a discussion among the FBO members on what 
the District council should do? 
Yes/No 
221 How much influence do you think your FBO has on the 
District Council’s priorities? 
1 = high 
2 = some 
3 = little 
4 = no influence 
222 How much influence do you think your FBO has on the 1 = high 
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NAAD’s priorities in the sub county? 2 = some 
3 = little 
4 = no influence 
223 List your three most important benefits for being a member 
of the FBO? 
 
 
J-Records  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
224 Do you keep farm records? Yes/No 
225 Why not  
226 Which type of farm records do keep? 1=Crop farm records 
2=Livestock farm records 
3=Marketing farm records 
227 Have you ever received training on farm record keeping? Yes/No 
228 Which organization offered the trainings? 1=NGO 
2=Government extension 
3= CAHW 
229 Does your farm records follow particular format or 
structure 
Yes/No 
230 In your view what are the 5 main constraints to livestock 
production? 
1. Availability of drugs 
2. Availability of transport 
3. Market services 
4.Lack of credit 
5.High cost of livestock 
service delivery 
6.Information service 
7.Long distance to travel to 
service provider 
8.Lack qualified livestock 
workers 
9. Insecurity 
10. water 
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Appendix B: Service Provider Questionnaire 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
1 Introduction: This is a PhD study for John Ilukor on Institutional Arrangements Livestock 
Service Delivery. This is a survey questionnaire module administered to livestock service 
providers. Information that your are going to provide will be used for academic purpose only. 
 Please can you tell us your name. 
2 Start time  
3 A1. Interviewer: Miriam Kyambade 
Kabogo C 
Brenda Nayonga 
Georgin Amongin 
Ronnet Atukunda 
John Ilukor 
Namaganda C 
Awori Eris 
4 Date:  __ __ / __ __ / 2011  
5 A2. Supervisor: John Ilukor 
Regina Birner 
6 A3. District Name: Amudat 
Masaka 
Nakapiripirit 
Pokot-Kenya 
Kabras 
Kakamega 
Mukono 
7 A4. Sub county Name: Karita 
Loroo 
Amudat 
Moruita 
 
 
 
Mukono 
Kabras 
Kapenguria 
Kyampisi 
NBabaale 
Nakisuga 
Mpaata 
Ntunda 
Ntengeru 
Seeta Namuganga 
Nagonje 
Mukono Municipality 
Nama 
Ngoma 
8 A5. What is your work  operational area Subcounty 
Parish 
Villages 
District 
9 A6. Number of Operational area :  
10 A7. Were you ever transferred from another 
operational area within the district? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
11 A8. If yes, which one? Karita 
Loroo 
Amudat 
Moruita 
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Namulu 
Loregai 
Kamongole 
Lolochat 
Nabilatuk 
NAKAPS tc 
Kyampisi 
Ntejeru 
Nabaale 
Mpaata 
seeta namuganga 
Nagooje 
mukono municipality 
Nama 
12 A9. What is your position? 1=Veterinary Officer 
2=Senior Veterinary Officer 
3= Principal Veterinary officer 
4= Community Animal Health Worker 
4= Private Veterinarian 
5= Ethno veterinarian(Traditional Vet) 
6=Animal Husbandry Officer 
7=Hides Improvement Officer 
8=NGO Veterinary Officer 
Paravet 
13 Do you have a phone Yes/No 
14 Telephone number  
 
B: Background  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
15 B2. Sex of the respondent 1=Male 
2=Female 
16 B3. Age of the respondent in years  
17 B4. What is your highest level of education? 1=None 
2=Primary 
3=High School 
4=Certificate 
5=Diploma 
6=Degree 
7=Masters 
8 = PhD 
10=Don't know 
18 B7. What is your family home town?  
19 B9. What is the name of the community 
where you stay? 
 
20 B10. Are you the first generation of your 
family to reside here? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
21 B11. For how many years have you lived 
here? 
 
22 B12. For how many years has your family 
lived here? 
 
23 B13. Do you have livestock? 1=Yes 
2=No 
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B14 - Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
24 B14. Indicate livestock in your farm (Provide 
information for the last one year) 
 
 Livestock Kept in the farm (1 = Grade Cows, 
2 = Grade bulls,3 = Grade calves, 4 = Cross 
cows,5 = Cross bulls, 6 = Local cows, 7 = 
Local  bulls, 8 = Local calves,9 = Dairy 
goats, 10 = local goats,11 = Sheep,12 = pigs 
 ) 
 
 Breeds (1 = Holstein Friesian,2 = Ayrshire,3 
= Guernsey, 4 = Jersey,5 = Sahiwaal, 6 = 
Zebu, 7 = Boran,8 = Ankole, 9 = 
Torgenberg, 10 = Angora goat, 11 = local 
goat,12= local sheep ) 
 
 Number currently owned  
 Number purchased during the year  
 Number born during the year  
 Number sold during the year  
 Number died during the year  
 Number stolen during the year  
 Average value per head  
25 Do you want to Add another type of 
livestock in the farm? 
Yes 
No 
 
C. Field Activities  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
26 C1. How many sub-operational areas do you 
cover? 
 
27 C2. How many livestock keeping households 
are there in these entire communities in 
total? 
 
28 C3. How many livestock keeping households 
do you work with? 
 
29 C4. Do you work with any households 
headed by a woman? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
30 C5. If yes, how many households?  
31 C6.What are your major three types of 
animals kept in your operational area? 
Catlle 
Goats 
Sheep 
Pigs 
Chicken 
32 What is the largest herd size of the livestock 
keepers that you work with? 
 
 Cattle  
 Goats  
 Sheep  
 Pigs  
 Chicken  
33 C8. What is the average herd size of the 
livestock keepers that you work with? 
 
 Cattle  
 Goats  
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 Sheep  
 Pigs  
 Chicken  
34 C9. What is the smallest Herd size of the 
livestock keepers that you work with? 
 
 Cattle  
 Goats  
 Sheep  
 Pigs  
 Chicken  
35 C10. What percent of the livestock keepers 
that you work with in each livestock 
category produce mainly for home 
consumption? 
 
 Cattle  
 Goats  
 Sheep  
 Pigs  
 Chicken  
36 C11. What are some of the most important 
ways you come into contact with the 
livestock keepers that you work with 
1 = I meet them as an FBO 
2 = They call me 
3 = I visit them in their homes 
4 = They visit me at my house 
5 = Trainings and demonstrations 
 
6 = They visit me at the LG office 
37 While in villages treating animals; do you at 
times provide treatment for humans as well 
Yes/No 
38 If yes what are the main activities do you 
offer to sick people 
Injecting 
Prescribing drugs 
Minor Operations 
Sell drugs to them 
First aid 
 
C12-loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
39 C12. Please describe some of the livestock 
related topics/technologies that you recently 
promoted or demonstrated to farmers in the 
last one year. 
 
 Type of technology(1=disease identification 
and control, 2=Animal Vaccination, 
3=Deworming, 4=Parasite control, 
5=Livestock housing and construction 
techniques,6=Castration, 7= Artificial 
Insemination, 8=Prevention of Zoonotic 
diseases,9=Feed Preparation) 
 
 Was this topic requested by someone? 1= 
Yes, 2=No 
 
 Did you use physical demonstration 
materials?1=Yes, 2=No 
 
 If yes, how did you acquire these?1=from 
office, 2= personal resources,3= farmers 
provided, 4=NA 
 
 Do they pay for the service? 1=Yes, 2=No  
 If no who meets the costs?1=NGO, 2=  
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Government, 3=a farmer 4 = NA 
 What % of livestock keepers use the 
technology? 
 
40 Do you want to add  more information about 
the technology 
Yes/No 
 
C13-loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
41 C13. Which of the following livestock 
service activities were you involved in the 
past one year? 
 
 Activity(1=Vaccination, 2=Spraying, 3= 
dipping,4=Deworming, 5=Artificial 
Insemination, 6=Quarantine) 
 
 Did you participate in the this 
activity?1=yes, 2=No 
 
 Was it a free  service?1=yes,2=No  
 If no, How much did you charge per animal? 
if yes 99 
 
 Were CAHWs involved in provision of these 
services? 1=yes, 2=No 
 
 If yes did you have to pay them? 
1=yes,2=No, 3=NA 
 
 How much did you pay the CAHWs 
(Paravets) for the exercise? if no=99 
 
 How many animals were involved in the 
exercise? 
 
 If you did not perform these services, what 
would be the loss to livestock keepers per 
animal? 
 
 What was the cost of veterinary medicine, 
per animal in these exercises? 
 
 How much did you spend on transport?  
42 Add more information Yes/No 
 
C14-Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
43 C14. What are some of the most prevalent livestock diseases 
in your area of jurisdiction (Please indicate the diseases that 
have occurred in the area in last one year) 
 
 Five most common livestock diseases in your area of 
operation(1=Anthrax, 2=East coast fever,  
3=Anaplasmosis,4=F&M,5=Trips ,6=RV, 
7=Brucelloisis,8=PPR,9=Mastitis,10=Babiosis,12=Helmint
hs Infestation, 13=CBPP, 14=CCPP , 15=lumpskin 
 
 Is the disease treatable?1=Yes, 2=No  
 Were you called upon to treat the livestock? 1=Yes, 2=No  
 Which livestock get mostly affected? 1=Cattle, 
2=Goats,3=sheep,4 = Pig 
 
 How many livestock died due to the disease  
 Value of the animals that died of the disease  
 For animals that survived, estimate the value of loss due to  
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the disease? 
44 Do you want to add  more information about another disease Yes/No 
 
D1- Loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
45 D1.  In the last one year, how often did you 
hold consultations with the following types 
of people? (prompt for all) 
 
 Professional persons you meet; 
1=Traditional Animal Health Practitioner, 
2=Community Animal Health Workers, 3= 
Veterinary Staff, 4=Livestock stock 
Researcher 
 
 Frequency (1=Never, 2= A few times a year, 
3=About once a month, 4=Several times a 
month 
 
 Reasons (1=Sharing Knowledge, 
2=Supervision, 3=Casual) 
 
 Are there service providers to whom you 
refer or consult with (1= yes, 2 = NO) 
 
 If yes who do you refer farmers to (1= vete 
office, 2=Animal health officer, 
3=Colleague, 4=NA 
 
 Paravet  
46 Add more information Yes 
No 
 
E1-loop Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
47 E1. Please tell us about your occupational 
history, beginning with your current position 
and working backwards in time. 
 
 Position Title and Grade (1=Animal 
Husbandry Office, 2= Veterinary Assistant, 
3=Veterinary Officer, 4=Senior Vet Officer, 
5=Principal Vet Officer, 6=District 
Production Officer) 
 
 Office / Location(1=District HQ, 2=Sub 
county 
 
 From when?  
 To when?  
 Annually assessed? 1=Yes, 2=No  
48 Add more information Yes/No 
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Formal education Iteration 1 
 
Question ID Question Answer 
49 E2. Information on professional training 
either before or since you started work? 
 
 Name of training or certificate  
 Training organization  
 Year  
 Duration  
 Did the training include a gender component 
(yes, No, gender specific) 
 
 How do you describe the training (Very 
Useful, Somewhat useful, Not very useful, not 
all useful) 
 
50 Add more information Yes/No 
 
Transport  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
51 E4. Do you have access to a motorbike or 
vehicle for work? 
Yes/No 
52 E5. If yes, is it: Individual 
Shared 
53 E6. If individual, was your motorbike or 
vehicle: 
1=Purchased from local government 
2=Purchased on own 
3=Given free from local government 
4=Given free from other project 
5=Provided by an NGO 
54 E7. When did you acquire it? 
_________________( 
 
55 E8. On average, how much do you spend per 
month on mobility for your job? (Amount in 
local currency) 
 
56 E9. On average, how much do you receive in 
transport and travel allowances per month? 
(Amounts in local currency) please type 999 
if service provider is self-employed or 
privately employed 
 
57 Are you aware of the existence of any kind of 
award in your district in recognition of 
services delivery to farmers 
Yes/No 
58 Name of the award  
59 Does it have monetary value Yes/No 
60 Monetary value of the a ward  
61 E10. Have you ever received an award for 
good performance, such as Farmers Day Best 
Extension Agent? 
Yes/No 
62 E11. If yes, please specify name of award:  
63 When you were recruited did receive 
orientation 
Yes 
No 
Not Applicable 
64 Were you given instructions or guidelines on 
professional actions 
Yes 
No 
Not Applicable 
65 Are always subject to performance appraisals 
say at the end of year 
Yes 
No 
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Not applicable 
66 How do perceive this appraisal Useful in guiding professional conduct 
Just for formality 
Always conduct in free and fair manner 
The appraisal is always biased 
67 E12. In the past one year, have any of the 
livestock service providers been subjected to 
sanctions for unprofessional conduct? 
Yes/No 
68 E13: If yes, how often did this happen? 
Approximately. ________times 
 
69 E14. What were the causes of this disciplinary 
action? 
1=Failure to submit report on time 
2=Poor work performance 
3=frequent complaints from farmers 
4=Conflict with supervisor 
5=Soliciting or accepting bribe 
6=Other 
(specify):_____________________________
________ 
7= Abusing farmers 
70 E15. What was the sanction? =Withholding of transport allowance 
2=Salary decrease for a specified length of 
time (suspension) 
3=Warning 
4=Demotion 
5=Public censure and reprimand 
6=Other 
(specify):_____________________________
________ 
71 E16. a) Are you a member of any professional 
body such as a veterinary association or any 
form of professional association? 
Yes/No 
72 b) If yes: which one:  
73 Member since  
74 E17. a)  Are you aware of any other 
professional body of livestock service 
providers? 
Yes/No 
75 b)   Name  
76 c) Are you aware of anybody who has been 
disciplined by the professional body that you 
have named above? 
Yes/No 
77 If No or yes why  
 
F. Perceptions of Work Environment  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
78 F1. In your own view, what are the three 
biggest problems facing the livestock keepers 
that you work with? (ask and do not prompt 
for the answers) 
1=Access to credit 
2= Access to water 
3=Weather failure 
4=Pests and diseases 
5=Diseases 
6=Marketing of farm produce 
7=Other (specify): 
______________________________________ 
8= insecurity 
9=Staff or veterinarians 
79 F2. Have you ever had an experience working 
with Community Animal Health workers or 
Yes/No  
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Paraprofessionals? 
80 How many community animal health workers 
are in your operational area 
 
81 F3. According to you, what are the three main 
contributions of CAHWS or 
paraprofessionals? 
 
82 F4. What are the three main weaknesses of the 
CAHWS or paraprofessionals? 
 
83 What are the main challenges faced by 
CAHWs in their service delivery 
 
84 F5. According to you, do you think there is 
need to integrate CAHWS into Government 
livestock service delivery systems? 
Yes/No 
85 As CAHWS, do you think your activities 
should regulated and you should be 
recognized by government 
Yes/No 
86 Explain  
87 F6. What needs to be done in order to ensure 
this? 
 
88 F6. Why not?  
89 Do you believe that paraprofessionals and 
Community Animal health workers are a 
replacement for retrenched certificate holders 
for government staff 
Yes/No 
90 Explain your answer  
91 Have you had experience working with 
former frontline workers that were retrenched 
by government 
Yes/No 
92 Can CAHWs be compared with the former 
frontline certificate holders animal health 
assistant that were retrenched by government 
They have same experience and training 
CAHWs are ill-trained 
They serve the same purpose 
CAHWS are more trained and equipped than 
the frontline Office 
CAHWS are more effective than frontline 
Officers 
CAHWS are less effective than Frontline 
Officers 
They are have same qualifications 
No difference in their effectiveness 
 
G. Beliefs of Work Environment  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
93 G1.Veternary association is very competent in 
supervising activities of veterinary 
professionals or practitioners? 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
94 G2. Livestock service providers respect the 
decisions of veterinary association 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
95 G3. Working with the private sector is not all 
that beneficial to small scale livestock keepers 
as the private sector is only interested in 
making profits. 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
96 G4. Without subsidies on veterinary drugs, 
livestock keepers will not keep improved 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
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breeds Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
97 G5.I feel that your work is recognized by 
livestock keepers and co-workers 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
98 I always work in isolation (alone) Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
99 G6. Your salary and/or other benefits received 
allows you to maintain a decent standard of 
living 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
100 G7. There is a tendency of livestock service 
providers to over prescribe drugs 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
101 G8. Livestock service providers always 
charge a fee  for free services to meet 
transport costs 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
102 Livestock service providers often offer 
services on credit 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
103 G9. Livestock keepers always pay their bill if 
the service is offered on credit 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
104 In case a farmer does not pay at all, you can 
always seek court action (local and policy) 
and you would get paid 
Strong agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
105 G10. Regular visits to the livestock keeper 
motivates livestock keepers to pay 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
106 G11. You have all the resources available to 
carry out your  work satisfactorily 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
107 G13. Corruption or misuse of funds is a 
problem in the district 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
108 Misuse of funds is not a serious problem in 
livestock sector 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
109 There is no money to steal in livestock sector Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
110 Livestock sector is always marginalized in 
terms of resource allocation in local 
government 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
111 G14. There is no political interference in your 
work. 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
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Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
112 G15. Most of your colleagues are well-
qualified to do their job. 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
113 G16.  Livestock keepers never complain about 
the performance of livestock service providers 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
114 G17.  Complaints from livestock keepers are 
taken very seriously by the service providers 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
115 G18. Your activities are always supervised 
appropriately 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
116 Quality of supervision is always  appropriate Stongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
117 Supervises have sufficient incentives to 
supervise 
Stongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
118 G19. Your workload is adequate. Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
119 G20. The farm distances from where you stay 
are manageable. 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
120 G21. Livestock production is disadvantaged 
compared to crop production 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
121 Explain your answer  
122 G22. Supply of inputs for your work comes 
regularly and timely 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
123 G23. Mobility to your operational area is easy. Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
124 G24. Your salary motivates you to work better Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
125 G25. You are satisfied with your job Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
126 People in your organization work for required 
hours and sometime over time 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
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H. Decentralization and liberalization:  
 
Question ID Question Answer 
127 H1: Have you worked for government 
before the current LG District Offices 
(headed by LC5 or decentralization) were 
created or do you have knowledge about 
how it used to function? 
Yes/No 
128 H2: What has become different in livestock 
service delivery due to this reform? 
 
129 H3: How has it improved delivery of 
livestock services? 
 
130 H4. Have you heard about plans to have 
NAADS staff to replace Local Government 
Service staff? 
 
131 How might these affect livestock service 
delivery? 
 
132 H6. What should be done to correct or 
promote resulting impacts of these policy 
 
133 What is your salary scale or salary (99)  
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Appendix C: Animal Health Medical Card 
 
Cooperative and Integrative Game-Animal Health Card 
 
      
 
Date:…../…../…….. Amount a farmer receives:…......……......….Balance:…......….........…....... 
No. of Animals:…………................................................................................................................... 
Disease: English Name…………… Local Name:..…..……………………District Code:…..……. 
Farmer ID:………………………………Education level: (1) Primary, (2) secondary (3) tertiary 
Sex: Male or female…………..Phase No:……………… Village:………………………………… 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CBAHWS/PARAVET/ Veterinarian 
ID:………………………………………………............................................................…... 
Telephone:……………………………………………………………………..…………..... 
Cardinal Signs and Disease Diagnosis: 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
 
Drug Prescription and management 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
 
Consultation & Professional Fee:………………………………………………………….. 
Drug cost:………………………………………….………………………………………... 
Transport fee:………………………………………………………………………………. 
Outcome:………………………………………………………………..………………....... 
Referral Case:  Direct refer 1 yes, 2 No…… 
Reason for referral: 1 Response poor, 2 Busy, 3 Others…….......................……………. 
Veterinarians ID:………………………………………………………………………….... 
Telephone:…………………………………………………………………….…………….. 
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Cardinal and Disease Diagnosis: 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
 
Drug Prescription and management: 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................. 
 
Professional fee:………………………………………………....………………………….. 
Drug costs:…………………………………………...…………..………………………….. 
Fee to Paravet:…………………………………………………………….………………... 
Transport fee:………………………………………………………………………………. 
Outcome:…………………………………………………………………………......…....... 
 
 
 
 
--END-- 
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